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**(U) "ZENDEBAD, SHAH!":
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE FALL OF IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER
MOHAMMED MOSSADEQ, AUGUST 1953**

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(U) Source and Classification Note

(S) This study is based largely on classified records of the Central Intelligence Agency. Secondary sources proved invaluable in setting the historical context for TPAJAX, but the details of the operation itself come from classified sources. These sources are listed in the footnotes and bibliography.

(U) I have also examined relevant records from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency. These records were not as plentiful or as helpful as I had hoped. I was nonetheless able to fill in some gaps with documents from these organizations. The vast majority of surviving documents on the operation itself remain with CIA, but for the reasons provided below even these are not as numerous as one might expect.

(S) Most of the operational files on TPAJAX, held in the Near East Division in the Directorate of Operations, were destroyed during a routine office cleaning in 1962. According to various sources, the Division needed more file space, and management told branch members to clean out their files. Much operational material was destroyed under the mistaken idea that because the operation was over, the documentary record was of no further use.

Witnesses have confirmed this unfortunate event.

(U) Copies of cables sent between Tehran Station and Washington during the operation also were among the files the Division destroyed in its attempt to gain more filing space. At the time, the copies were already nine years old and no one thought that they were important. A record copy may have remained in the Agency's former Cable Secretariat for some time, but such records too have long since disappeared in routine house cleanings. An extensive search of CIA's archives has failed to uncover any surviving copies.

(U) Some *transcripts* of Station cables nonetheless survive because CIA had some of the cables microfilmed. I have been unable to determine when. In the late 1970s or

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early 1980s, CIA's History Staff prepared transcripts of these documents and sent them to the Department of State's Office of the Historian, then researching a volume of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. There is every reason to believe that these transcripts, produced under the supervision of a professional historian, are authentic. The matters in the transcripts correspond in sequence and subject with events as we know them.

(U) The microfilm itself apparently has been destroyed, in accordance with National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidelines. According to NARA, the microfilm had to be kept for 20 years and then could be destroyed. The record of destruction had to be kept for five years, at which point it too could be destroyed.

(S) CIA is not the only organization that has destroyed records relevant to TPAJAX. The State Department has destroyed three quarters of the records for the relevant time period belonging to the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (GTI) of State's Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. These materials were in GTI files, Lot 57, D 529. According to State's *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. X, *Iran, 1951-54*, the documents covered "political and military matters and US economic and military assistance to Iran for the years 1946-1954."

(S) The present study [redacted] It examines some of the issues currently occupying scholars: Why did the United States act against Mossadeq? [redacted]

[redacted] Would Mossadeq's government have fallen even if the United States had done nothing? I have also exploited records of government agencies other than CIA. [redacted] Finally, I have addressed the relationship between the operators in CIA's then-Directorate of Plans (now the Directorate of Operations) and the analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence, a missing dimension in all published histories.

(U) Some readers may think that this study is over-classified, but many of the crucial documents are still top secret after almost 50 years. Since this handful of documents contains information critical to the story, I have decided to use the material they contain even if it means restricting the potential readership.

Scott A. Koch
1 June 1998

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Chapter 1

(S) The Roots of TPAJAX

(U) Iran and the United States to 1951

(U) During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, Washington considered the Middle East in general and Iran in particular to be among the great strategic prizes in the geopolitical and ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. It was not always so. For almost 175 years, American policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do otherwise.

(U) That changed during World War II and the immediate postwar years. During the war, Iran was an important route for American aid to the Soviet Army, engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Hitler's *Wehrmacht*.¹ Soviet troops remained in northern Iran immediately after the war, encouraging pro-Communist separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish region. For a time it appeared to Washington that Moscow would demand the "unification" of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan, but this problem evaporated once Stalin understood that the United States would not permit such an aggressive move.²

(U) The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf after the end of World War II, but the postwar British retreat and retrenchment "East of Suez" created a vacuum that the US felt obligated to fill. After London announced that it could no longer supply military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, President Harry Truman publicly declared in March 1947 that the United States would support free peoples everywhere, "resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside

¹(U) Eventually, almost a quarter of American aid for the Soviet Union came through Iran. Convoys using more northern routes lost about 20% of their cargoes to the Nazis; only 8% of cargoes sent to the Persian Gulf for shipment through Iran were lost. See, Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 284, 404.

²(U) See, Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977); Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73*, 2d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974); and John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) for a discussion of the Azeri crisis in early 1946.

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pressures.”³ For Iran, the Truman Doctrine—as this pledge came to be known—meant that the United States was replacing Britain as the main geopolitical counterweight to the Russians.

(U) For the first three years after President Truman’s declaration, the United States paid relatively little attention to Iran even though that oil-rich country was experiencing serious economic problems, widespread discontent with the government, and growing agitation by the Tudeh—Iran’s Communist Party.

(S) In April 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence, RAdm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, drew Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s attention to “the urgent need for additional intelligence coverage of Iran.” Hillenkoetter wrote that CIA was unable to draft reliable national intelligence estimates on the country because it simply did not have enough information. All the Agency could do, according to the DCI, was “tell US policy makers that some sort of crisis does exist, but [CIA] cannot confidently answer such specific pertinent questions as : (1) how serious the situation actually is; (2) how adequate are Iran’s own resources for meeting its present difficulties; and (3) how capable the Iranian Government is of using these resources.”⁴

(S) Hillenkoetter proposed two solutions. Either existing facilities could be expanded to seek information from more diverse sources or “coverage might be expanded through the establishment of a consulate in the strategically important southwestern part of Iran.”⁵

(S) The records do not contain Acheson’s reaction to Hillenkoetter’s letter, but the still-classified copy in the National Archives has three handwritten notes attached to it. The first is from Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, forwarding the letter to John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. The second is from Jernegan to C. Vaughan Ferguson, Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. The final is from Ferguson to Jernegan.⁶

(S) Howe thought Hillenkoetter’s letter was largely for the record, “to show that CIA is fulfilling its overall responsibility for calling attention to weaknesses in intelligence coverage.” Jernegan had his own unspecified recommendations and doubted whether State should adopt CIA’s [redacted]

[redacted] The State Department clearly did not view the paucity of intelligence on Iran with the same urgency as CIA.

(U) Even without the most basic intelligence on Iran, two elements drove American foreign policy in the post-war Persian Gulf region: oil and the fear that political instability might jeopardize Western access to oil. Ever since Shah Muzaffar al-Din

³(U) *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Harry S. Truman (Washington, DC, 1947), p. 179.

⁴ (S) Letter from Director of Central Intelligence RAdm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 11 April 1950, Records of the State Department, RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, NND959286, “Iran 1946-54,” box 4, National Archives and Records Administration.

⁵ (S) Ibid.

⁶ (S) Ibid.

⁷ (S) Ibid.

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granted William Knox D'Arcy an oil concession covering three-fourths of Persia (as Iran was known until 1935), Iranian oil had helped fuel the British economy in peace and war.⁸ The United States was then producing enough oil for its needs, but it knew that Western Europe depended on oil exports from the Middle East. In January 1951, nine months after Hillenkoetter's letter to Acheson, the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates (ONE) wrote that the British economy would suffer if it lost Iranian oil. The loss of *all* Middle Eastern oil, ONE said, would have profound and far-reaching consequences for the economies of the Western bloc.⁹

(U) Political instability in the Middle East and the Gulf region threatened the continuing supply of oil to the West. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Before the Cold War, the domestic politics of what later came to be called the Third World had made no impact on American foreign policy decisionmaking. During the Cold War, Washington could not afford the luxury of indifference because doing so would spur Soviet intrigue. Domestic politics almost anywhere abroad—and especially in strategically valuable areas—became important arenas for the international ideological struggle between East and West. Washington was determined to win this struggle through policies promoting long-term democratization. The result, American officials hoped, would be stability—and victory.

(U) Twisting the British Lion's Tail: Mohammed Mossadeq Nationalizes the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

(U) An Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister General Ali Razmara on 7 March 1951.¹¹ Razmara's death set in motion a series of events that were to bring American and British officials face to face with Mohammed Mossadeq, one of the most mercurial, maddening, adroit, and provocative leaders with whom they had ever dealt.¹²

⁸(U) One of the reasons the British Government eventually took over D'Arcy's concession when he ran into financial difficulties was to ensure a secure supply of oil for the Royal Navy. See, Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 137, 140-42, 151.

⁹(U) NIE-14, 8 January 1951, *The Importance of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacetime Conditions*, pp. 1-2. CIA estimated that if all Middle Eastern oil were lost, the non-Soviet world would have to impose an immediate and mandatory 10% cutback in consumption. In that event, the United States would have to implement rationing even though domestic production in those days met its own needs.

¹¹(U) A member of the Fadaye Islam underground organization assassinated Razmara.

¹²(U) See Appendix D for a biographical sketch of Mohammed Mossadeq.

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(S) Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi—who had become Shah when his father, Reza Shah, abdicated in 1941—appointed Mossadeq as Prime Minister on 29 April 1951. Shah's initial choice to succeed Razmara, Hussein Ala, had resigned after only a few weeks. Severe economic and political problems awaited the Mossadeq, and it was not obvious that he had the skill to solve them. In a Special Estimate prepared one month after he took office, CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) characterized Mossadeq as an "impractical visionary and a poor administrator," but in a strong political position that was unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future.¹³

(U) Mossadeq's immediate concern was a struggle for control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). By 1950 the British oil concession in Iran, which the Shah had renewed in 1949, was a sore point in relations between the two countries. In March 1951, when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament), he submitted a bill, which the Majlis quickly passed, nationalizing AIOC. He signed the bill into law on 1 May 1951, just three days after the Shah appointed him Prime Minister. Nationalization went into effect on 2 May 1951 and was made retroactive to 20 March 1951.

(U) AIOC's nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate conflict with Britain. The British government owned half of AIOC's stock and did not intend to let Mossadeq nationalize its assets without adequate compensation as required under international law.¹⁴

(U) Britain Responds to "The Antics of Incomprehensible Orientals"

(U) The two countries tried to resolve the dispute, but differing negotiating styles and the personalities involved hindered these efforts. Many Britons found Mossadeq's seemingly impossible demands and unpredictably shifting arguments inexplicable. L.P. Elwell-Sutton captured the mood of British policymakers at the time when he wrote, "Really, it seemed hardly fair that dignified and correct western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals."¹⁵

(U) Mossadeq found the British evil, not incomprehensible. He and millions of Iranians believed that for centuries Britain had manipulated their country for British ends. Many Iranians seemed convinced that British intrigue was at the root of every domestic misfortune. In 1951 Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W. Averell Harriman, "You do not know how crafty they [the British] are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch." Harriman protested that surely the British

¹³(S) SE-6, *Current Developments in Iran*, 22 May 1951.

¹⁴(S) In March 1951 the CIA estimated that 6 to 8 percent of Iran's national income came from AIOC and that the AIOC contributed nearly one quarter of the Iranian Treasury's receipts. Office of National Estimates, "NIE-6: Iran's Position in the East-West Conflict," [Draft] 21 March 1951

¹⁵(U) L.P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955), p. 258.

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were like people everywhere; some bad, some good. Mossadeq was not persuaded. "You do not know them," he insisted. "You do not know them."¹⁶

(U) When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of compensating London for AIOC's assets, the British mounted a multi-pronged effort to reassert control over the company. They hoped legal and economic pressure would convince Mossadeq to settle on British terms. If not, they were prepared to force him from office and replace him with someone open to compromise on terms favorable to the AIOC.

(U) London first asked the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute. Mossadeq rejected two British proposals because neither of them addressed the issue of Iran's sovereignty over its own oil. The British thereafter refused to deal directly with Mossadeq. They used economic weapons and then tried ostentatious military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf to try to weaken Mossadeq's negotiating position.

(U) In September 1951, Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel, sugar, iron, and oil-processing equipment shipments to Iran—that is, on almost anything that the Iranians could exchange for dollars. The AIOC laid off 20,000 oil workers at the port at Abadan and Mossadeq had to put them on the government payroll. Gradually, the flow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world stopped.

(U) A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus and a Royal Navy cruiser and four destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan. The display of British force did not intimidate Mossadeq; he announced that the first shot would start a world war.

(U) Britain also considered covert action options while it maneuvered diplomatically and militarily. According to C.M. Woodhouse, MI6's Chief of Station in Tehran, the idea of overthrowing Mossadeq came from the Foreign Office, not British intelligence. Woodhouse himself thought that any move against Mossadeq had to have American support and participation. London had neither until the inauguration of President Dwight Eisenhower in January 1953.¹⁷

¹⁶(U) Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 247-48.

¹⁷ (U) C.M. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured* (London: Granada, 1982), pp. 110-111.

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(U) Mossadeq Challenges the Shah

(U) At the same time that he was quarreling with the British, Mossadeq also was struggling against the Shah. He insisted that the Shah should reign and not rule. To that end, he worked to enhance the power of the Majlis at the Shah's expense. The flash point came in July 1952, when Mossadeq resigned during a dispute over whether the Shah or the Prime Minister should appoint the war minister.

(U) During the elections for the 17th Majlis earlier in the year, vote-tampering by the Iranian Royal Court had convinced Mossadeq that the government's survival depended on control of the military. On 16 July he demanded the right to appoint himself minister of war. The Shah refused and Mossadeq resigned.¹⁹ Mossadeq appealed directly to the public and accused the Shah of violating the Constitution.

(U) Mossadeq's resignation initially appeared to be a shrewd political move that underscored his mastery of Iranian politics and his ability to gauge and exploit public opinion. The Shah appointed Ahmad Qavam, Prime Minister during the Azeri crisis with the Soviet Union in 1947, to succeed Mossadeq. In response, the National Front, a broad coalition formed in 1949, organized mass demonstrations in Tehran demanding Mossadeq's return. The demonstrations turned violent—69 people died and more than 750 were injured—but the Shah refused to use the police or the military to restore order. Qavam lacked broad support and was unable to organize counter-demonstrations. For five days the National Front controlled the streets of Tehran and other cities. On 21 July 1952 the Shah bowed to the pressure and replaced Qavam with Mossadeq.²⁰

(U) Once back in power, Mossadeq struck back at the Shah and the military. He transferred Reza Shah's lands back to the State, appointed himself Minister of War, forced the Shah's twin sister Princess Ashraf to leave the country, and forbade Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from communicating directly with foreign diplomats. By May

¹⁹(U) M. Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 186. Mossadeq wrote

I cannot continue in office without having the responsibility for the Ministry of War, and since Your Majesty did not concede to this, I feel I do not enjoy the full confidence of the Sovereign and, therefore, offer my resignation to pave the way for another government which might be able to carry out Your Majesty's wishes.

(U) Sepehr Zabih, *The Mossadeq Era* (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), p. 40.

²⁰(U) Ibid., p. 265. The National Front was a loose coalition of political parties professing liberal democratic aims and opposing foreign intervention in Iranian affairs. The National Front included the leftist, anti-Soviet intellectuals of the Iran Party; the workers and leftist intellectuals of the Toilers' Party; and the workers, bazaar merchants, and Islamic clergy of the Mujahedeen-i-Islam (Warriors of Islam) Party. Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani, later instrumental in the coup against Mossadeq, was one of the leaders of the Warriors of Islam. The ultranationalist Pan-Iranist Party, affiliated with the National Front but not a member, included many lower class toughs. The Tudeh (Iranian Communist Party) was not a member of the National Front but included itself among the parties opposing the government. Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'etat in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (Aug. 1987): 262.

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1953, according to Iranian specialist Ervand Abrahamian, "the shah had been stripped of all the powers he had fought for and recovered since August 1941."²¹

(U) The Prime Minister also seized the opportunity to purge the Iranian officer corps. He forcibly retired many Royalist officers, and cut the military budget 15%. To add to the insult, Mossadeq transferred 15,000 men from the military to the Gendarmerie, the military's bureaucratic rival. These acts fueled smoldering resentment among the dismissed officers and those few royalists escaping Mossadeq's purge.²²

(U) Mossadeq used his popularity and ability to control the streets of Tehran to good advantage. When the British appeared intransigent during the oil negotiations, he simply severed diplomatic relations in October 1952. All British personnel left the country in an overland exodus at the beginning of November 1952.²³

(U) Mossadeq's apparent political triumph rapidly turned sour. The National Front began to unravel in late 1952 and early 1953 as the Prime Minister grew increasingly dictatorial. By November 1952, Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani, a key Islamic cleric in the National Front, had turned against Mossadeq and quit the Front, as had Mozaffar Baqai's Toilers' Party. Kashani's defection was a particularly hard blow because his group, the Warriors of Islam, included the bazaar merchants of Tehran and many mullahs (Islamic clerics). Support from these two groups historically has been critical to Iranian governments.²⁴

(U) The reasons for the defections were complex. Although 30 of the 79 deputies of the 17th Majlis, convened in February 1952, belonged to or identified with the National Front, they represented different constituencies and interests were united only in their opposition to the British. In addition, nationalization of the AIOC did not produce the bonanza for Iran that Mossadeq had hoped it would. He began to demand more and more power from the Majlis, and when the legislature granted the Prime Minister what amounted to dictatorial powers, Ayatollah Kashani resigned as Majlis speaker. Toilers' Party leader Mozaffar Baqai compared Mossadeq to Hitler and praised the army as a bulwark against Communism.²⁵

(U) Some groups in the National Front continued to back Mossadeq. The Iran Party still supported him, as did the Third Force, a splinter group expelled from the Toilers' Party.²⁶ The Prime Minister also could still count on the backing of the Qashqai

²¹(U) Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 272-73.

²²(U) Ibid., p. 273.

²³ (U) Before leaving the country, C.M. Woodhouse ensured that all British contacts, like the Rashidian Brothers, would remain active. Roger Goiran helped him. Woodhouse, p. 116.

²⁴ (U) Manucher Farmanfarmaian in his memoirs describes the bazaar and the relationship of its merchants with the mullahs. "It [the bazaar] was a world unto itself, impregnable to the army, which could not easily enter its labyrinthine alleys. The leaders of the bazaar were weighty men, often tightly allied with the mollahs, and they could start riots or shut down the bazaar to instant political effect." Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanfarmaian, *Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince* (New York: Random House, 1997), p. 36.

²⁵(U) Abrahamian, pp. 269, 277; Gasiorowski, p. 269.

²⁶(U) Abrahamian, p. 277; Gasiorowski, p. 269.

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tribes and—more ominously—the Tudeh, Iran's Communist Party. As support for Mossadeq narrowed, the Tudeh would soon be the only group willing to take to the streets on his behalf

(U) Ayatollah Kashani's defection and increased squabbling among the deputies effectively paralyzed the Majlis. Opposition politicians—including former Mossadeq allies like Kashani—blocked the Prime Minister's legislation. In early June 1953, fistfights broke out in the Majlis. The Prime Minister won a temporary victory when Abdullah Moazemi, a Mossadeq supporter, succeeded Kashani as speaker in a close Majlis vote (41 to 31) on 1 July 1953. Mossadeq recognized, however, that the Majlis was hopelessly deadlocked and that dissolution and new elections were necessary to break the stalemate.²⁷

(U) Under the Iranian constitution only the Shah could dissolve the Majlis. The government could request him to do so. Mossadeq knew the Shah would not agree to such a proposal, so he devised a plan to achieve the same end. He asked all National Front members and supporters to resign, which they did, and simultaneously announced the dissolution of the Majlis. The Iranian people, he held, could ratify or reject his decision in a referendum on the theory that popular will superseded the constitution. Iranian scholar Ervand Abrahamian has noted the irony in Mossadeq's rationale. "Mossadeq, the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah," Abrahamian wrote, "was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will."²⁸

(U) From 3 to 10 August 1953, Iranians voted on Mossadeq's bold and unconstitutional act. The results of the rigged election were never in doubt. Mossadeq purposely excluded rural areas from the balloting, ostensibly because it would take too long to count the votes from remote areas. The ballot was not secret, and there were separate polling places for "yes" and "no." In the end, Mossadeq claimed victory, gaining "over 2,043,300 of the 2,044,600 ballots cast throughout the country and 101,396 of the 101,463 ballots cast in the capital."²⁹

(U) The dissolution of the Majlis and the tainted referendum alienated Iranian liberals and conservatives alike. Jamal Imami, a pro-British member of the Majlis, warned that Mossadeq was leading the country toward anarchy. Ayatollah Kashani declared the referendum illegal under Islamic religious law. At his trial in late 1953, Mossadeq defended his actions on the grounds of popular sovereignty. "In view of the Royal Court's flagrant interference in the electoral process, we had to suspend the

²⁷(U) Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 75.

²⁸(U) Abrahamian, p. 274; M. Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 187.

²⁹(U) Zabih, p. 111; Abrahamian, p. 274. See also, Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.), pp. 187-88. In an interview appearing in the 22 August 1962 issue of *Deutsche Zeitung*, Mossadeq admitted that he dissolved the 17th Majlis to avoid a confidence vote that would have caused his government to fall.

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remainder of the Majlis elections," he told the court. "What else was left to us but consulting the people in a most democratic method of direct plebiscite?"³⁰

(U) A US Embassy assessment cabled to Washington shortly after the referendum stated that the dissolution of the Majlis "will graphically demonstrate truism of [Mossadeq's] regime that as opposition and discontent have mounted, Mossadeq has moved steadily in authoritarian direction using technique of mobocracy to maintain his hold on power and to eliminate influence Shah." Nonetheless, the Embassy thought Mossadeq's continued appeals to the street could boomerang because he lacked "any real authoritarian organization aside from armed forces." To compensate, according to the Embassy, he would be forced to rely increasingly on the Tudeh, thereby alienating the non-Communist followers of his Government.³¹

(U) Mossadeq Looks for American Support

(U) Mossadeq hoped for US support in his struggle against the British. Like many in the Third World immediately after World War II, he saw the United States as an anti-colonial power. His hopes were not entirely misplaced; the Truman administration saw some merit in his position.

(U) Secretary of State Acheson thought that the British were overly preoccupied with their oil interests and that London did not fully understand the broader Communist threat. He saw Mossadeq as a potentially important part of the solution to the problem of Soviet influence in the Middle East. In Acheson's view, the Iranian Prime Minister would in time become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into Iran. To that end, Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with Tehran. Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian government and promote regional stability.³²

(U) Other considerations, however, complicated the Truman administration's approach. The United States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive pressure on London. Washington needed cooperation and support from Britain—America's closest ally—elsewhere in the world. The war in Korea was not yet over, and the presence of British combat troops was an important symbol of Anglo-American solidarity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949, was still in its formative stages and depended upon British participation as evidence of Western unity

³⁰(U) Ghods, p. 188; Zabih, pp. 112-13. For Kashani's views on the Shari'a, see Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, p. 187.

³¹(U) Department of State Cable from Tehran to Secretary of State, No. 300, 12 August 1953. National Archives and Records Administration Record Group 319, Entry 57, box 27.

³²(U) Acheson criticized "the unusual and persistent stupidity of the [Anglo Iranian Oil] company and the British Government" when it came to Iran. See, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 501, quoted in Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 453. Richard W. Cottam, *Iran & the United States: A Cold War Case Study* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), p. 102.

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and determination. Vigorous American support for Mossadeq would have complicated American foreign policy in other parts of the world as well.

(U) President Truman had no patience with those refusing to view the Anglo-Iranian problem in a global context. When the US Ambassador to Iran, Henry Grady, wrote to Truman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice, the President let him know exactly where he stood. "Let me tell you something about the Iranian Situation from this end," he wrote.

(U) [we] held Cabinet meetings on it—we held Security Council meetings on it, and Dean, Bob Lovett, Charlie Sawyer, Harriman and all the senior staff of the Central Intelligence discussed that awful situation with me time and again . . . We tried . . . to get the block headed British to have their oil company make a fair deal with Iran. No, they could not do that. They know all about how to handle it—we didn't according to them.

(U) We had Israel, Egypt, Near East defense, Sudan, South Africa, Tunisia, the NATO treaties all on the fire. *Britain and the Commonwealth Nations were and are absolutely essential if these things are successful.* Then, on top of it all we have Korea and Indo-China. Iran was only one incident. Of course the man on the ground in each one of these places can only see his own problem.³³

(C) The suggestion that British forces might occupy the port city of Abadan or launch some other military action against Iran set off alarms in ONE. In an April 1951 memorandum to DCI Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, ONE chief Dr. William Langer warned that the appearance of British troops in Iran might result in Soviet occupation of the northern part of the country under the terms of the 1921 treaty of friendship between Persia and Soviet Russia.³⁴

³³(U) Farhad Diba, *Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 131-32, citing papers of Henry Grady. Emphasis added.

³⁴(C) William L. Langer, Assistant Director National Estimates, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith, "Situation in Iran," 20 April 1951 [redacted] (emphasis added).

(U) In February 1921, Persia, as Iran was then known, and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) [the USSR did not exist until December 1922] signed a treaty of friendship. Article VI gave the RSFSR the right to send troops into Persia if a third party tried to use that country as a base from which to attack Soviet Russia. Russian troops would cross the border only if Persia proved incapable of removing the threat itself. In an exchange of explanatory notes in December 1921, the Russians made clear that the treaty applied "only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia . . . by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown [the Tsarist Government] or by its supporters . . ." Leonard Shapiro, ed., *Soviet Treaty Series: A Collection of Bilateral Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, Etc., Concluded Between The Soviet Union and Foreign Powers*, vol. 1, 1917-1928 (Washington, DC: The Georgetown University Press, 1950), pp. 92-94, 150-51.

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(S) Neither Langer nor any of the Iran specialists in CIA's clandestine service—the Office of Special Operations (OSO), and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)—thought the Tudeh was strong enough by itself to topple Mossadeq. As long as the central government remained able to deal with events, Langer and others saw the danger of a Tudeh coup as negligible. "Tudeh represents a serious threat in view of the opportunities awaiting it," OSO and OPC specialists agreed in January 1952, "but does not yet have the intention or the ability to gain actual control of the government at this time either by force or political means."³⁸ CIA's operators thought that the Tudeh would come to power only through chaos and impotent central authority.

(U) Although the documents in CIA's files do not indicate that Smith relayed Langer's concerns to President Truman, he evidently did so because the administration subsequently let London know that the US Government disapproved of *any* military action against Iran. At a British cabinet meeting in September 1951, the government of

(U) Strictly speaking, the USSR could not have invoked Article VI if a small British force occupied Abadan in 1951. Abadan is far from the Soviet-Iranian border and the few troops the British contemplated sending could not have made a "considerable armed attack" upon Soviet forces. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the USSR would have found some pretext to occupy northern Iran had Stalin desired.


³⁸(S) R.L. Hewitt, Memorandum to Sherman Kent, 8 January 1952, "Conversations with OPC and OSO Specialists Concerning the Tudeh Problem," History Staff Records, Job 840B00443R, Box 4, Folder 11, ARC.

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Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it "could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this kind."³⁹ A potential military crisis had passed.

(S) As of 30 July 1952, the State Department and CIA were committed to supporting Mossadeq. That evening, CIA representatives met at the State Department with Secretary of State Acheson, Under Secretary of State David K.E. Bruce, Charles Bohlen, Henry Byroade, John Jernegan, and Robert Joyce, all of the State Department.⁴⁰ The participants decided that "It is the policy of the Department of State to maintain the present government in Iran so long as this government has the authority to govern, *or until it appears certain that the government will be taken over by the Communists.*"⁴¹



³⁹(U) H.W. Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 234.

⁴⁰(U) Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State and member of the Senior Staff, National Security Council; Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.



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(U) As of November 1952, CIA's Office of National Estimates thought that Mossadeq would remain in power for the near future and that a Tudeh coup was unlikely. According to an ONE estimate, if the unrest plaguing Iran in 1952 continued through 1953, "rising internal tensions and continued deterioration of the economy and of the budgetary position of the government might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by Tudeh." ONE thought Soviet intervention into Iran was unlikely "unless there is a far more serious deterioration of Iranian internal stability than is foreseen in this estimate. However, the USSR has the capability for greatly increasing its overt and covert interference in Iran at any time, to the detriment of US security interests."⁴⁶

(U) During the last two months of 1952, both ONE and the Iran Branch of the DDP watched events in Iran and hoped things would not change radically. Their hopes were soon dashed.

(U) Foggy Bottom's Differences with Whitehall

(U) As the foregoing indicates, Washington and London had fundamentally different perspectives on the events in Iran and on their consequences worldwide. These differences complicated the State Department's and Foreign Office's search for a common policy. At times the problems must have appeared insolvable.

(U) In January 1952 an internal memorandum in the State Department's Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs identified two areas of disagreement. The United States and the United Kingdom had differing views on the strength of nationalism in Iran (and therefore on Mossadeq's political strength), and on the global consequences of Tehran's failure to reach an oil settlement with London.⁴⁷

(U) The State Department recognized that Iranian nationalism was a potent and growing force, making an oil settlement on British terms unattainable even if Mossadeq fell. In contrast, the British disparaged Iranian nationalism as merely a "passing storm."

⁴⁶(U) Office of National Estimates, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953," NIE-75, 13 November 1952.

⁴⁷(U) Memorandum, "Varying British and American Appraisals of the Iranian Situation," 14 January 1952, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office in Charge of Iranian Affairs, 1946-54, Lot 57, D 529, Box 40, National Archives and Records Administration.

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It had no roots and would "pass and its leaders fall as soon as it is demonstrated that their policies have brought Iran to the brink of ruin."⁴⁸

(U) More specifically, American officials feared that a British failure to compromise with Mossadeq would enable him to whip up Iran's virulent nationalism further, with potentially disastrous results. The West might well lose so much of its influence that it could not stop Tehran from moving the Soviet orbit. Or the Iranian political situation could simply descend into chaos, in which case the Soviet-backed Tudeh—Iran's best organized, best financed, and most effective political organization—would be ready to fill the vacuum. In the State Department's view, such developments would jeopardize the security and stability of the entire Middle East, would serve notice that the West could not preserve the independence of important Third World states, and could deprive the West not only of Iran's oil but ultimately that of its Arab neighbors as well.⁴⁹

(U) In contrast, the British regarded Iran as basically a conservative country that would not seek Soviet help nor collapse internally if London held out for the kind of oil settlement it wanted. The British also feared that a "bad" settlement (one not on their terms) would severely diminish their global political and economic power, already starting to decline with the post-World War II emergence of independence movements in much of the British empire.⁵⁰

(U) The only suggestion for resolving these differences offered in the State Department's internal memorandum further consultation to determine the "political, military, economic, and psychological effects of the loss of Iran to the west as balanced against the political and economic effects of an agreement with the Iranians on the oil situation which might prejudice other concessions elsewhere and diminish British prestige throughout the world." The memorandum concluded that unless the US and United Kingdom agreed on the importance to the West of an independent Iran, there was little chance the two would be able to forge a common policy.⁵¹

(U) Eleven months later the National Security Council set forth basic US policy toward Iran. NSC 136/1 emphasized that the United States was committed to preventing Iran from falling under communist control and that Iran's strategic position, its oil, and its vulnerability to Soviet political subversion or military attack made it a tempting target for Soviet expansion. If the Tudeh Party seized or attempted to seize control of the Iranian government, the document argued, the United States should, in conjunction with the British, be ready to support a non-communist Iranian government militarily, economically, diplomatically, and psychologically.⁵²

⁴⁸(U) Ibid.

⁴⁹(U) Ibid. The State Department memorandum noted that American influence was waning daily as more and more Iranians identified the United States with British interests. The State Department assessed British influence as negligible.

⁵⁰(U) Ibid.

⁵¹(U) Ibid.

⁵²(U) United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954*, Vol. X, *Iran 1951-1954* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 529-34.

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(U) American Policy Turns Against Mossadeq

(U) Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately turn his attention to Iran after taking the oath of office in January 1953. His campaign pledge to end the Korean war had priority, and only weeks after the inaugural festivities Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died. The new administration was faced with reevaluating Soviet-American relations. Under these circumstances, events in Iran receded into the foreign policy background—temporarily.⁵³

(U) The British had never given up hope of executing a covert action to remove Mossadeq, and continued to test the American response. After Mossadeq severed diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952, the indefatigable Woodhouse met in London with Foreign Office officials, including Anthony Eden, to consider options available to Britain. According to Woodhouse, Eden said that no covert operation would succeed unless it had American support. Woodhouse "took his words as tantamount to permission to pursue the idea further with the Americans, particularly with the CIA." This he did, arriving in Washington in mid-November 1952 after Dwight Eisenhower's victory.⁵⁴

(S) Woodhouse met with State and CIA officials and argued that political conditions in Iran made that country subject to a serious Communist threat. He did not stress the oil issue. His reception at Truman's State Department was "chilly"; at CIA, he met with initial skepticism. Walter Bedell Smith told him "You may be able to throw out Musaddiq, but you will never get your own man to stick in his place." Frank Wisner and future DCI Allen Dulles showed increasing interest and eventually warmed to the idea of planning a covert operation to remove the Iranian Prime Minister. Woodhouse writes that Dulles enlisted "a young academic expert on Iran to examine the situation with us."

(S) Allen Dulles became DCI in late February 1953 and promptly apprised the President of the situation in Iran. Mossadeq, Dulles told the President, remained the single strongest Iranian political leader. With the Shah showing no inclination to marshal the armed forces for a move against Mossadeq, the situation, in Dulles's words, was "slowly disintegrating." If a showdown developed between the Shah and Mossadeq, "and a real armed conflict ensued between the two opposing elements, the communist Tudeh elements might come up as the victors with their relatively small but well organized group of supporters, and with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, disposing of plenty of funds."

⁵³(U) Brands, p. 272.

⁵⁴ (U) Woodhouse, pp. 116-17.

⁵⁵ (U) Ibid. p. 119.

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(U) President Truman's and Secretary Acheson's policy of encouraging the parties to reach an equitable oil settlement had reached a dead end. Neither the British nor Mossadeq appeared willing to back off from their publicly stated positions, which each by this time held with something approaching religious fervor. To London's relief, the new US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis. Perhaps now, the British hoped, Washington would finally begin to see Mossadeq as the demagogue London thought he was and take appropriate action.

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(U) Also in March 1953, State Department officials and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation. Eden found the Americans much more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson. The collapse of the Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations had changed the Americans' attitude; Washington now considered Mossadeq a source of *instability* and feared that his continued tenure invited a Tudeh coup.

(C) The State Department agreed with Eden that Mossadeq had to go, but its reasons differed from his. For Eden and his government, Mossadeq's policies damaged "British prestige, influence, and vital commercial interest." For the Americans, Mossadeq represented a weakened Iran and its increasing vulnerability to Soviet domination.⁵⁸

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(U) The United States suspected the Soviets of trying to take advantage of the deteriorating situation in Iran. In the US view, Soviet leaders undoubtedly saw Mossadeq's troubles as a diplomatic opening, and if he wanted to try to play Moscow against Washington, the Soviets would let him. The Kremlin would help him. The

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
⁵⁸(U) Cottam, p. 103.

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potential benefits to the Soviets of cultivating Mossadeq were great: a docile southern neighbor at a minimum, and beyond that, a chance to draw a strategically important country into the Soviet sphere of influence.



(S) The Soviet-Iranian negotiations were front page news in *The New York Times* on 11 August 1953. Iranian Ambassador to the United States Allahyar Saleh met for 90 minutes on the 11th with John Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Jernegan learned that Iran was interested in maintaining good relations with the United States as well as the Soviet Union.

(S) Upon leaving the State Department, Saleh met a group of waiting reporters wanting to know whether the meeting had anything to do with Iranian-Soviet negotiations and whether the US had reason to be concerned about such talks. Saleh replied that the American Government should be pleased about the negotiations because they might resolve claims arising from Iranian expenses incurred in furthering American policy aims in World War II.

(U) The Iranian-Soviet negotiations were never held. On the day he met with Jernegan, Saleh could not know that the Mossadeq government would remain in power

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only eight more days. President Eisenhower apparently had already made the decision to oust the Iranian Prime Minister.

(U) Mossadeq's Successor: Ayatollah Kashani or Fazlollah Zahedi?

(U) At this point, there was no consensus on who should replace Mossadeq. US officials briefly considered backing Ayatollah Kashani, the former Mossadeq ally, who had a large following and had become a strident opponent of the Prime Minister.⁶⁰

(S) CIA Headquarters viewed the prospect of a Kashani government with alarm. According to a Special Estimate published on 14 October 1952, a Kashani-led Iran would be worse for Western interests than if Mossadeq stayed in power. Such a regime would be even more difficult on the oil issue and would be more resistant to Western influence. The military, or even Mossadeq's followers, might well overthrow Kashani. The worst consequence of a Kashani government would be the "progressive general deterioration of Iran possibly leading to the eventual assumption of power by the Tudch."⁶¹

(U) Opinion gradually settled on General Fazlollah Zahedi as Mossadeq's successor. Zahedi had served as an irregular soldier under the Shah's father, Reza Shah, in 1915 and subsequently rose through the ranks of the Iranian Army. In 1942 the British arrested him for his activities under Nazi agent Franz Mayer and deported him to Palestine. Zahedi worked for the Germans because of his anti-British views; he was not generally thought to be pro-Nazi. The British released him on VE Day in 1945. Zahedi retired from the army in 1949 and subsequently served in a series of mostly honorary posts. He was Minister of the Interior in the early 1950s.⁶²

(S) Zahedi's association with the Germans during the war was not the only blot on his record. Although he was a staunch anti-Communist, the CIA thought him "like all

⁶¹(S) Office of National Estimates, "Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran," SE-33, 14 October 1952, p. 3, Records of the Office of National Estimates, Directorate of Intelligence, ARC.

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Iranians on the public scene [not] noted for honesty, consistency, reliability and strength of convictions."⁶³

(U) The State Department recognized that he was not the ideal candidate, but was qualified because he seemed "friendly to the United States and Britain and would be acceptable to both Governments."⁶⁴ Even more importantly, he was willing to take the job.

(S) Zahedi was the only opposition figure meeting two other important criteria: he had consistently opposed Mossadeq, and he had a significant following. Other potential candidates either had a longer record of opposition or more followers, but none had both. Zahedi claimed to have the support of Ayatollah Kashani, court officials, elements of the armed forces, influential merchants in the bazaar, and most of the Iranian people. This last assertion, at least, was dubious, for as [redacted] an Iranian specialist working as a consultant for DDP's Near East and Africa Division, observed: "It is far more likely that the man in the street continues to admire Mossadeq for his strong stand against the British and as a symbol of resurgent nationalism. However, this element is of no practical value to either side unless effectively organized and led."⁶⁵

(U) Whoever succeeded Mossadeq would be able to count on US support. In March 1953, an internal memorandum by the State Department's Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs outlined the steps the United States was likely to take if Mossadeq fell. Although American officials would limit their public pronouncements to expressions of unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, privately they would use non-US channels to assure the Shah and new prime minister that Washington was eager to help. Sensitivity to Iranian concerns that the country was being turned into a foreign base would preclude ostentatious and immediate American military assistance, but privately the Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid (trucks, communication equipment, and other items that also had civilian uses) would be forthcoming.⁶⁶

(U) Eisenhower Turns to CIA

(U) President Eisenhower had several options for implementing Mossadeq's removal. He could use military force to invade Iran, but that was impractical for obvious reasons. He could keep hoping that a diplomatic solution would appear. That option too was not viable; diplomacy had already failed and the political situation in Iran was worsening daily. Finally, he could turn to CIA for a covert political operation; the National Security Council had decided that covert action was a legitimate instrument of US policy.⁶⁷ This alternative held the promise of attaining the result the administration

⁶³(TS) Ibid.

⁶⁴(TS) State Department, "Proposal to Bring About Change of Government in Iran," 25 June 1953 [redacted]

⁶⁵(TS) Ibid.


⁶⁶(U) "Measures Which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq," March 1953, Department of State, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Issues, RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, Box 40, National Archives and Records Administration.

⁶⁷(U) In NSC 10/2.

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
wanted with a minimum of cost and attention. If such an operation went sour, Washington could disavow any knowledge or connection.

(S) No one in CIA suggested or even hinted that Mossadeq should be assassinated.



(U) Available documents do not indicate who authorized CIA to begin planning the operation, but it almost certainly was President Eisenhower himself. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflected the President's style:


(U) Before going into the operation, Ajax had to have the approval of the President. Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax; he received only oral reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC. Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency, he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over cocktails, he was kept informed by Foster Dulles, and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA.⁶⁹



⁶⁹(U) Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 111. Ambrose repeats this paragraph verbatim in *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 333.

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Chapter 2

(U) Planning the Operation

(S) Responsibility for planning and executing TPAJAX fell to [redacted] the Near East and Africa Division¹ (NEA) in the Directorate of Plans (DDP). The DDP, CIA's clandestine service, was less than a year old when it received the TPAJAX assignment. Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith had created the directorate in August 1952 by combining the Office of Special Operations and the Office of Policy Coordination. The two had been rivals, and Smith hoped their merger would prevent continued friction and duplication of effort.

(U) Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, was the chief of NEA Division. A 1938 Harvard graduate, Roosevelt had embarked on a scholarly career teaching government to undergraduates—first at Harvard and then at the California Institute of Technology. He joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II and worked for the chief of the organization's Secret Intelligence Branch in the Near East. After the war he compiled the official OSS war report and then returned to the Middle East as a writer for the *Saturday Evening Post*.² In 1947 he published *Arabs, Oil, and History: The Story of the Middle East*.³ C.M. Woodhouse of MI5 wrote in his memoirs that Roosevelt "had a natural inclination for bold and imaginative action, and also a friendly sympathy with the British."⁴

(S) Roosevelt did not "look" like an operative (Kim Philby called him "the last person you'd expect to be up to his neck in dirty tricks"), but was an intellectual with

¹ (U) The name went through several permutations before settling on Near East and Africa Division.

²(U) Burton Hersch, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), p. 331; G.J.A. O'Toole, *Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), p. 458; *Who's Who*, 1964-65.


³(U) Kermit Roosevelt, *Arabs, Oil, and History: The Story of the Middle East* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press [1947] 1969).

⁴ C.M. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured* (London: Granada, 1982), p. 120.

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
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specific ideas on how to counter Soviet influence in the Middle East.



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


⁹(U) Although CIA almost certainly would have hired him as a permanent staff employee, Wilber refused and preferred to work under contract. He lived in Princeton and did not wish to leave. A contract enabled him to work at CIA without requiring him to move to Washington. Wilber continued his contract relationship with CIA until the 1960s.




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
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
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(U) According to the military attachés, it was important to recognize the difference between allegiance and control. The Shah enjoyed the allegiance of almost all Iranian Army officers; they had been raised to regard their monarch as a symbol of loyalty and patriotism. Whether he wielded any "control" was more problematic. His failure to assert himself against Mossadeq was causing confusion and consternation as officers risked their careers by backing him against the Prime Minister. The attachés concluded that "if the Shah were to give the word, probably more than 99% of the officers would




²⁷ (U) M 175 from USARMA Tehran to Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, "Control of the Armed Forces of Iran," 11 August 1953, National Archives, RG 319, Entry 57, box 27. The distribution list shows that CIA received nine copies of the attachés' assessment.

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comply with his orders with a sense of relief and with the hope of attaining a state of stability."²⁸

(U) Mossadeq, through Army Chief of Staff General Riahi, a Mossadeq loyalist, actually controlled the Army. Iranian officers considered legal—and would obey—any order of the Shah coming from the Chief of Staff. The officer corps considered the Shah's silence about the Chief of Staff's actions as implied consent. Failure to follow orders even under these conditions was tantamount to treason. The American military attachés concluded that if the Shah opposed the Chief of Staff, or if the Chief of Staff with the Shah's support opposed the Prime Minister, Mossadeq's control of the Army would evaporate.²⁹



(U) **The First Phase: Convincing the Shah**




²⁸(U) Ibid.

²⁹(U) Ibid.




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


³⁴(U) Schwarzkopf was the father of the American general of the same name who led US and Coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq.




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⁴⁵(U) Donald N. Wilber, *Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incursions* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1986) , p. 189.

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⁴⁸(U) The Shari'a is Islamic religious law, intended to guide all aspects of social activity. See, William O. Beeman, "Patterns of Religion and Economic Development in Iran from the Qajar Era to the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79," in *Global Economics and Religion*, ed. James Finn (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), p. 78.



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
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


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⁵⁹(U) H.W. Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire 1918-61* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 282.




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**(U) Final Approval**

(S) On 25 June 1953, senior foreign policymaking officials met at the State Department to hear Roosevelt outline the final plan for TPAJAX. President Eisenhower did not attend, but other top officials did: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson; DCI Allen Dulles; Undersecretary of State and former DCI Walter Bedell Smith; Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy; Robert Bowie, head of the State Department's policy planning staff (and subsequent CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence in the late 1970s); Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East; and US Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson.⁶¹

(U) After Roosevelt's briefing, Secretary of State Dulles polled the meeting. Allen Dulles and Walter Bedell Smith were strongly in favor of proceeding; the others agreed but were less enthusiastic. Henderson did not like covert operations but thought the United States had no choice in this case.⁶²



(U) Nor did CIA have to notify Congress of its impending operation. Allen Dulles may have informally told key Senators like Richard Russell, as well as key members of the House of Representatives, what the Agency was doing, but CIA's files contain no record of these conversations.



⁶¹(U) Brands, p. 281. Eisenhower's absence should not be read as passivity or disinterest. The President knew what was going on but preferred to keep himself out of all formal deliberations. His orders and briefings were given orally with no record kept.


⁶²(U) Ibid.



⁶⁴(U) In December 1974 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment required a Presidential "finding" for each covert action, and President Gerald Ford's Executive Order 11095 (16 February 1976) required that the Executive Office notify Congress of all Presidential findings.

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


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
Chapter 3

(U) Execution and Initial Failure



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



⁶(U) The absence of relevant intelligence in Carroll's file is curious. Foreign intelligence assets, not covert action assets, collect the sorts of information Carroll needed. Two possible reasons explain the paucity of information. Either the foreign intelligence assets had not been tasked properly, or, as is more likely, their focus up to this time had been on the Soviet Union and its activities rather than on Iranian activities. The USSR invariably was the main target of the American intelligence effort, and most if not all of CIA's foreign intelligence assets in Tehran were almost certainly trying to collect information on the Soviets.



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(U) TEXT BOX: The Corrupt and Impotent Iranian Army

(S) The Iranian Army in 1953 was understrength, underequipped, and ill prepared to repel invasion, suppress a country-wide insurrection, or defeat Tudeh subversion. Its 125,000 men comprised eight divisions, nine independent brigades, and one military police brigade. According to a US Army Intelligence Staff Study in December 1952, the Iranian officer corps was corrupt and lacked leadership ability. Promotions were based on politics rather than merit. The enlisted men were mostly tough peasants who uncomplainingly endured hardships and privations unthinkable to Western soldiers. These traits made the enlisted ranks amenable to discipline but made instilling initiative almost impossible. The absence of modern weapons and shortage of ammunition made training almost nonexistent. The US Army report concluded that Iranian Army units had no offensive capability and negligible defensive capability.¹³

(S) The General Staff positioned the divisions and brigades with an eye toward suppressing Iran's sometimes unruly tribes, rather than where they would be best able to defend the country against a Soviet invasion. Accordingly, most of the divisions were in the south and east, rather than along the northern border with the USSR. The table below lists major Iranian units and the tribal areas in which—or adjacent to which—they were deployed.¹⁴

Unit	Location	Tribal Area
1st Mountain Brig.	Tehran	
2nd Mountain Brig.	Tehran	
3rd Mountain Brig.	Tehran	
1st Armored Brig.	Tehran	
2nd Armored Brig.	Tehran	
Military Police Brig.	Tehran	
3rd Infantry Div.	Tabriz	
4th Infantry Div.	Rezaieh (Orumiyeh)	
5th Infantry Div.	Khorramabad	Lur
6th Infantry Div.	Shiraz	Qashqai
7th Infantry Div.	Kerman	
8th Infantry Div.	Meshed (Mashhad)	
9th Infantry Div.	Isfahan (Esfahan)	Bakhtiari
10th Infantry Div.	Ahwaz (Ahvaz)	Arab
Gorgan Ind. Brig.	Gorgan (Gorgan)	Turcoman
Kermanshah Ind.	Kermanshah	Lur
Sanandaj Ind. Brig.	Sinneh (Sanandaj)	Kurd
Resht Ind. Brig.	Resht (Rasht)	Shahsavani

¹³ (S) US Army, G-2 (Intelligence), Intelligence Staff Study, "Estimate of the Capabilities of the Iranian Armed Forces Including the Employment of Iranian Tribes as Auxiliaries," 15 Dec 1952, Records of the Department of State, RG 59, Lot 57, D529, NND 959286, "Iran 1946-54," Box 4, National Archives and Records Administration.

¹⁴ (S) Ibid.

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(U) Securing the *Firmans*

(U) The first phase of the operation began on 15 July 1953, when Asadollah Rashidian went to the French Riviera to meet Princess Ashraf. He explained to her that Mossadeq posed a continuing danger for Iran and that she should convince her brother to dismiss him. She was unenthusiastic.

[REDACTED]

(U) The Princess also was convinced that Mossadeq would do whatever he could to prevent her return. She had already written to the Prime Minister three times, saying that she wanted to come back to Iran because she could no longer afford to live in Europe. When she saw, with some prompting, that a surreptitious visit to the Shah might improve her chances of returning home permanently, she began to warm to the idea.

[REDACTED]

(U) Princess Ashraf arrived in Tehran on 25 July 1953 and met with her brother four days later. She was unable to convince him to sign the *firman*s and left Tehran the following day.

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23(U) The arrival of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Lavrentiev in Tehran on 1 August 1953 probably heightened Washington's and Roosevelt's sense of urgency. Lavrentiev had been ambassador to Czechoslovakia in 1948 and had been behind the Communist coup that deposed pro-Western Czech President Benes. Lavrentiev replaced Ivan Sadchikov, who left Tehran for Moscow in July 1953.

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(U) Manucher Farmanfarmaian, a member of the Iranian nobility, was present when Nassiri brought the documents to the Shah and relates in his memoirs the circumstances of this historic event. One afternoon the Shah was relaxing outside with a circle of friends. A butler approached and whispered into the Shah's ear, and the Shah replied loudly, "Tell him to come in." A man in a dark suit whom Farmanfarmaian did not recognize appeared from behind some trees and, after a few words with the Shah, presented him with a document. The Shah asked if anyone had a pen; Farmanfarmaian offered his. After signing the document, the Shah noted that the pen would be worth much more now that he'd used it to sign the paper. "A fortune?" Farmanfarmaian joked. "Perhaps," the monarch replied. "Perhaps it will bring us all luck as well." Farmanfarmaian writes that he "found out later that the messenger had been sent by Kermit Roosevelt and the document the Shah had signed appointed General Zahedi prime minister."²⁸

(S) Nassiri returned to Tehran with the signed documents late on the evening of 13 August.²⁹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In his book *Countercoup*, Roosevelt notes that nothing could be done on the

²⁵(S) Donald Wilber, *Operation TPAJAX* (draft), March 1954, Directorate of Operations Records, Job 80-1701, Box 3, Folder 11, p. 26, ARC.

²⁶(U) Nassiri later became the head of SAVAK. In 1978, former Agency officer Miles Copeland met General Nassiri to discuss Ayatollah Khomeini and the deteriorating situation in Iran. Copeland found Nassiri "even stupider than Kim [Roosevelt] said he'd be." The General regaled Copeland with "fairly bloodthirsty details of how he could have put an end to the demonstrations within a week if only the Shah had given him free rein." Miles Copeland, *The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA's original political operative* (London: Aurum Press, 1989), p. 251.

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²⁸ (U) Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanfarmaian, *Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince* (New York: Random House, 1997), p. 292. Farmanfarmaian says that the Shah signed the *firman* on a Sunday in the second week of August. This cannot be correct, for the *firman* was not signed until 13 August. The second Sunday in August was the ninth, and the third Sunday was the sixteenth.

²⁹ A State Department cable reported that the *firman* appointing Zahedi read:

View of fact situation of nation necessitates appointment of an informed and experienced man who can grasp affairs of country readily, I therefore, with knowledge I have of your ability and merit, appoint you with this letter Prime Minister. We give into your hands duty to improve affairs of the nation and remove present crisis and raise living standard of people.

Gordon H. Mattison, Telegram to Department of State, 16 August 1953, Tehran No. 342.

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13th or 14th—Thursday and Friday—because Thursday afternoon and Friday comprise the Iranian weekend. Effective action would be impossible until Saturday 15 August.³⁰

(S) The Shah's *firmans* changed the entire character of TPAJAX. No longer was the operation essentially a military coup with the aim of installing Zahedi as Chief of the General Staff and then Prime Minister. Now it was an exercise of the Shah's constitutional prerogative and authority. Mossadeq's failure to abide by the *firmans* would make his tenure as Prime Minister illegal.

³⁰(U) Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 171.

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(U) American Diplomatic Moves

(S) Newspaper articles and statements from senior American government officials hammered home the theme that the US could not work with the Mossadeq government. On 29 June 1953, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Mossadeq making it clear that further American foreign aid would not be available. The letter appeared in the press 10 days later. On 28 July Secretary of State Dulles held a press conference in which he answered a planted question about the American view of Communist activity in Iran. "The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian Government," Dulles said, "has caused our Government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran." President Eisenhower asserted at the Governors' Conference in Seattle on 4 August that the United States would not sit by and watch Asian countries fall behind the Iron Curtain.³⁴

³³(U) Ibid. (S). Wisner's idea of the "public" probably was narrow. Most Americans did not read *The New York Times* and could not have told him whether Iran was in the Middle East, South America, or North Carolina.

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
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Just before midnight on 15 August, Col. Nassiri set out with two trucks of soldiers to arrest Mossadeq. When Nassiri arrived at Mossadeq's home to deliver the *firmands* and arrest the Prime Minister, he found himself surrounded and arrested instead.³⁷

(S) Troops loyal to Mossadeq took the other participants into custody by early morning Sunday 16 August. By 0500 pro-Mossadeq troops and tanks ringed the Prime Minister's house. At 0545 Radio Tehran announced that the government had foiled a coup.³⁸ Riahi informed the commanders of all military formations of the attempted coup and ordered them to monitor morale in their units and to prevent disorder and disturbance in their areas. Riahi's and Mossadeq's quick reactions effectively emasculated the military's participation in TPAJAX.

(U) The original plan for a military operation had failed abysmally. Upon hearing of Nassiri's arrest, the principal anti-Mossadeq figures lost their courage. For example, General Batmangelich, who was to have captured Riahi's headquarters, turned back when he saw the troops surrounding the building. Batmangelich and Col. Akhavi soon found themselves under arrest. The Shah, for his part, left the summer palace in the suburbs of Tehran and flew to Baghdad via Ramsar.



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(S) The Shah's flight to Baghdad was no surprise, given his temperament and his inability to withstand any kind of psychological pressure. The Shah later portrayed his flight to Baghdad as part of the operation.³⁹

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³⁹In his memoirs, the Shah said:


However, following a pre-arranged plan, the Queen and I had left Tehran before learning of the revolution's success. It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadegh should use force to resist his deposition, we would temporarily leave the country. I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadegh and his henchmen to show their real allegiances, and that thereby it would help crystallize Persian public opinion.

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961), p. 104.

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(U) Ambassador Henderson, who had left Iran to distance himself from the operation, returned to Tehran on 16 August. He immediately sought and received an audience with Mossadeq. The ambassador asked the Prime Minister if he believed the Shah had issued orders dismissing him and appointing Zahedi. Mossadeq replied that he had never seen such documents, that he would not believe them if he saw them, and that in any event the Shah was powerless to dismiss him. According to Mossadeq, the Shah could not, on his own authority, demand a change in the government. Notwithstanding the Iranian constitution's provision that the prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch, Mossadeq contended that his power came from the people rather than the Shah.⁴²

(U) At noon on Sunday 16 August, Mossadeq issued a brief statement over Radio Tehran: "According to the will of the people, expressed by referendum, the 17th Majlis is dissolved. Elections for the 18th session will be held soon." Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoseyn Fatemi held a press conference that afternoon in which he reviewed the events of the coup and announced that the Acting Minister of Court Abul Ghassem Amini had been

⁴²(U) H.W. Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire 1918-1961* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 235, 285.

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arrested.⁴³ Fatemi made several violent speeches virulently attacking the Shah and ordered the monarch's statues in Tehran torn down.⁴⁴



(U) Washington Reacts

(S) Nassiri's arrest and the subsequent roundup of many anti-Mossadeq principals shook official Washington. A US Embassy cable to Washington on 16 August blamed the coup attempt's failure squarely on "the commonly appreciated difficulty in operating when confronted by current Iranian incapacity for large scale organized effort under clandestine conditions, and when confronted by unforeseen difficulties."⁴⁶

(S) Without knowing the extent of American involvement in the move against Mossadeq, CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) analyzed the consequences of the failed military coup.⁴⁷ An OCI assessment in the *Current Intelligence Bulletin* on 16 August stressed Mossadeq's continued mastery of the situation. According to OCI, the Prime Minister could be expected to move against his enemies and proceed arbitrarily. "The shah's flight, the involvement of the commander of the imperial guards as leader of the coup, and the imperial decrees to remove Mossadeq and appoint General Zahedi prime minister," OCI asserted, "present Mossadeq with the opportunity of reducing the Shah's position still further or attempting to eliminate the monarchy altogether."⁴⁸

(C) On 17 August, OCI published a more in-depth analysis, opining that the coup's failure had broken the will of Mossadeq's opposition. In the analysts' view, no group appeared willing to act after Mossadeq apparently had some ringleaders under



⁴⁵(S) TEHE 724, 18 August 1953.

⁴⁶(S) TEHE 704, 16 August 1953.

⁴⁷(U) See Appendix E for a discussion of the limited role that CIA's analytical components played before and during the operation.

⁴⁸ (TS) Office of Current Intelligence, *Current Intelligence Bulletin*, 16 August 1953, p. 3.

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arrest and forced others into hiding. Even if such a group emerged, OCI was pessimistic about its chances for success.⁴⁹

(C) OCI thought the Shah's involvement had created new dangers for the monarchy and amounted to an "open invitation" for Mossadeq to proceed against him. If the Prime Minister did not succeed in forcing the Shah to abdicate, "he will manage to strip from [the monarch] the remaining vestiges of power." "Mossadeq," OCI concluded, "[may] be expected to retain political control but will probably assume a more dictatorial position and indulge in more chicanery to maintain himself."⁵⁰ The situation seemed irretrievable to US analysts unwitting of NEA's plans to try again.

⁴⁹(C) "Assessment of the Iranian Situation," 17 August 1953, Office of Current Intelligence,

⁵⁰(C) Ibid.

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Chapter 4

(U) Victory

(S) The US Embassy in Tehran may have been ready to write off TPAJAX, but Kermit Roosevelt was not. He knew that the elements for success were still present even though the anti-Mossadeq Iranian military leadership had collapsed ignominiously at the first hint of resistance. Mossadeq remained politically isolated and the military, for all its inactivity, was basically pro-Shah.

(S) CIA no longer viewed TPAJAX as a military coup; it was now a political action designed to swing the Iranian military away from the illegal Mossadeq government and place the armed forces squarely and actively behind the Shah and the legal Zahedi government. Inducing the military to move in this direction would require a rapid, concentrated, and effectively improvised psychological warfare campaign to publicize the notion that Mossadeq had launched a coup against the legitimate government. Roosevelt wanted to control events to the extent possible, but he was also prepared to react to them and take advantage of fluid situations.


(U) Sunday 16 August: Roosevelt and the Station Regroup

(U) Roosevelt knew he held at least two powerful cards in the Shah's *firmans*. Although Zahedi was hiding from Mossadeq, under the Iranian Constitution he was the legal Prime Minister of Iran and Mossadeq was not. Roosevelt was convinced that if he could publicize and emphasize that theme, Mossadeq could not retain his illegal grip on power for long.

¹(U) Love covered the entire crisis for *The New York Times*. His reports made the front pages of the newspaper from 17-24 August 1953.


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
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(U) TEXT BOX: "A Terrible, Terrible Coincidence" in Rome

(U) When the Shah arrived in Rome on 18 August, CIA faced a potential disaster. By coincidence, DCI Allen Dulles was there on vacation. When the Shah checked into the Excelsior Hotel, Dulles was standing next to him trying to do the same thing.

(U) John Waller remembers that he got a call from Frank Wisner between 0200 and 0300. Wisner was agitated. "He's gone to Rome," Wisner told Waller. "A terrible, terrible coincidence occurred. Can you guess what it is?" Waller could not.

(U) "Well," Wisner continued, "he went to the Excelsior Hotel to book a room with his bride, and the pilot, there were only three of them, and he was crossing the street on his way into the hotel. Guess, . . . can you tell me, I don't want to say it over the phone, can you imagine what may have happened? Think of the worst thing you can think of that happened."

(U) Waller said, "He was hit by a cab and killed."

(U) "No, no, no, no," Wisner responded impatiently, by this time almost wild with excitement. "Well, John, maybe you don't know, that Dulles had decided to extend his vacation by going to Rome. Now can you imagine what happened?"

(U) Waller answered, "Dulles hit him with his car and killed him."


(U) Wisner did not think it was funny. "They both showed up at the reception desk at the Excelsior at the very same moment. And Dulles had to say, 'After you, your Majesty.'"²⁵

(U) The meeting between Dulles and the Shah was completely fortuitous but fraught with embarrassment for the US Government and CIA had the news media learned of it. They did not, so the incident passed unnoticed. Wisner's reaction strongly suggests that the meeting was coincidental. It was unlikely that he would have called Waller at 0200 in a panic and revealed sensitive information over an open telephone line if there had been a plan for the DCI to meet the Shah in Rome.²⁶

²⁶(U) In writing of this incident in *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles*, Peter Grose says that "Of all the conspiracy theories that later swirled around the personage of Allen Dulles, none has made a convincing case to accommodate this unfortunate proximity." Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: the Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p. 367.

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(U) At this point, members of Iranian *Zuhrkhaneh* (exercise clubs)—weightlifters, wrestlers, and acrobats—appeared at the head of the crowd. Their involvement was almost certainly the work of the Rashidian brothers and was a brilliant stroke that showed a profound understanding of Iranian psychology.

(U) Iranians idolize acrobats and weightlifters in the same way that many Americans idolize baseball, basketball, or football players. The sight of these men tumbling or exercising in unison with dumbbells drew a crowd in an astonishingly short time. Moreover, the country's most famous athlete, Shaban "Bi Mohk" (Shaban "the Brainless") Jaffari, was in the lead and began chanting pro-Shah slogans. The effect was electrifying.³⁶

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the influence of the mullahs on the demonstration was clear. Holy men had galvanized many of the poor of South Tehran by hammering on the themes that the Soviet-backed Communists were taking over, the Shah was gone, and Mossadeq was to blame. The streets of Tehran, which had belonged to the Tudeh 24 hours earlier, now belonged to a different crowd. The few Tudeh members appearing on the streets around mid-morning 19 August saw that they were hopelessly outnumbered and lost their enthusiasm for a confrontation.³⁷ They were swept away like so much chaff.

(U) The swelling crowd headed for the offices of the pro-Mossadeq and anti-American newspaper, *Bakhtar Emruz*. Security forces watched passively as the crowd demolished the newspaper's office. By 1000 the crowd was headed for Mossadeq's residence at 109 Kakh (Palace) Street, which was ringed with tanks and troops loyal to the Prime Minister.

(U) The troops guarding the residence were unsure of what was happening. When confronted with the large, angry crowd, some of the soldiers opened fire. The fighting escalated as pro-Shah troops returned fire. Mossadeq climbed over the wall surrounding his house and escaped.

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(U) The size and fervor of the demonstrations were critical in encouraging the military to come down on the side of the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi. Although some members of the officer corps opposed Mossadeq, Roosevelt could not be certain that their units would follow their orders in the absence of evidence that the general population would back them up. The Iranian army has a long tradition of waiting to see who controls the streets before it acts.

(S) By 1130 the military evidently had concluded that Mossadeq was through. Truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers sped through the streets of Tehran, and many troops joined the mobs that were shouting "Zendeabad Shah!" while waving pictures of the monarch.

[REDACTED]

³⁸(S) Ibid., pp. 10-11.

³⁹(S) Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁰(S) Ibid., p. 12.

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(U) The broadcast in the afternoon of 19 August was confused and chaotic, but there was no doubt that pro-Shah forces had captured and were controlling Radio Tehran. The first indication came when the announcer said, "The people of Tehran have risen today and occupied all the government offices, and I am able to talk to you all through the help of the armed forces. The government of Mossadeq is a government of rebellion and has fallen."⁴¹ Seven minutes later, amid much confusion and shouting on the air, a Col. Ali Pahlavon said,

(U) Oh people of the cities, be wide awake. The government of Mossadeq has been defeated. My dear compatriots, listen! I am one of the soldiers and one of the devotees of this country. Oh officers, a number of traitors, like Hoseyn Fatemi, wants to sell out the country to the foreigners.

(U) My dear compatriots, today the Iranian royalists have defeated the demagogue government by which Fatemi was ruling. The Iranian nation, officers, army, and the police have taken the situation in their hands.

(U) Premier Zahedi will assume his post. There is no place for anxiety. Keep tranquil.⁴²

(U) The broadcast stopped. After seven minutes it continued with a woman shouting,

(U) Oh people of Iran, let the Iranian nation prove that the foreigners cannot capture this country! Iranians love the King. Oh tribes of Iran, Mossadeq is ruling over your country without your knowledge, sending your country to the government of the hammer and sickle.⁴³

(U) A major from the Iranian army said that he was an infantry officer "retired by Mossadeq, the traitor. We proved to the world that the Iranian army is the protector of this country and is under the command of the Shah." Much confusion followed, after which Radio Tehran played the national anthem and then went off the air.⁴⁴

(U) Wednesday Afternoon 19 August: "Zendeabad, Shah!"

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
⁴¹(U) Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service, 19 August 1953, 1200 GMT, Records of the Directorate of Operations, Job 79-01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, ARC

⁴²(U) Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service, 19 August 1953, 1207 GMT, Records of the Directorate of Operations, Job 79-01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, ARC.

⁴³(U) Intercept from Tehran Iranian Home Service, 19 August 1953, 1214 GMT, Records of the Directorate of Operations, Job 79-01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, ARC.

⁴⁴(U) Ibid. Radio Tehran went off the air at 1222 GMT.

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(U) Zahedi began broadcasting that he was the legally appointed head of the government.⁴⁸ He also promised, to Roosevelt's chagrin, that he would boost living standards, provide free health services to the poor, and modernize agriculture.⁴⁹



⁴⁸ (U) According to the State Department, the Embassy monitor reported Zahedi's transmission as follows:

Dear Compatriots:

In the name of Almighty, I address you.

I have been appointed your Prime Minister by order of His Majesty.

Past governments have made many promises but have achieved very little.


Nation must know I am lawful Prime Minister on Shah's orders. Principal points my program are: Rule of law; raising standard of living; free health services for all; mechanization of agriculture; road construction; public security; individual and social freedom; cooperative societies.

Long live Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlevi.

Telegram from US Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State, No. 406, 19 August 1953. National Archives, RG 319, Entry 57, box 27.


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(S) The Shah at this point was still in Rome. At first, Ambassador Henderson did not want the monarch back in Tehran until popular pressure for his return became overwhelming.⁵⁴ Washington, however, thought it was a good idea for the Shah to return as soon as possible. The State Department had reversed itself and now was strongly urging the Iranian ruler to make a statement thanking his people for their support and promising to return. CIA Headquarters added that "We feel it extremely important for Shah to return immediately since issue is still in doubt and his presence just might make all the difference."⁵⁵

(S) State favored pressuring the Shah if he hesitated. Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith wanted to remind Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of two points: (1) his actions were constitutional, legal, and in keeping with Iranian practice and tradition, and (2) had he stayed in Tehran, perhaps the earlier military coup attempt would have



⁵⁴(S) TEHE 745, 19 August 1953.

⁵⁵(S) Dir I6330, 19 August 1953.

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succeeded. The initial failure, Smith thought, was in part a result of the Shah's sudden departure, "leaving behind only pieces of paper which are not too meaningful or forceful in Iran at best let alone when they are the subject of controversy as to their validity."⁵⁶

he arrived in the Iranian capital on Saturday 22 August to a tumultuous and emotional welcome.⁵⁷ His plane stopped in front of the ranks of the Imperial Guard, drawn up to greet their sovereign and commander. Kennett Love described the scene for *The New York Times* as the new Prime Minister met the Shah's airplane:

(U) General Zahedi half-entered the plane and kissed the Shah's knee, then backed from the door to allow the 34-year-old Emperor to descend. The Shah wore the gold-braided blue gray uniform of the Air Force Commander in Chief that had been specially flown to Baghdad for his return. His eyes were moist and his mouth was set in an effort to control his emotions.⁵⁸

The Mossadeq era was over.⁵⁹

⁵⁶(S) "Items for inclusion in messages to possibly Rome, Baghdad and Tehran," 19 August 1953, [redacted] The points that Smith wanted to impress upon the Shah came from the Iranian ambassador in Washington.


⁵⁷(S) TEHE 749, 20 August 1953.

⁵⁸(LD) *New York Times* 23 August 1953.

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(S) CIA estimated that the short-term prospects for Zahedi's government were good. "Although many Iranians will regret the downfall of Mossadeq and will thus provide a source of future opposition to the new regime, most of this group will probably acquiesce at least temporarily in the change." The Tudeh Party lost much of its support in the upsurge of anti-Communist, pro-Shah sentiment. CIA thought the Tudeh unlikely to recover its support in the near future. Zahedi faced a formidable task in dealing with the disparate elements responsible for Mossadeq's downfall, and he probably could not count on the Shah's strong support. The Shah had never supported any of his past prime ministers consistently, and CIA did not believe this would change.⁶⁰




⁶⁰(S) Office of National Estimates, "The Current Outlook in Iran," SE-49, 26 August 1953, Records of the Office of National Estimates, Directorate of Intelligence, ARC.



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Chapter 5**(U) Aftermath****(U) Zahedi Consolidates His Government**

(S) The situation in Tehran was still fluid, and no one knew if the Tudeh might try to instigate an armed revolt against Zahedi that could have led to civil war. Neither Zahedi nor his new military Chief of Staff, Gen. Batmangelich, wanted to take any chances. Batmangelich spent the first two days of his tenure as Chief of Staff ordering selected Iranian Army units to Tehran. Batmangelich may have intended to augment the security forces already in or enroute to Tehran or he may have wanted to ensure enough "show troops" to greet the Shah when he returned.

(S) Batmangelich ordered battalions from Isfahan, Kerman, Tabriz, and Khorramabad to leave their garrisons for Tehran. These cities are widely separated and cover the country from the northwest to the southeast. The Chief of Staff may have ordered other units as well, but there is no evidence supporting additional troop movements of additional units.

(S) Each battalion enroute to Iran's capital had 358 enlisted men, 79 non-commissioned officers, and five or six officers. They left with weapons, full equipment, provisions for two days, and one fire unit of ammunition. Batmangelich was anxious that the units arrive in Tehran on time, and ordered them to report their progress while enroute.

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(U) The different and widely separated home garrisons of the battalions made them unlikely co-conspirators against the new regime. The chance that any of these battalions would refuse to follow Zahedi's orders was remote.

(U) The five brigades in the Tehran garrison had not covered themselves with glory during the civil unrest ousting Mossadeq, and Batmangelich and Zahedi no doubt thought it prudent to have other troops in the capital who probably would not hesitate to crush a Tudeh-led coup attempt. Batmangelich clearly intended these forces for more than ceremonial purposes; troops do not parade or pass in review with live ammunition.

(S) Mossadeq's fall did not mean an immediate end to the problems that had bedeviled Iran's relations with the West. Almost immediately after TPAJAX, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Henry Byroade wrote a memorandum addressing two issues: How will the change in government affect Iranian policies, and what attitude should the US Government take toward the Zahedi government?¹

(U) Byroade noted that a revolution of nationalism was sweeping Asia and that any effective leader had to base his program on nationalist aspirations or face political suicide. Zahedi, therefore, was not likely to reverse many of Mossadeq's policies. Byroade warned that American policymakers would be unwise to assume "Iran will turn a new face toward the West in the immediate future." Nonetheless, he argued, Zahedi merited American support. His fall, in Byroade's opinion, would "open the way to chaos and a struggle for power in which only the Tudeh organization would be likely to win."²

(U) Two complications affected American support for the new Iranian Prime Minister. Zahedi lacked solid political support in his own right. He could expect the Shah to thwart his efforts to create a strong government, since the Shah distrusted *any* strong leader—or anyone who might emerge as a strong leader.


(U) Zahedi's options were limited. He could not become a military dictator as long as the military remained loyal to the Shah, nor could he seek broad-based civilian support without calling for new Majlis elections. The Majlis was notorious, in Byroade's words, for its "destructive criticism" and there was no guarantee that a new Majlis would cooperate with Zahedi. In short, Byroade wrote, "there is no cause for jubilation that our problems are ended in Iran. On the contrary, the future can be expected to bear remarkable similarity to the recent past."³ It was a sobering antidote to the euphoria at the highest levels of CIA.

¹(U) Memorandum from [Henry A.] Byroade, NEA, to Mr. Bowie, S/P, "Iran," 21 August 1953, RG 59, Records of the State Department, Records of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Lot 57, D 529, Box 40, NARA.

²(U) Ibid.


³(U) Ibid.

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
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


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**(U) The Tudeh Party**

(S) TPAJAX left the Tudeh Party weakened and demoralized.




(S) In November 1953, the intelligence community judged that the Tudeh's disarray made it unlikely that the Party would seize power. In a National Intelligence




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Estimate entitled *Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954*, ONE wrote that the Tudeh had been seriously disrupted, with many of its most active members under arrest. Zahedi, moreover, had purged known Tudeh sympathizers from government agencies. Even so, in ONE's view, the Tudeh was not impotent and still remained capable of sabotage and terrorism.²¹



²¹(S) Office of National Estimates, NIE-102, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1954," 16 November 1953, p. 2, Records of the Office of National Estimates, Directorate of Intelligence, ARC



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(U) Until the archives of the former Soviet Union are fully opened, it will be impossible for scholars to know the exact reasons why the Tudeh did not act. Perhaps Bahrami was right in suggesting that it was only because the Tudeh was unprepared, but the reasons are probably more complex. Stalin had been dead for only five months, and the new leaders were probably reassessing his policies. They almost certainly recognized the importance of Iran to the United States (and to the Soviet Union) but may have been unsure how much freedom of action they had. In any event, since the Tudeh was so closely directed from Moscow, it is unlikely that the Iranian Communists decided on their own to do nothing

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(U) Whatever ill effects or career damage Lavrentiev suffered from Mossadeq's fall were temporary. He eventually returned to his post in Tehran and stayed until May 1955, when Moscow recalled him to participate in a commission trying to resolve outstanding Soviet-Iranian border and financial disputes.

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(U) Kermit Roosevelt

(S) The American intelligence and diplomatic communities feted Kermit Roosevelt when he returned to Washington. It is no exaggeration to say that TPAJAX owed its success to him, inasmuch as Headquarters and the State Department were ready to abandon the project after the initial failure on 15 August. Roosevelt had quickly seen that the essence of the operation had changed into a political action. Success came from

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his initiative, quick thinking, calm analysis, and ability to recognize turning points and act decisively upon them.

(S) Although CIA did not conduct an investigation or post-mortem analysis of the operation to determine what the Agency did wrong and what it did right, Roosevelt in September 1953 talked about his role in TPAJAX before a group that included President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, the Cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others

[redacted] Roosevelt kept his audience enthralled for two hours and emphasized that the operation had succeeded because it enjoyed the support of the Iranian army and the people. It also succeeded because he did not have Washington second-guessing his every move. Cables from Tehran were scarce during the critical days of 16-19 August—for a good reason. "Gentlemen," Roosevelt joked to general applause, "I made a point of not letting you know what was happening." No one seemed more amused than Allen Dulles.²⁶

(S) Roosevelt cautioned his audience not to draw the wrong lessons from TPAJAX. "Now we'll think we can walk on water, everywhere," he said, "and we've got to be careful and restrain ourselves."²⁷

(S) Roosevelt had long thought that contradictions in American foreign policy would continue to make covert action necessary. In 1952 he wrote that, at least in the Middle East, as long as American words do not match American deeds "so long will our orthodox diplomacy in the area be hamstrung and our reliance upon clandestine operations increase."²⁸ Outside the Middle East, he wrote, strategic considerations—chiefly the fear of losing French or British support for NATO—"often require or seem to require our pursuit of a policy which alienates large segments of the Islamic-Asian world." Roosevelt also believed that the United States had a tendency "to develop policy in terms of irrelevant traditional formulae."²⁹

(U) Secretary of State Dulles did not heed Roosevelt's admonition. The Secretary was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran and much closer to home.³⁰ Officials in CIA's Directorate of Plans had been working since 1952 on schemes to depose Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. Like Mossadeq, Arbenz was willing to turn a blind eye to Communist machinations in his country. Unlike Mossadeq, however, Arbenz appeared to be a Communist sympathizer. Even the most bitter anti-Mossadeq partisans did not claim the Iranian Prime Minister was a Communist or a sympathizer.³¹

[redacted]
²⁸(C) Kermit Roosevelt, Chief, Division of Near East and Africa, Directorate of Plans, Memorandum, "General Observations on the Operational Problems Confronting NEA Division," 7 October 1952 [redacted]

²⁹(C) Ibid.

³⁰(U) Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 210.

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(U) Roosevelt's knowledge of the Middle East gave him the confidence to play the situation in Iran by ear without much Headquarters involvement. His lack of Latin American expertise would have precluded a similar approach in dealing with Guatemala. Control from Headquarters would necessarily have been tighter, restricting his freedom of movement.³⁴

(U) There was another important distinction between Iran and Guatemala. Arbenz controlled a comparatively stable Guatemalan Government; Mossadeq presided over a shambles. At the start of 1953, according to Iranian specialist Kuross A. Samii, "Iran resembled an old ship swept away by a storm with no one aboard capable of dealing with

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³² (S) See Nicholas Cullather, *Operation PBSUCCESS: The United States and Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1993); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1982); and Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

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³⁴(S) Ibid.

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the attendant frenzy." By August, Mossadeq "was barely holding on to the broken sails of his sinking ship. Everything considered, whatever might be said of the morality or the legality of American action, it still should not be characterized as having overthrown a stable regime in Iran."³⁵ What worked in Iran, Roosevelt sensed, probably would not work in Guatemala because the circumstances were so different.

(S) Neither CIA nor the US Government heeded Roosevelt's warnings about the seductiveness and danger of covert action, and PBSUCCESS went forward successfully. With the overthrow of Arbenz, many in the State Department and CIA thought American action had narrowly averted a Communist government in Guatemala. The relative rapidity and ease with which TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS had accomplished their objectives, however, deceived CIA officials. They drew the erroneous lesson that the Agency could alter world events in the Third World at will and with minimal expense. It would take the debacle at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to vindicate Roosevelt, but by then the man who had brought down Mossadeq had resigned from CIA.³⁶

³⁵(U) Kuross A. Samii, *Involvement By Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), p. 143.

³⁶(U) Roosevelt, *Countercoup*, p. 210.

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Chapter 6

(S) Evaluating TPAJAX

(U) During the 1979-81 Iranian hostage crisis, a reporter asked President Jimmy Carter whether he thought that "it was proper for the United States to restore the Shah to the throne in 1953 against the popular will within Iran." Instead of correcting the reporter's loaded question, the President replied, "That's ancient history, and I don't think it's appropriate or helpful for me to go into the propriety of something that happened 30 years ago."¹

(U) Many diplomatic historians, intelligence historians, and political scientists do not consider TPAJAX "ancient history." Eighteen years after President Carter's remark, the questions implicit in the reporter's query persist and continue to stir controversy.

(S) The extensive secondary literature on TPAJAX and other American covert operations in the early 1950s focuses on a single issue, whether stated or implied: Was the operation in the US national interest? With this question as a guide, this chapter evaluates the covert action as its contemporaries saw it and as we view it retrospectively.

(S) TPAJAX and the National Interest: the Contemporaneous View

(S) Official Washington thought that TPAJAX was a stunning victory for the West. The operation almost certainly prevented Iran from sliding into political anarchy and becoming a target too tempting for the Tudeh and its Soviet mentors to ignore. In the short term, a stable Zahedi Government permitted a rapid settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, thereby restarting the flow of oil and providing a much-needed boost for the sagging Iranian economy.

(S) At the time, neither Washington nor London could foresee the long-range benefits that would flow from TPAJAX. The pro-Western, strongly anti-Communist

¹(U) President Jimmy Carter, "The President's News Conference of February 13, 1980, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter*. Book I-January 1 to May 23, 1980 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 307.

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policy of the Zahedi Government that the United States obtained at minimal cost² would last for 26 years. Secure in the knowledge that the US would support Iran against the USSR, the Shah was able to turn his attention to domestic matters. He began a series of far-reaching modernization efforts, including land reform and steps toward the emancipation of women.

(U) TPAJAX came at a time when the events in pre-war Europe were a fresh memory. Americans had seen how Nazi subversion could destroy a country like Czechoslovakia. They had seen the consequences of weakness and appeasement before Nazi and Japanese demands. They had suffered the incalculable cost of failing to act when action might have stopped further aggression. Many were determined never again to let the appearance of weakness and indecision encourage aggression.

(U) Neither the White House nor State Department had the slightest doubt that the Soviets coveted Iran and would do whatever they could, short of war, to bring that country within the Soviet orbit. The Azeri crisis of 1947 showed that unless checked, Stalin would continue to test the West's resolve.

(U) Stalin's death in March 1953 added a dangerous element of ambiguity to Soviet intentions. Who would succeed the late dictator, the "breaker of nations"?³ Would Soviet policy become more or less aggressive? Would the Soviets reoccupy Iranian Azerbaijan? Would they encourage the Tudeh to topple Mossadeq? The White House, the State Department, and CIA struggled to find answers to these questions.

(U) Sending American troops to Iran was never a practical option for logistical and political reasons. An American military occupation almost certainly would have led to war. The USSR would have invoked the terms of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship Between Iran and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and occupied the northern part of the country. Iran would have been divided into a Communist north and a free south. Fear of partition lay behind Washington's objection to the proposed British occupation of the port city of Abadan early in the oil nationalization crisis.

(U) A covert political operation promised to attain American foreign policy and strategic objectives in Iran without the threat of war. CIA gave the Eisenhower administration flexibility where diplomacy had failed and military action was not practical. In addition, CIA gave the US Government "plausible deniability." If a covert action went awry, the President could deny American involvement. With these considerations in mind, and given the widely held Western outlook on the international

³(U) Historian Robert Conquest's term. See, Robert Conquest, *Stalin: Breaker of Nations* (New York: Viking Press, 1991).

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situation in general and on Soviet intentions in particular, the Eisenhower administration's decision to act in Iran was reasonable and understandable.

(S) TPAJAX and the National Interest: The Retrospective View

(U) A kind of historical hubris results from the belief that because we know far more about the consequences of past acts than contemporaneous actors could know, we are more likely than they are to have a correct interpretation of events and of cause and effect. We cannot know the consequences of decisions not made or actions not taken any more than contemporaries did. Nevertheless, time and knowledge of past events provide the historian with a perspective not available to contemporaries.

(U) Some historians argue today that TPAJAX was not in the US national interest.⁴ Maintaining that American policymakers in the 1950s defined national security narrowly, these historians emphasize that actions intended to enhance American power ultimately have the opposite effect if they violate democratic ideals. In this view, intervening in domestic political processes in foreign countries inevitably undermines US national security by weakening the values on which US security rests in the long run.

(S) Specifically, critics of TPAJAX contend that it damaged American national interests for a number of reasons. In their view, it returned the Shah to his throne illegally. The operation removed a popular, legitimately elected Prime Minister from office (who some now claim would have fallen eventually even without American intervention). Finally, American action created a reservoir of resentment among the Iranian people that helped create the conditions for Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in 1978-79.⁵ In short, what appeared to be a short-term success ultimately proved to be a failure.

(U) This critique deserves careful attention; its more thoughtful and articulate proponents appear to make a persuasive case. The Shah *did* leave Tehran, to return only when he was certain Mossadeq was gone and American support for the Peacock Throne assured. Mossadeq *was* popular among some segments of the population. Some Iranians *were* disillusioned with the United States. They had hoped that the US, as the great postwar anti-colonial power, would not intrigue against their country as the British and Russians had done. A close examination of the facts, however, reveals flaws in the revisionist critique.

⁴ See, e.g., Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1980); Barry Rubin, *Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988).

⁵(U) C.M. Woodhouse, one of the British principals in the operation, deals with this point in his autobiography *Something Ventured*. He contends that what Britain and the United States saw in 1953 was vastly different from what happened in 1979. The proper analogy, he asserts, is to the events in Afghanistan from 1973 to 1980: the overthrow of a weak monarchy by nationalist forces, who in turn would be overtaken by indigenous Communists, who in turn would call in the Soviet Army. C.M. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured* (London: Granada, 1982), p. 131.

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(U) Did CIA Restore the Shah to His Throne?

(S) TPAJAX did not "restore" the Shah to his throne either technically or constitutionally. Although the Iranian monarch left Tehran during the operation, he never abdicated. Mossadeq's argument that the Shah's *firmans* were invalid was disingenuous. The Iranian constitution gave the Shah the right to dismiss the Prime Minister. As soon as Mossadeq refused to obey the Shah's legal order, he was rebelling against constitutional authority. From that point on, TPAJAX became an operation to remove the usurper Mossadeq and permit Zahedi, the legitimate Prime Minister, to take office. Unlike Mossadeq's government, Zahedi's government recognized the Shah's constitutional authority.

(S) Did CIA Act Against a Legitimate Leader Enjoying Popular Support?

(U) Although there is no doubt that Mossadeq captured the imagination of segments of Iranian society with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, his political support dwindled steadily. By August 1953 he did not command mass support. The Tudeh and splinters of the National Front were the only political parties willing to support him.

(U) The pro-Shah sentiments of the Tehran crowds on 19 August 1953 were genuine. Although CIA had a hand in starting the demonstrations, they swelled spontaneously and took on a life of their own that surprised even Kermit Roosevelt. Many average Iranians seemed convinced that they had to choose between the Shah and Communism. In marching against the Tudeh, Iranians were supporting the Shah. Iran expert Donald Wilber's plan to make this choice explicit had worked.

(S) By August 1953, Mossadeq's support was vociferous but increasingly narrow. The Shah's support was latent but deep, and took a crisis—like the news of Tudeh demonstrators pulling down the Shah's statues—to awaken. Khorramabad residents, for example, wildly rejoiced at hearing of the monarch's return and threatened to destroy the homes of Tudeh leaders. Security forces prevented them from doing so.

(U) Before dismissing reports like those from Khorramabad as propaganda, it must be remembered that CIA was able to influence directly events only in the capital city, and there only barely. Kermit Roosevelt had neither the money nor the agents to initiate the kinds of demonstrations that took place in Iran's widely separated cities.

(U) Has CIA's Role Been Exaggerated?

(S) If Mossadeq's growing unpopularity invalidates one criticism of TPAJAX, it strengthens another. As indicated above, some historians argue that Mossadeq's deteriorating political base made it likely he would have fallen without American intervention. In this view, TPAJAX was unnecessary because Iranian domestic politics would have solved the problem itself.

(S) The American role is one of the new debates among academicians. Books published before the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 tend to assign a central role to CIA

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and Kermit Roosevelt.⁶ Post-revolutionary authors like Sepehr Zabih take the opposite position. Zabih asserts that ascribing a large role to CIA and SIS understates "the complex interaction of external and internal political forces of this era."⁷

(U) American University's Amos Perlmutter belongs to the school of thought that considers Mossadeq's fall inevitable regardless of Western actions. In a foreword to Zabih's *The Mossadeq Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution* Perlmutter writes that CIA's "role in these climactic events was not very significant, despite some of the heavily unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such as Kermit Roosevelt."

(U) To a large extent, the return of the Shah and the downfall of Mossadeq were made possible by divisions among the political forces of the left and right, the left split among nationalists, Marxists and Communists and the right split among the reactionary and xenophobic clergymen and their more liberal counterparts.⁸

(U) Perlmutter is correct in saying that Iranian political divisions made the fall of Mossadeq possible, but merely because something is possible does not ensure that it will happen. CIA's role was significant. Without Kermit Roosevelt's leadership, guidance, and ability to put some backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit, no one would have moved against Mossadeq. Iran had many political factions but few legitimate leaders—and even fewer leaders with the discipline and will necessary to take risks.

(U) A key difference between Mossadeq and his domestic opponents was his ability to control the streets. Although much of the National Front had deserted the Prime Minister, the Tudeh, by this time Iran's only disciplined political party, rallied to him when its aims and Mossadeq's coincided. Tudeh demonstrations intimidated the opposition and kept the army on the sidelines. Mossadeq's opponents would have been unable to overcome these disadvantages without outside help.

(U) The notion that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway ignores the realities of Iranian politics. No group was able, without help, to contest control of the streets of Tehran with the Tudeh. The opposition needed a rallying point and a psychological trigger. Roosevelt provided both and gave Tehranians a choice between the Shah and the

⁶(S) Kermit Roosevelt, *Counter coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Dr. Donald N. Wilber, one of the principal characters in TPAJAX, was one of many criticizing Roosevelt's book. "Of its 217 pages," Wilber wrote in his own memoirs, "about 100 are fillers, reviewing recent history. Concerning Operation AJAX itself, the book is not meticulously correct in reporting meetings where plans were drawn up or in quoting those who were there. In my opinion, it should have been subjected to a full editorial revision." See Donald N. Wilber, *Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incursions* (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1986), p. 9. Mark Gasiorowski writes that *Counter coup* has many mistakes and omissions. See Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'etat in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (Aug. 1987): 261.

⁷(U) Sepehr Zabih, *The Mossadeq Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution* (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), p. 126.

⁸(U) Amos Perlmutter, forward to *The Mossadeq Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution* by Sepehr Zabih (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), p. vii.

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Tudeh. Ordinary Iranians were willing to demonstrate their support for the monarch only when they became convinced, through the pro-Shah demonstrations in the streets, that others were doing the same.

(S) The actual events of TPAJAX suggest how a purely Iranian operation would have fared without CIA direction. When Mossadeq arrested Imperial Guard commander Col. Nassiri, the other principals became disheartened and went into hiding. Gen. Batmangelich turned around when he saw troops loyal to Mossadeq surrounding the General Staff office building. The operation collapsed before it started.

(U) Historians arguing that Mossadeq would have fallen anyway fail to answer a critical related question: Without US intervention, what would have replaced him? In August 1953 Iran seemed more likely to degenerate into chaos than to experience a stable transfer of power from Mossadeq to someone else. No potential prime minister was strong enough to command a majority in the Majlis, or even to form a coalition government out of the factions and splinter groups comprising Iranian politics. If Ayatollah Kashani, whom the US had briefly considered supporting in mid-1953, had somehow been able to succeed Mossadeq, his government might have resembled Ayatollah Khomeini's regime more than Fazlollah Zahedi's.

(S) Was TPAJAX Responsible for Khomeini's Islamic Revolution?

(U) If the United States and United Kingdom had not intervened in Iran's chaotic politics in August 1953, would Ayatollah Khomeini have been able to launch his Islamic Revolution 25 years later? Asking this question is like asking whether World War II would have been fought if Germany had won World War I and Hitler had remained an obscure corporal. We cannot know the consequences of events that did not happen, but we can engage in informed speculation.

(U) Revisionists contend that CIA stifled Iran's drive to democracy and strengthened the rule of the autocratic Shah, thereby making Khomeini's revolution all but inevitable. Despite its faults, in this view, Mossadeq's Government represented the popular will. His government reflected a vision for Iran's future that the Shah did not share. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wanted to transform Iran into a modern Westernized state; his people preferred a more traditional society.

(U) In removing Mossadeq, the revisionists continue, the United States and Britain effectively strangled traditional Iranian nationalism. Frustrated and resentful, the people rose 25 years later in rage against the Shah and the United States, disparaged as the "Great Satan." For there can be no doubt that despite years of official American and British denials, most Iranians have been convinced of the CIA's role in Mossadeq's fall.⁹

⁹ (S) One of the participants in TPAJAX assured the author that many Iranians only suspected the American role in the operation, subject of bazaar rumors for years. *The Cambridge History of Iran*'s assessment is probably more accurate. "Nevertheless, Iranians have never had the slightest doubt that the C.I.A., acting on behalf of the American and British governments, organized the conspirators and paid the pro-Shah mobs led by toughs from southern Tehran which, together with army units, were in control of the streets by nightfall on 19 August. By 1982 this tenacious rumour had been fully confirmed and is now seen as incontrovertible" (footnote omitted). Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds., *The Cambridge*

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(U) A problem with this thesis is that Mossadeq's Iran was not moving toward democracy. The Prime Minister's increasing political isolation and the fragmentation of the National Front, as documented above, had weakened his position and made him desperate. His dictatorial grab for power from the Majlis alienated his former allies and gained him new political enemies. Iran was, to repeat Iran specialist Kuross Samii's apt metaphor, "an old ship swept away by a storm with no one on board capable of dealing with the attendant frenzy."¹⁰

(U) In fact, Khomeini's revolution was a reaction against secularism, modernization, and the Shah's misrule, not a push for a return to the National Front. The streets of Tehran rang with shouts of fanatical support for Khomeini rather than nostalgic calls for Mossadeq. The Ayatollah was not interested in Mossadeq or the things he stood for. The last thing Khomeini wanted was a secular government with multi-party participation. He would have called for fundamentalist revolution against *any* government, including a National Front or Tudeh Government, that promoted modernization, the emancipation of women, and secularization.

(U) Edward Shirley, the former CIA DO employee who journeyed through revolutionary Iran, argues that the revisionist thesis also underestimates the role the clerics played in TPAJAX. Without the support of Ayatollahs Kashani and Behbehani, Shirley doubts the covert political action could have succeeded. What the ayatollahs did in 1953 with American and British help, they might have been able to do later without such help. Alternatively, given Mossadeq's growing political weakness and isolation from Iranian society, the clerics may have defeated him and the National Front in general elections.

(U) In short, according to Shirley, the 1953 aborted-democracy theory is appealing, but is "too convenient in its diabolization of the CIA and MI6, and too Persian in its determination to make someone else responsible for failure."

(S) TPAJAX and the Future of American Covert Action

(S) TPAJAX exerted a powerful influence on the DDP's thinking about covert action. Unfortunately, Allen Dulles and others in the DDP did not evaluate their experience critically and apparently drew dubious conclusions. The easy success of the Iranian and Guatemalan operations seemed to herald a "golden age" of covert action, and a sober reappraisal of the utility and flexibility of covert action as a foreign policy instrument did not occur until President John Kennedy fired Dulles after the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.¹¹

(S) Dulles and his colleagues were correct in regarding covert action as an important weapon of Cold War foreign policy, giving the President the means to halt or

History of Iran, vol. 7, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 263.

¹⁰(U) Kuross A. Samii, *Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran* (University Park, PA: the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), p. 143.

¹¹(U) See Peter Wyden, *Bay of Pigs: the Untold Story* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).

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reverse developments he deemed harmful to American interests. This capability freed the US from merely reacting to Soviet moves or threats of moves and permitted American action without the threat of direct military confrontation. Moreover, early American covert action successes notified the Soviets that the United States was an able player in the game of high-stakes international intrigue it had only recently joined.

(S) Leading DDP figures erred in relying on covert action too heavily and resorting to it too readily. As an intelligence professional, Dulles must have recognized the limits and risks of covert action. The success of TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS, however, was seductive. Kermit Roosevelt's warning that covert actions like TPAJAX would succeed over the long run only with the support of the indigenous military and population fell on deaf years. The operation in Guatemala seemed to show that both elements could be neutralized quite easily—the military by paramilitary operations and elements of popular opposition by psychological operations.¹²

(S) Peter Grose, Dulles's biographer, writes that the DCI drew a straight line from Guatemala in 1954 to the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Any doubts Dulles may have had about TPAJAX and PBSUCCESS vanished as both operations unfolded and benefited from unexpected luck. Both operations may have made Dulles and the DDP overly confident that in these sorts of operations "something would turn up" that would lead to ultimate success. They miscalculated in assuming—and expecting—that the Bay of Pigs invasion would follow the same pattern.¹³

(S) Perhaps the most important and unique result of TPAJAX was to strengthen CIA's position within the government as an instrument of policy and solidify its responsibility for clandestine activity. Up to this point, the Agency had not been taken seriously

The fall of Mossadeq was a watershed in demonstrating *civilian* clandestine operational expertise and in putting a *civilian* intelligence agency at the forefront of planning and executing covert operations. After TPAJAX, the military could not argue, as it had during the Congressional hearings for the National Security Act of 1947, that civilians did not have the background, training, or experience for clandestine activity.

¹²(U) Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p. 384.


¹³(U) Ibid.

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Postscript

(U) The Shadow of the Pahlavis

(S) The political landscape of Iran today is vastly different from what it was in 1953, but the motivations of some of the players remain essentially the same.



(S) Iran continues to draw Moscow's attention for several reasons. Its size and strategic location make it a potential threat to Russian interests. The Cold War may be over, but that does not mean Russian and American national interests in the Middle East coincide. A sense of competition in the region lingers, even if its consequences are no longer potentially catastrophic. TPAJAX appears to have forestalled but did not end the Russian drive for influence in Iran.

(U) The average Iranian still believes that the British and Americans are omnipotent and that if they removed Mossadeq, either or both somehow put the mullahs in power. Edward Shirley's *Know Thine Enemy: A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran* recounts several conversations he had with Iranians while traveling through that country. One asked Shirley for help:

(U) 'Americans should help us. Your secretary of state was spit upon by Khomeini. He calls Iran the most evil state in the world, but he does nothing. Unless you want Iranians thinking that you like the mollahs, you should bring them down. The British put them in, and America should drive them out. The young Shah, he is like his father, a coward. And the United States wastes money on him. Iranians don't want to fight anymore. They need a sign from America.'

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Another told Shirley it did not matter what Iranians thought. "It only matters what the Americans and the *Englisss* think. They hold the power. The *Englisss* have always had the clergy in their pockets." ²




² (U) Edward Shirley, *Know Thine Enemy: A Spy's Journey into Revolutionary Iran* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), pp. 75, 106.

³ (U) See Harold Bloom, *The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition into the Forces of History* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), pp. 264-70. SAVAK's successor in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VAVAK), known in the West as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). According to historian Carl Wege, VAVAK "is noted primarily for assassinating Iranian dissidents abroad" and has been doing so since the revolution in 1979. Its first victim was the Shah's nephew Shahriar Shafiq (in Paris, December 1979), but its most famous victim was former prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar, assassinated in August 1991. Carl Anthony Wege, "Iranian Intelligence Organizations," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 10 (Fall 1997): 289. Heritage Foundation Senior Policy Analyst James Phillips writes that "more than a dozen Iranian dissidents have been assassinated in European cities since 1987." VAVAK even struck in the

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United States, murdering Iranian political activist Ali A. Tabatabai, founder of the Iran Freedom Foundation, in his Bethesda, Maryland home in July 1980. James Phillips, "The Challenge of Revolutionary Iran," Heritage Foundation Committee Brief No. 24, 29 March 1996.

⁵ (U) "Iran: Internal Security," DODOD 141-2B, 21 May 1993. The information in this report is classified TOP SECRET UMBRA NOFORN; the title is unclassified. The report, already five years old, states that Iran's various tribes have not been a serious threat to Tehran's rule for several years. No reporting since then has warranted a qualification or change of that opinion.

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Appendix A

(S) TPAJAX Chronology

8 January 1951	Office of National Estimates (ONE), Central Intelligence Agency, publishes NIE 14, <i>The Importance of Iranian and Middle East Oil to Western Europe Under Peacetime Conditions</i> .
7 March 1951	General Ali Razmara, Iranian Prime Minister, assassinated.
16 March 1951	ONE publishes SE 3, <i>The Current Crisis in Iran</i> .
5 April 1951	ONE publishes NIE 6, <i>Iran's Position in the East-West Conflict</i> .
29 April 1951	Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi names Mohammed Mossadeq as prime minister of Iran.
2 May 1951	Iran nationalizes the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, retroactive to 20 March 1951.
22 May 1951	ONE publishes SE 6, <i>Current Developments in Iran</i> .
August 1951	Anglo-Iranian oil negotiations collapse.
September 1951	Britain embargoes shipments to Iran of iron, steel, sugar, oil processing equipment, and other goods that could be resold for dollars.
12 January 1952	Iran orders all British consulates closed by 21 January.

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4 February 1952	ONE publishes NIE 46, <i>Probable Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil Settlement.</i>
16 July 1952	Mossadeq resigns as Prime Minister.
21 July 1952	After five days of demonstrations and rioting by members of the National Front, the Shah renames Mossadeq Prime Minister.
31 July 1952	DDP Wisner reports to DCI Smith that the consensus at a meeting at the State Department on 30 July was that for the moment there was little the CIA could do in Iran.
14 October 1952	ONE publishes SE 33, <i>Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime Iran.</i>
22 October 1952	Iran breaks off diplomatic relations with Britain.
13 November 1952	ONE publishes NIE 75, <i>Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953.</i>
20 November 1952	National Security Council issues NSC 136/1, <i>The Present Situation in Iran.</i>

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[REDACTED]

26 February 1953

[REDACTED]

Allen Dulles sworn in as DCI.

[REDACTED]

March 1953

[REDACTED]

Under
Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith concludes that
Mossadeq's tenure in office is inimical to US interests.
State Department authorizes CIA to consider operations
that would replace Mossadeq.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

28 May 1953

Prime Minister Mossadeq asks President Eisenhower for
American financial aid.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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
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3 June 1953

Ambassador Henderson arrives in Washington for consultations.

8 June 1953

Ambassador Henderson briefed on TPAJAX in Washington.



29 June 1953

President Eisenhower informs Mossadeq that Iran will not receive further US aid until the oil nationalization issue is resolved.



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11 July 1953

President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and DCI Allen Dulles approve TPAJAX.

21 July 1953

In Tehran the National Front and the Tudeh Party stage demonstrations commemorating 21 July 1952.

23 July 1953

British Ambassador to the United States Roger Mellor Makins presents assurances to Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith that UK Government would be flexible in its approach to oil question.

25 July 1953

Princess Ashraf arrives in Tehran.

28 July 1953

Secretary of State Dulles gives a press conference in which he says that "Recent developments in Iran, especially the growing activity of the supposedly illegal Communist Party which appears to be tolerated by the Iranian government, have caused us concern."


29 July 1953

Princess Ashraf meets with the Shah but is unable to convince him to dismiss Mossadeq.

30 July 1953

Princess Ashraf leaves Tehran at request of Mossadeq government after having spoken to the Shah.

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


4 August 1953

President Eisenhower states at Governors' Conference in Seattle that the US will not stand by and let Asian nations fall behind the Iron curtain.

7 August 1953

Asadollah Rashidian again meets with the Shah, who agrees that action should be taken on 10 or 11 August.




12 August 1953



 Col. Nematollah Nassiri, commander of the Shah's Imperial Guard, takes the *firman*s by plane to Ramsar.

13 August 1953

Late in the evening Col. Nassiri returns to Tehran with the signed *firman*s: 



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15/16 August 1953

[REDACTED] During the night of 15/16 August, Col. Nassiri tries to deliver the *firmans* to Mossadeq dismissing him, but is arrested. General Taghi Riahi, Mossadeq's chief of staff, has troops at strategic points in Tehran. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

16 August 1953

At 0545 Radio Tehran announces an abortive coup. At 0600 Mossadeq meets with cabinet to receive reports on the situation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

16 August 1953

Radio Tehran broadcasts message at noon from Mossadeq: "According to the will of the people, expressed by referendum, the 17th Majlis is dissolved. Elections for the 18th session will be held soon."

16 August 1953

Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi holds a press conference at 1400 at which he makes anti-Shah statements.

16 August 1953

Crowds mass in Majlis Square around 1930 to hear speeches attacking the Shah. Crowds learn for the first time that the Shah had fled.

17 August 1953

Radio Tehran at 1030 calls on General Zahedi to surrender.

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18 August 1953	Shah leaves Baghdad for Rome on a commercial flight. Some morning newspapers run copies of the <i>firman</i> .
18 August 1953	Sporadic violence breaks out.
19 August 1953	Pro-Shah groups assemble at 0900 in the Tehran bazaar. Newspapers continue to print the <i>firmans</i> and alleged interviews with Zahedi quoted as insisting that his government is the only legal government.
19 August 1953	Pro-Shah truckloads of soldiers posted in mid-morning at key points in Tehran.
19 August 1953	Gen. Riahi tells Mossadeq at 1030 that he no longer controls the army.
19 August 1953	Radio Tehran falls into royalist hands at 1420.
19 August 1953	Zahedi speaks over Radio Tehran at 1725. He seems to be consolidating his hold over the government.
19 August 1953	Mossadeq's house is destroyed in the evening around 1900.
5 December 1953	United Kingdom and Iran agree to reestablish diplomatic relations.
21 December 1953	An Iranian military court in Tehran sentences Mossadeq to three years' solitary confinement for disobeying the Shah's order dismissing him and for dissolving the Majlis.

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
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Appendix B




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
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Appendix D

(U) Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Mossadeq

(U) Mohammed Mossadeq was born in Tehran on 16 June 1882 into a prominent political family.¹ After working for several years in the Ministry of Finance, he left Iran to pursue advanced studies at the University of Liege in Belgium and the University of Neuchatel in Switzerland. He received a doctorate of laws (LL.D.) from Neuchatel in 1914. Mossadeq returned to Iran in 1915, ostensibly to resume his career in the Ministry of Finance, but was elected to the Third Majlis that same year. He later served as Governor-General of the Province of Fars (1921), Minister of Finance (1921-22), Governor General of Azerbaijan (1922), and Minister of Justice (four months in 1923).²

(U) In January 1924, Mossadeq took his seat in the Fifth Majlis as an elected deputy from Tehran. The central issue before the Majlis was the termination of the Qajar

¹(U) Various writers give different dates of birth. Barry Rubin asserts that Mossadeq was born in 1881; James A. Bill uses the 1882 date; Faramarz S. Fatemi claims Mossadeq was born in 1879; Mossadeq's entry in the 1951 edition of *Current Biography* gives 1879 as his year of birth. Farhad Diba's *Mohammed Mossadeq: A Political Biography* probably comes closest to solving the mystery. Diba says that the confusion stemmed from an error on Mossadeq's identity card. Mossadeq registered with Precinct 3 of the Tehran police, and the clerk made a mistake converting the Arabic year into the Iranian year. The error made the future Prime Minister appear older than he really was. The family Koran, which surfaced years later, records that Mossadeq was born 16 June 1882. See, Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 58; James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 53; Faramarz S. Fatemi, *The U.S.S.R. in Iran: The Background History of Russian and Anglo-American Conflict in Iran, Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism, and the Fall of the Shah* (New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1980), p. 54; Farhad Diba, *Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 3.

²(U) Fatemi, p. 54; Bill, pp. 53-54, *Current Biography*, 1951, p. 444.

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Dynasty and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty under Reza Khan.³ Mossadeq, related to the Qajar family, strongly opposed Reza Khan's ascension as Shah and continued to oppose him after the Majlis voted him hereditary Shah in October 1925. Mossadeq's outspokenness brought him to the attention of the British Legation. In the Legation's listing of prominent Iranians, Mossadeq's entry read, "Poses as a jurist and talks a lot of nonsense. Is nothing but a demagogue."⁴

(U) Reza Shah did not tolerate Mossadeq's defiance for long. He banished the troublesome deputy from Tehran to his native village at Ahmadabad, outside of Tehran, and later imprisoned him. For all practical purposes, Mossadeq was out of Iranian politics from 1926 to 1941.⁵

(U) World War II changed Mossadeq's fortunes. The future prime minister left prison when British and Soviet troops occupied Iran in August 1941 and Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.⁶ In 1944 Mossadeq Tehran again elected him to the Majlis. He gained national recognition during the 1940s for strongly opposing Iranian oil concessions to foreign powers—including a concession the Soviets demanded during the Azerbaijan crisis in 1946. His opposition to the USSR's support of breakaway Azerbaijan was not as vociferous. He rose in the Majlis to propose changing the constitution to transform Iran into a federation of semiautonomous states, including Azerbaijan. The other deputies shouted him down.⁷

(U) Mossadeq's prominence and the public's perception that he was a man of principle for having stood up to Reza Shah propelled him into a leading role in an emerging political force known as the *Jabha-yi Milli* or National Front.⁸ His work in the 16 Majlis as the chairman of the Parliamentary Oil Commission (a body the Majlis established to review the options open to the government, then renegotiating the United Kingdom's oil concession) drew even more attention to him. He began to attract a following in the streets and bazaar, and was becoming a formidable political figure.⁹

(U) When an Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Prime Minister Gen. Ali Razmara in March 1951, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi replaced him with Hussein Ala. Ala held office a little more than a month before resigning on 27 April. The Majlis then voted to recommend that the Shah appoint Mossadeq as Prime Minister. The Shah did so on 29 April 1951.¹⁰

³(U) On 31 October 1925 the Majlis elected Reza Khan as "hereditary" Shah. *Current Biography*, 1951, p. 444.

⁴(U) Wilfred Knapp, "1921-1941: the Period of Riza Shah," in *Twentieth Century Iran*, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), p. 28.

⁵(U) Bill, p. 54.

⁶(U) Reza Shah abdicated on 16 September 1941.

⁷(U) *Current Biography*, 1951, p. 445.

⁸(U) See chapter I.

⁹(U) Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 253.

¹⁰(U) *Current Biography*, 1951, pp. 444-45.

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(U) Western statesmen did not know how to take the new Prime Minister because he neither looked nor acted like they thought heads of government should look and act. Secretary of State Acheson, for example, described the Prime Minister as "small and frail" without "a shred of hair on his billiard-ball head; a thin face protruded into a long beak of a nose flanked by two bright, shoebutton eyes." Mossadeq's mannerisms were quirky to Western eyes, and Acheson likened his quick, nervous movements to a bird hopping on a perch.¹¹

(U) Mossadeq knew how to play the role of a frail old man when it suited his purposes. He cried, moaned, and fainted when addressing the Majlis. His nose ran. He often conducted state business from his bed and delivered speeches in pink pajamas. In naming him "Man of the Year" *Time* magazine dubbed Mossadeq "an appalling caricature of a statesman."¹²

(U) Mossadeq's apparent physical frailty and almost constant illness masked an indomitable will. The US Ambassador, Henry F. Grady, warned that the Prime Minister "is not to be discounted. He's a man of unusual ability, well educated at European universities, and of great culture. He is a Persian gentleman."¹³

(S) CIA did not nor underestimate Mossadeq, but it also did not minimize the magnitude of the problems facing his new government. In a Special Estimate prepared a month after Mossadeq became Prime Minister, the Office of National Estimates characterized him as an "impractical visionary and a poor administrator," but added that

¹¹(U) Dean Acheson, *Present At the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 503.

¹² (U) C.M. Woodhouse relates how Mossadeq's histrionics took in Majlis Deputy Hassan Alavi, a medical doctor. "Musaddiq was making an impassioned speech, all about the British milking his country like a wicked landlord milking a peasant's cow. Alavi knew it was all nonsense, but listened with tears of emotion in his eyes. Suddenly Musaddiq collapsed on the floor of the Majlis, apparently unconscious. Alavi rushed forward, pushing other Deputies aside and crying: 'Let me through! I'm a doctor!' He reached Musaddiq to take his pulse, in an agony of dread lest the great national leader had been taken from them. Then Musaddiq slowly opened one eye and winked at him. Alavi laughed admiringly at the joke against himself." C. M. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured* (London: Granada, 1982), pp. 113-14. Vernon Walters relates a similar story with an unnamed Majlis deputy (probably Alavi) in *Silent Missions*. Vernon Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1978), p. 247.

¹³(U) Henry F. Grady, "The Real Story of Iran," *U.S. News and World Report*, 19 October 1951, p. 14. Quoted in James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 55. C.M. Woodhouse had a low opinion of Grady and considered the United States inadequately represented in Tehran during the oil crisis. "The American [Grady] was a business tycoon whom I had previously encountered in Greece," Woodhouse wrote in his memoirs. "He was known (at any rate to his wife) as 'President Truman's trouble-shooter,' which meant that he was being rewarded for his contributions to the Democratic Party. Fortunately he was soon replaced by an able career diplomat, Loy Henderson, and he went off to shoot trouble elsewhere." C. M. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured* (London: Granada, 1982), p. 109.

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he was in a very strong political position unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future.¹⁴

(U) After TPAJAX, Zahedi's forces found and arrested the former Prime Minister on 20 August 1953. His fate then lay in the Shah's hands. The monarch discussed several options with Ambassador Henderson: trial, execution, commutation of sentence, internal exile, or exile.

(S) Washington urged the Shah to avoid any action that might make Mossadeq a martyr. A public trial was inadvisable for this reason. CIA favored having him fade from sight by "enforced residence in a small village" under strong surveillance. The State Department opposed a public trial but made no other recommendation.¹⁵

(U) Mossadeq's trial before a military court began on 8 November 1953 and ended on 21 December. The deposed Prime Minister appeared in court in a bedjacket and according to *The New York Times*, "alternately bellowed defiance, threatened suicide, challenged the public prosecutor to a wrestling match and resorted to histrionic weeping."¹⁷ On 11 January 1954, the court sentenced him to three years of solitary confinement, starting from the date of his arrest, 20 August 1953.¹⁸ He was convicted of disobeying the Shah's *firmans* and illegally dissolving the Majlis.

(S) The Shah seemed satisfied with the sentence. He told Ambassador Henderson that a longer sentence might have generated public sympathy for Mossadeq. If the sentence had not included solitary confinement, the Shah would not have been in a position to commute it to banishment, which he intended to do (and did do in 1956). Iranians generally consider simple imprisonment no worse than banishment and not worthy of commutation.¹⁹

¹⁴(S) SE-6, *Current Developments in Iran*, 22 May 1951.

¹⁵(S) Dir 16678, 21 August 1953.

¹⁷ (U) This description appears in Mossadeq's obituary in *The New York Times*, 5 March 1967.

¹⁸(S) L.P. Elwell-Sutton writes that the court's decision came on 21 December 1953. I have used the January 1954 date because it appears in a State Department cable summarizing Mossadeq's trial and imprisonment. See, L.P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955), p. 7, (U); Dispatch 864 from American Embassy Tehran to Department of State, "What to Do With Dr. Mosadeq?—A Knotty Problem for the Government," 11 April 1956 (S)

¹⁹ (S) Loy W. Henderson, "Memorandum Summarizing Conversation Between the Shah of Iran and Loy W. Henderson, American Ambassador, on the Afternoon of December 22, 1953," attachment to Dispatch 368 From American Embassy, Tehran to Department of State, 28

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(S) The Shah confided to the Ambassador that he had sent a statement to the trial judge before sentencing. He told the judge that nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had served the interests of Iran and that Mossadeq had had the monarch's support during his first year as Prime Minister. Consequently, he harbored no personal animus toward Mossadeq for what the latter had done during the rest of his tenure.²⁰

(S) The monarch explained that he had sent the statement for two reasons. First, he wanted to make clear that he favored nationalizing the AIOC so that the nationalists did not think he had abandoned them. He said he encouraged nationalism but wanted to direct it himself. Second, and more importantly, he wanted to distance his regime from the British and dispel the impression that Iran was under London's thumb. Because it appeared that the return of the British to Iran would coincide with Mossadeq's sentencing, the Shah wanted to emphasize that he supported Mossadeq's attitude toward Britain during the first year of his prime ministership.²¹

(S) The Shah was pleased with the results of his intervention into Mossadeq's trial. He thought that he had thrown the former Prime Minister off balance and had disarmed Mossadeq's supporters.²²

(U) Mossadeq, however, was far from off balance. From his confinement in the Second Armored Brigade's prison in Tehran,²³ he immediately appealed to a higher military court. The military appeals court affirmed the sentence on 21 April 1954. The former Prime Minister then appealed the military tribunal's decision to the Supreme Court, Iran's highest civil court. Under the Iranian Constitution, such an appeal could occur only with the Shah's permission. On 21 May the Shah agreed to let the Supreme Court review the case.²⁴

(U) In January 1956, Mossadeq wrote to the Supreme Court asking for an early decision and the opportunity to be heard in person. He sent another letter to the Court a month later outlining the reasons why the military court had no jurisdiction over him.²⁵

(U) The Supreme Court issued its decision on 12 March 1956. Without addressing the merits of the case, it ruled that the lower military court had jurisdiction to try Mossadeq. The Court added that it reached its opinion under "special circumstances." On 1 April, Mossadeq protested that the Supreme Court had not heard him before reaching its decision, that the Court committed a crime of its own in not calling him to

December 1953. [redacted] The routing slip shows that CIA received seven copies of Henderson's report.

²⁰(S) Ibid.

²¹(S) Ibid.

²²(S) Ibid.

²³(S) The American Embassy in Tehran reported that Mossadeq's confinement "has been very comfortable." According to Timur Bakhtiar, the Military Governor of Tehran, Mossadeq occupied "a small cottage, has his food sent in from his family if he doesn't like the best the prison has to offer, and enjoys a large library, a gramophone, and a radio. He can exercise in the open air whenever he wants to, but he still seems allergic to exercise." Ibid.

²⁴(S) Ibid.

²⁵(S) Ibid.

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argue his own case, and that the military court had no jurisdiction over him. His protest went unanswered.²⁶



(S) The documents do not indicate why the Shah changed his mind and decided to try Mossadeq. His chronic indecision and the considerable pressure that the US had exerted against making Mossadeq a rallying point for the Shah's opponents are the most likely explanations. That is not to say that the Shah's initial inclination to hold a public trial despite Washington's opposition was anathema to all the US officials involved. As Roosevelt remarked in a debriefing after TPAJAX, "I would be more inclined to trust his [the Shah's] judgment and Zahedi's about it than I would ours. I mean they know the psychology of the situation, and certainly from here [Washington] we can't tell it."²⁹

(U) Mossadeq left the Second Armored Brigade's prison in Tehran on 4 August 1956.³⁰ The Shah then banished the former Prime Minister to his village at Ahmadabad outside Tehran, where he remained until his death from intestinal bleeding (a chronic condition from which he had suffered for 42 years) on 5 March 1967.³¹

²⁶(S) Ibid



³¹(U) L.P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955), p. 7; Faramarz S. Fatemi, *The U.S.S.R. in Iran: The Background History of Russian and Anglo-American Conflict in Iran, Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism, and the Fall of the Shah* (New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1980), p. 55; *New York Times*, 5 March 1967.

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Appendix E**(S) CIA and TPAJAX: The Tension Between Analysis and Operations**

(S) TPAJAX illustrates the philosophical tension inherent in planning covert operations. Preparation must balance the need for fully informed decisionmaking with the need for strict operational security. The former requires that those with knowledge relevant to the operation be intimately involved from the start, while the latter requires that the number of people involved be kept to a minimum.

(S) An ideal operation is not at either extreme and acknowledges the inevitability of tradeoffs. Covert actions might have to be planned on less-than-perfect knowledge to ensure that they remain covert, and there may have to be compromises on absolute security in order to take advantage of relevant available expertise. How to balance these conflicting requirements has been a recurring issue throughout the history of CIA's covert operations. TPAJAX offers the intelligence historian some clues on how this tension might be resolved in some cases.

(S) TPAJAX was planned and executed with far greater concern for operational security than for ensuring that the planners had all relevant information. There is no evidence that the [redacted] in Kermit Roosevelt's NEA Division consulted either the Office of National Estimates (ONE) or the analysts in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) at any stage of the operation. ONE and OCI might not have provided much help because they had chronic difficulty getting intelligence reporting from DDP—a problem that itself reflects poor communication between the analysts and collectors.

(S) The Office of National Estimates and TPAJAX

(U) The Board of National Estimates (BNE) in ONE was responsible for producing long-range appraisals of world events. These appraisals, known as National Intelligence Estimates, represented the intelligence community's best thinking on a particular topic. ONE did not concern itself with day-to-day events, concentrating instead on trends and probable future courses of action of other nations. Primarily because the Soviet Union was the focus of its attention, ONE wrote few national intelligence

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
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estimates on Iran. These priorities changed when Mossadeq's Iran became a critical issue in US foreign policy.

(S) ONE did not always have the cooperation of the clandestine services when drafting an estimate. In 1951, the year before DCI Walter Bedell Smith merged the Office of Policy Coordination and the Office of Special Operations into the new Directorate of Plans, Dr. William Langer, head of BNE, asked CIA's [] to seek OSO's views for an upcoming national intelligence estimate on Iran. OSO management resisted [] request, telling him (1) that OSO had too many similar requests from ONE, (2) that OSO personnel "were not paid to 'estimate,' but to produce facts," and (3) that OSO personnel could barely keep up with their assigned duties, much less help ONE do its job.¹ OSO clearly was not interested in dialogue with analytical components for the purpose of producing a superior analytical product.


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
**(S) The Office of Current Intelligence and TPAJAX**

(U) The tension between ONE and the clandestine services was unfortunate but not potentially crippling to American policymakers during fast-breaking events. ONE concentrated on larger perspectives that were not sensitive to daily crises. The Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), on the other hand, analyzed events as they happened. OCI analysts could help shape policymakers' views and decisions during crises. What they wrote could have an immediate impact.

(S) In the summer of 1953, OCI was responsible for keeping the President informed about daily events that might affect US foreign policy. [redacted]



(S) OCI initially conducted its analysis of the unfolding events in Iran in ignorance of the developing American role. [redacted]



[redacted] wrote that Mossadeq had been faced with many plots in the past but had always defeated them, and that there was no reason to believe that he would not do so again.⁸

(U) *The day before DDP executed the operation* someone finally called [redacted] (who does not remember who), said that there was an imminent covert action, "and on this side of the house your analysts are saying there's no chance that it'll work." At this point [redacted] analysts finally received a briefing.⁹

(U) "From an analytical point," [redacted] says, "this changed the situation completely. This was a major piece of information that we didn't have, and that if we had known it ahead of time, we would have phrased things differently, or maybe simply kept our mouth shut about it until it went off."¹⁰

(U) The problem [redacted] identified was, unfortunately, old and persistent. R. Jack Smith, later a Deputy Director for Intelligence, was the head of the current intelligence staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates in the old Central Intelligence Group. In his



⁸(S) Interview with [redacted] 25 September 1995, transcript, p. 16.

⁹(S) Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁰(S) Ibid.

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book *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades With the Agency*, Smith writes that clandestine reporting was absent from the current intelligence publications his office produced. He later discovered the reason. Rather than going to analysts, the "best clandestine reports were being hand-carried by top clandestine services people over to senior people in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon." In contrast, Smith's office saw "mostly inconsequential scraps of information about foreign personalities, especially the officer of local communist cells." Analysts routinely were denied access to critical information from clandestine sources, but Smith, not knowing differently, thought that what he had was the best American espionage could offer. It was not.¹¹

(S) After TPAJAX [] tried to develop closer personal ties with the DDP on his own. He did not expect DDP to tell him what was going on all the time, but he wanted to develop a relationship so that "they would trust me enough that they might tell me things that otherwise wouldn't get on paper, and so on. And by the same token to demonstrate to them that we could help them."¹²

(U) [] gradually built a rapport with DDP officers that he says paid off for both sides. Nonetheless, he thinks that more cooperation could have improved the intelligence product immensely. When he went to the DDP in 1957 "and started clawing through the files, one thing that struck me was how much useful intelligence information was in the operational files but had never made it out into intelligence reports because the reports officer or whoever had just not spotted it as intelligence report material."¹³

(U) [] is philosophical about the limited contact that he and the other analysts in his branch had with the people on the Iranian desk in the Directorate of Plans. There was, he says, "indeed a very deep gulf, institutionally, and policy wise" and surmises that the reason lay in differences between overt and covert employees. He and his fellow analysts were overt; many DDP employees were covert. From the DDP's perspective, overt employees were not sufficiently sensitive to security issues. "There was a measure of distrust," [] believes, "on the DDP side against these overt analysts who probably had loose tongues and if we [in DDP] talk too much they'll [OCI analysts] go blabbing around town, . . ."¹⁴

(U) John Waller [] makes the same assessment of the relationship between the analysts and operators. In a July 1995 interview, Waller suggested two additional reasons for the unofficial separation between the two directorates. First, most Iranian specialists in the DDP were OSS veterans who had spent substantial amounts of time in the Middle East. They had acquired their

¹¹ (U) Smith's best source of information was sensitive State Department cables. While valuable, CIG's (and CIA's) analytical over-reliance on these cables meant that the "daily intelligence summary was essentially a digest of top State telegrams." Intelligence reports from military and naval attachés were, in Smith's words, "markedly inferior." R. Jack Smith, *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades With the Agency* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, Inc., 1989), pp. 41-42.

¹² (S) Interview with [] p. 19.

¹³ (S) Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁴ (S) Ibid., pp. 9-10.

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knowledge from practical experience and thought that knowledge acquired this way was superior to the academic knowledge many Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts prized. Second, the DDP officers' relationships with the DI analysts were informal. "There was a lot of time," Waller said, "before you sort of had a wiring diagram that put us [DDP] together with the DI. It was all based on if you need their help, go get it, but you'd better know who you were talking to. There's no point in talking to a man who's only read the books you've read."¹⁵

(U) Bureaucratic differences probably played an important part in reinforcing the separation between the DDP and the DI. DDP officers may have thought that if the DI were included in covert action planning, analysts would begin to challenge DDP's preeminence in covert operations. Similarly, DI analysts may have feared that DDP operators would question their analytical preeminence and that close association with a covert action would raise questions about their intellectual objectivity. Philosophical, organizational, and physical separation ensured that these kinds of issues seldom touched off bureaucratic warfare.

(S) At least in the case of TPAJAX, the relationship between the DDP and the DI contrasted sharply with the relationship between DDP and the State Department. After the operation, John Stutesman of State sent a letter to Roy Melbourne, First Secretary of the Embassy in Tehran, telling him of the close personal relationship he had developed with CIA's John Waller and Roger Goiran. "John Waller and Roger Goiran are men," Stutesman wrote, "upon whose judgment we can all rely without qualification and Arthur Richards [Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State] and I have been happy to observe that they go out of their way to maintain friendly and close relations with us, asking our advice often upon subjects which their organization might not normally discuss with working levels in the Department."¹⁶

(U) Allen Dulles's Personal Directorate of Intelligence

(S) The highest levels of management in CIA did nothing to discourage the estrangement of the Directorate of Plans from the Directorate of Intelligence, and in fact reinforced it. Allen Dulles ignored the Agency's analytical arm during TPAJAX, preferring to use personal acquaintances as sources of information.¹⁷ He had numerous contacts across the world and throughout American society from his pre-war days as an attorney and his wartime service in the OSS.

¹⁵(S) John H. Waller interview with the author, 7 July 1995, p. 42.

¹⁶(S) Letter from John H. Stutesman to Roy Melbourne, First Secretary, US Embassy, Tehran, 6 November 1953, Records of the Department of State, RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, NND959286, "Iran 1946-54," box 4, National Archives and Records Administration.

¹⁷(U) Peter Grose's biography of Dulles captures this characteristic well. "Institutional ties never inhibited Allen from nurturing his own private networks of diverse colleagues and friends, many dating back decades, upon whom he would call in his regular trips to Europe for civilized exchanges among men and, increasingly, women of the world." Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p. 319.

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(U) Personal relationships were important to Dulles, and he tended to trust the information he got from people he knew. On Iran, much of this information came from Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Max Thornburg, an oil company executive. There is no evidence that Dulles ever passed on information from these sources to analysts in ONE or OCI.¹⁸

(U) Schwarzkopf had spent considerable time in Iran, had trained the Iranian Gendarmerie during World War II, and knew the Shah well. His knowledge extended beyond Tehran because the Gendarmerie operated in provinces across the country. Through his work with this police force, Schwarzkopf became a storehouse of knowledge about Iran and was happy to share it with Dulles.¹⁹

(S) Max Thornburg ran Overseas Consultants, Inc., a firm that advised Middle Eastern governments on oil and economic questions. In 1950 he was in Iran as a consultant to the government, advising Iranian officials about the country's seven year economic plan.

(S) Thornburg gained unusual access to then-Deputy Director (Plans) Allen Dulles and key State Department officials. He maintained a steady correspondence with both CIA and State about events in the Middle East. He was not shy about telling "Allen" what he thought should be done, and consistently urged that the US had to change the psychological climate in the Middle East. He also argued that the Shah was not weak, but only "young, beaten-down and understandably skeptical about any real support coming from the United States or Britain."²¹ Thornburg sat in on several sessions with Dulles and drafted some papers for CIA.

(U) The Consequences of Analytical Exclusion

¹⁸ (U) Schwarzkopf, father of the American general heading coalition forces in the Gulf war, formed the New Jersey State Police in 1921. He was head of the State Police at the time it investigated the Lindbergh kidnapping in the early 1930s.

¹⁹ (S) John H. Waller interview with the author, 7 July 1995, pp. 41-42.

²¹ [REDACTED]

(U) For background on Thornburg's activities in Iran from 1947 to 1951, see Linda Wills Qaimmaqami, "The Catalyst of Nationalization: Max Thornburg and the Failure of Private Sector Developmentalism in Iran, 1947-1951," 19 *Diplomatic History* (Winter 1995): 1-31.

²¹ (S) Letter, Max W. Thornburg to Allen Dulles, 10 February 1953, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence Records, Job 80-R01731R, Box 13, Folder 563, ARC.

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(S) The consequences of the analysts' exclusion from TPAJAX can be examined from two perspectives: its effect on analysis itself (product and process), and its effect on the preparation and execution of the operation.

(U) Exclusion damaged the analytical *product* because it prevented analysts from basing their judgments on complete information. Exclusion harmed the analytical *process* because it impeded the creation of a valid framework for assessing future developments.

(S) Had they been apprised of the US role in deposing Mossadeq, analysts probably would have been more circumspect in concluding that because he had turned back coup attempts in the past, he was likely to prevail again. Knowledge that this time the United States was supporting the Prime Minister's opponents with extraordinary measures might have changed or tempered this judgment. Inclusion in TPAJAX planning might have made analysts more inclined to recognize the operation's potential for success.

(S) It is less certain that the segregation of analysis from operational planning affected the conception and execution of TPAJAX. The analysis that [] and his colleagues wrote was essentially incompatible with the planned covert political action, but [] conclusions did not dissuade the President, the Secretary of State, and the DCI from executing TPAJAX. Under these circumstances, one can make a strong argument convincingly that analytical exclusion had negligible consequences for TPAJAX.

(S) It is possible, nevertheless, that fully informed analysis might have enhanced the operation. The DI's more scholarly and detached perspective and its methodology for assessing a dynamic situation perhaps could have helped NEA clarify the assumptions upon which TPAJAX was based, and how changes in those assumptions might affect the operation.

(U) The operation's initial failure provides the most conspicuous evidence that the absence of analytical expertise may have been detrimental. Mossadeq arrested Col. Nassiri, and the military challenge melted away. Headquarters wanted to call off the operation. Had the planning taken into account the possibility—even the likelihood—that segments of the Iranian military would react this way, DDP could have had contingency plans in effect instead of relying on Roosevelt's improvisation.

(S) Advances in collection technology have given today's analyst access to an almost bewildering array of sources inconceivable to his colleague of 44 years ago. Signals intelligence, imagery, and information from exotic collection platforms are available to analysts but generally are unavailable to those planning covert action programs. The exponential growth of information derived from these sources has made the consequences of ignoring analysis more serious today than was the case in 1953.

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
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
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
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
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
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Setting Operational Precedents

The Road to Covert Action in Iran, 1953 (U)

Scott A. Koch

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**US decisionmakers
 perceived Iranian
 events through the
 broad strategic lens of
 the Cold War.**
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August 2003 marked the 50th anniversary of TPAJAX, the US government's covert action in Iran that culminated in the fall of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. Washington feared that the deteriorating Iranian political situation and Mossadeq's inability or unwillingness to deal with the increasingly confrontational Iranian Communist Party would lead to the collapse of the central government in Teheran. The Iranian communists, with Moscow's full backing, would then step in amid the chaos, seize power, and declare Iran a peoples' republic. Yet another country would fall behind the Iron Curtain. (U)

Reverberations from the US government's role in deposing Mossadeq continue. At least one contemporary account links the CIA's action in Iran 50 years ago to current global anti-American terrorism, making it timely to revisit that era.¹ Over the years, most scholars have focused on the tactical aspects and outcome of operation TPAJAX itself, but US decisionmakers at the time perceived Iranian events through the broad strategic lens of the Cold War. This article examines

the policymaking dynamics in Washington that led to the pivotal covert action. (U)

Antecedents (U)

During the 1950s, Washington considered the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, to be among the great strategic prizes in the geopolitical and ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. But it was not always so. For almost 175 years, American policymakers ignored Iran because they had no reason to do otherwise. (U)

World War II and the immediate postwar years changed the US government's attitude toward Iran. During the war, the country had become an important route for American aid to the Soviet Army, engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Hitler's *Wehrmacht*.² Soviet troops remained in northern Iran immediately after the war, encouraging pro-communist separatist regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and the Kurdish

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¹ See Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003). The reader will find a review of Kinzer's book in *Studies in Intelligence* 48, no. 2 (2004)—available at <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies.html>. (U)


² Eventually, almost a quarter of American aid for the Soviet Union went through Iran. Convoys using northern sea routes lost about 20 percent of their cargoes to the Nazis; however, only 8 percent of cargoes sent to the Persian Gulf for shipment through Iran failed to arrive. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 284, 404. (U)

region. Washington anticipated that Moscow would demand the "unification" of Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan, and the crisis escalated from

World War II, but the postwar British retreat and retrenchment "East of Suez" created a vacuum that Washington felt obligated to fill. After London

and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in their struggles against communist-inspired insurgents, President Harry Truman publicly declared in March 1947 that

Iran and Environs



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January through March 1946. In response to aggressive Soviet troop movements, Iran, with the strong support of the United States, took the matter to the United Nations. Faced with an almost certain diplomatic defeat, the Soviets removed their troops from Iran before the UN could consider the matter.³ (U)

The United States would have preferred to withdraw from the Persian Gulf after the end of

announced that Great Britain could no longer supply military

³ For discussions of the Azeri crisis in early 1946, see Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977); Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73*, 2d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974); and John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). (U)

the United States would support free peoples everywhere who were "resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."⁴ For Iran, this "Truman Doctrine" meant that the United States was

⁴ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman* (Washington, DC: Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1947), 179. (U)

replacing Britain as the main geopolitical counterweight to the Soviet Union. (U)

For the first three years after President Truman's declaration, the United States paid relatively little attention to Iran, even though that oil-rich country was experiencing serious economic problems, widespread popular discontent with the government, and growing agitation by supporters of the Iranian Communist (Tudeh) Party. (U)

In April 1950, Director of Central Intelligence Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter drew Secretary of State Dean Acheson's attention to "the urgent need for additional intelligence coverage of Iran." DCI Hillenkoetter emphasized that the CIA was unable to draft reliable national intelligence estimates on the country because it simply did not have enough information. He wrote:

[We can] tell US policy makers that some sort of crisis does exist, but cannot confidently answer such specific pertinent questions as: (1) how serious the situation actually is; (2) how adequate are Iran's own resources for meeting its present difficulties; and (3) how capable the Iranian Government is of using these resources.⁵ (S)

Hillenkoetter proposed two solutions: the CIA could try to diversify its sources, or, alternatively, "existing coverage might be expanded through the estab-

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of Iran.'**
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lishment of a consulate in the strategically important southwestern part of Iran.”⁶ The extant records do not contain Acheson's reaction to Hillenkoetter's letter. (S)

**Twisting the British Lion's
Tail (U)**

On 7 March 1951, an Islamic fundamentalist assassinated Iranian Prime Minister Gen. Ali Razmara.⁷ Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's initial choice to succeed Razmara, Hussein Ala, resigned after only a few weeks. Then, on 29 April 1951, the Shah appointed Mohammed Mossadeq, a career politician and leader in the National Front, a loose coalition of political parties professing liberal democratic aims and opposing foreign intervention in Iranian affairs. Mossadeq's elevation set in motion a series of events that

were to bring American and British officials face to face with one of the most mercurial, maddening, adroit, and provocative leaders with whom they had ever dealt. (U)

Severe economic and political problems awaited Mossadeq, and it was not obvious that he had the skill to solve them. In a Special Estimate prepared one month after the new prime minister took office, the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) characterized him as an "impractical visionary and a poor administrator," but, at the same time, recognized that he was in a strong political position that was unlikely to deteriorate in the foreseeable future.⁸ (S)

Mossadeq immediately turned his attention to the unfolding struggle for control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The Shah had renewed the British oil concession in Iran in 1949; however, by 1950, the arrangement had become a sore point in relations between the two countries. In March 1951, when Mossadeq was a member of the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament), he had submitted a bill, which was quickly passed, nationalizing the AIOC. Just three days after becoming prime minister, he signed the bill into law; nationalization went into effect on 2 May, retroactive to 20 March 1951. (U)

⁵ Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Rear Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 11 April 1950, Records of the State Department, RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, NND959286, "Iran 1946-54," box 4, National Archives and Records Administration. (S)

⁶ *Ibid.* (S)

⁷ Razmara's assassin was a member of the Fadayane Islam underground organization. (U)

⁸ Office of National Estimates, "Current Developments in Iran," SE-6, 22 May 1951, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA Archives and Records Center [hereinafter ARC]. (S)

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**Mossadeq found
the British
comprehensible,
but evil.**
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The AIOC's nationalization brought Mossadeq and Iran into immediate conflict with Britain. The British government owned half of the AIOC's stock and did not intend to permit nationalization of its assets without the compensation that international law required.⁹ (U)

**“The Antics of
Incomprehensible Orientals”
(U)**

Britain and Iran tried to resolve the dispute over nationalization, but differing negotiating styles and personalities made agreement elusive. Many Britons found inexplicable Mossadeq's seemingly impossible demands and unpredictably shifting arguments. L. P. Elwell-Sutton captured the mood of British policymakers at the time when he wrote, “Really, it seemed hardly fair that dignified and correct western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals.”¹⁰ (U)

For his part, Mossadeq found the British comprehensible, but evil. He and millions of Iranians believed that for centuries Brit-

ain had manipulated their country for British ends. Many Iranians seemed convinced that British intrigue was at the root of every domestic misfortune. In 1951, Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W. Averell Harriman, “You do not know how crafty they [the British] are. You do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch.” Harriman protested that surely the British were like people everywhere, some bad, some good. But the American envoy did not persuade Mossadeq. “You do not know them,” he insisted. “You do not know them.”¹¹ (U)

When it seemed clear that Tehran had no intention of providing compensation for AIOC assets at any level London might accept, the British mounted a multi-pronged effort to reassert control over the company. They hoped legal and economic pressure would convince Mossadeq to settle on British terms. If not, they were prepared to force him from office and replace him with someone open to compromise on terms favorable to the AIOC. (U)

¹¹ James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 64–65, quoting Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), 247–48. (U)

London first asked the International Court of Justice to arbitrate the dispute, but Iran rejected the tribunal's jurisdiction on the ground that the nationalization of the AIOC was a purely domestic matter. London then offered Mossadeq two separate proposals to resolve the compensation dispute, but the prime minister did not consider them because neither addressed the issue of Iran's sovereignty over its own oil. The British thereafter refused to deal directly with Mossadeq. (U)

Turning to economic weapons, in September 1951, Britain placed an embargo on shipments of steel, sugar, iron, and oil-processing equipment to Iran—affecting almost everything that the Iranians could exchange for dollars. The AIOC laid off 20,000 oil workers at the port of Abadan, leaving Mossadeq little choice but to put them on the government payroll. Gradually, the flow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world stopped. (U)

London also staged ostentatious military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf to try to weaken the Iranian leader's negotiating position. A British airborne brigade arrived in Cyprus, and a Royal Navy cruiser and four destroyers exercised near the oil facilities at Abadan. Not intimidated by the display of British force, Mossadeq announced that the first shot would start World War III. (U)

⁹ In March 1951, the CIA estimated that 6–8 percent of Iran's national income came from the AIOC and that the company contributed nearly 25 percent of Iran's treasury's receipts. Office of National Estimates, “Iran's Position in the East-West Conflict,” NIE-6 [draft], 21 March 1951, Directorate of Operations, Job 79-01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, ARC. (S)
¹⁰ L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics* (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955), 258. (U)

**Mossadeq Looks To America
(U)**

Like many in the Third World immediately after World War II, Mossadeq saw the United States as an anti-colonial power and looked to Washington for support against the British. His hopes were not entirely misplaced; the Truman administration thought that his position had some merit. (U)

Secretary of State Acheson viewed the British as overly pre-occupied with their oil interests and concluded that London did not fully understand the broad communist threat. He saw Mossadeq as a potentially important part of a solution to the problem of Soviet influence in the Middle East. In Acheson's opinion, the nationalistic Iranian prime minister, in time, would become an effective bulwark against Soviet penetration into Iran. To that end, Washington consistently urged London to reach an equitable settlement with Tehran. Acheson apparently was convinced that an agreement would strengthen the Iranian government and, thus, promote regional stability.¹² (U)

Other considerations complicated the Truman administration's approach. The United States was loath to side publicly with Iran or put excessive pressure on London. Washington needed cooperation and support from Britain—America's closest ally—elsewhere in the world. The war in Korea was not yet over; and the presence of British com-

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”

bat troops was an important symbol of Anglo-American solidarity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949, was still in its formative stages and depended upon British participation as evidence of Western unity and determination. (U)

President Truman had no patience with those refusing to view the Anglo-Iranian problem in a global context. When US Ambassador to Iran Henry Grady wrote to Truman complaining that the White House was not listening to his advice, the president let him know exactly where he stood:

*Let me tell you something
about the Iranian situation
from this end . . . [We] held*

¹² Acheson criticized “the unusual and persistent stupidity of the [Anglo-Iranian Oil] company and the British Government” when it came to Iran. See, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 501, as quoted in Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 453. Also, see Richard W. Cottam, *Iran & the United States: A Cold War Case Study* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 102. (U)

Cabinet meetings on it—we held Security Council meetings on it, and Dean, Bob Lovett, Charlie Sawyer, Hariman and all the senior staff of the Central Intelligence discussed that awful situation with me time and again . . . We tried . . . to get the block headed British to have their oil company make a fair deal with Iran. No, they could not do that. They know all about how to handle it—we didn't according to them.

We had Israel, Egypt, Near East defense, Sudan, South Africa, Tunisia, the NATO treaties all on the fire. Britain and the Commonwealth Nations were and are absolutely essential if these things are successful. Then, on top of it all we have Korea and Indo-China. Iran was only one incident. Of course the man on the ground in each one of these places can only see his own problem.¹³ (U)

The CIA's Position (U)

The suggestion that British forces might occupy the port city of Abadan or launch some other military action against Iran set off alarms in the CIA's Office of National Estimates. In an April 1951 memorandum to DCI Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Dr. William Langer, the deputy chief

¹³ Farhad Diba, *Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 131–32, citing papers of Henry Grady (emphasis added). (U)

of ONE, warned that the appearance of British troops in Iran might result in Soviet occupation of the northern part of the country under the terms of the 1921 treaty of friendship between Persia and Soviet Russia.¹⁴ (C)

In June 1951, Langer sent another memorandum to Smith

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¹⁴ William L. Langer, Assistant Director, Office of National Estimates, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith, "Situation in Iran," 20 April 1951, Directorate of Operations Records, Job 79-01228A, Box 11, Folder 14, ARC. (C)

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**The CIA feared the
[communists] would be
able to seize control
under the chaotic
conditions of a British
occupation.**
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The documents in the CIA's files do not indicate whether Smith relayed Langer's concerns to President Truman. There is no historical evidence to suggest that he did so, or even that the president knew about the memorandum; whether the memorandum influenced the president remains speculation. Nonetheless, after Langer's mem-

¹⁶ *Ibid.* (S)

¹⁷ *Ibid.* (S)

orandum, the administration let London know that the US government disapproved of any military action against Iran. At a British cabinet meeting in September 1951, the government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee decided that it "could not afford to break with the United States on an issue of this kind."¹⁸ A potential military crisis had passed. (U)

Counting on Mossadeq (U)

The question of Iran's domestic stability remained, however. Could Mossadeq resist the Tudeh if it came to a confrontation? Neither Langer nor any of the Iran specialists in the CIA's clandestine service—the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)—thought that the Iranian communists had sufficient strength to topple Mossadeq without help. As long as the central government remained able to deal with events, Langer and others considered the danger of a Tudeh coup to be negligible.

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The Tudeh Party would come to power, the

¹⁸ H. W. Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918–1961* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 234. (U)

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**The US was
committed to
supporting Mossadeq
as the only alternative
to political chaos.**

”

CIA judged, only through chaos
and impotent central authority.
(S)

As of 30 July 1952, the US gov-
ernment was committed to
supporting Mossadeq because he
represented the only alternative
to political chaos.²⁰ That
evening, CIA representatives met
at the State Department with
Secretary of State Acheson,
Under Secretary of State David
K. E. Bruce, and senior depart-
ment officers.²¹

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²⁰ It is difficult to underestimate the im-
portance that American policymakers
placed on improving domestic stability in
the region. In July 1952, the Psychological
Strategy Board characterized this part of
the world as “a military vacuum, an eco-
nomic slum, a political anachronism, and a
house divided against itself.” (S)

²¹ Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian,
and African Affairs; John D. Jernegan,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African
Affairs; Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of
the Department of State and member of
the Senior Staff, National Security Coun-
cil; Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State. (U)

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The CIA's Office of National Esti-
mates continued to think that
Mossadeq would remain in power
for the near future and that a
Tudeh coup was unlikely—the
same conclusion that OSO and
OPC had reached the previous
January. A November 1952 esti-
mate informed readers that if the
unrest plaguing Iran in 1952 con-
tinued through 1953, “rising
internal tensions and continued
deterioration of the economy and
of the budgetary position of the
government might lead to a
breakdown of government
authority and open the way for at
least a gradual assumption of
control by Tudeh.” Soviet inter-
vention was unlikely “unless
there is a far more serious deteri-
oration of Iranian internal
stability than is foreseen in this
estimate. However, the USSR has
the capability for greatly increas-
ing its overt and covert
interference in Iran at any time,
to the detriment of US security
interests.”²⁵ (U)

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**The British hoped
Washington would
finally see Mossadeq as
the demagogue they
thought he was.**
”

During the last two months of 1952, both ONE and the Iran Branch of the DDP watched events in the Gulf, hoping that things would not change radically and that Mossadeq would be able to hold things together. Events soon dashed their hopes. (U)

Shift in the Wind (U)

Newly-elected President Dwight Eisenhower did not immediately turn his attention to Iran after taking the oath of office in January 1953. He meant to end the Korean War, having pledged to do so during the presidential campaign. To complicate the foreign policy problems facing the new administration, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin died in March 1953, and the White House had to deal with the implications of his death for Soviet-American relations.²⁶ (U)

Allen Dulles became Director of Central Intelligence in late February 1953 and on 1 March drafted a memorandum for the president apprising him of developments in Iran. Mossadeq remained the single strongest Iranian political leader, Dulles wrote, but the political situation in Teheran was "slowly disintegrating." Given the Shah's predilection to hesitate, forceful action on his part to stabilize and

strengthen the government was unlikely. If, however, a showdown developed between the Shah and Mossadeq, "and a real armed conflict ensued between the two opposing elements, the communist Tudeh elements might come up as the victors with their relatively small but well organized group of supporters, and with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, disposing of plenty of funds." Dulles told the president that the CIA was working with Qashqai tribal leaders in the southern part of the country to organize a resistance movement that could become active if the communists took control of the northern half.²⁷ (S)

The Eisenhower administration had decidedly different views than its predecessor on the desir-

²⁷ Dulles reported that "A considerable supply of small arms and ammunition [for support of Qashqai tribal leaders] has been assembled [redacted]"

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Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum, "The Iranian Situation," 1 March 1953, Records of DCI Allen Dulles, Job 80-R01731R, Box 11, Folder 350, ARC. (S)

ability of an Anglo-Iranian oil agreement. President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson had encouraged both countries to agree on equitable compensation for the oil company's nationalized assets. Negotiations had collapsed, however, when Mossadeq severed diplomatic relations with Britain in October 1952. By the time Eisenhower took office, neither the British nor Mossadeq appeared willing to back off from their publicly stated, and passionately held, positions. To London's relief, the new US administration abandoned the search for a negotiated end to the crisis. Perhaps now, the British hoped, Washington would finally begin to see Mossadeq as the demagogue London thought he was and take appropriate action. (U)

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²⁶ Office of National Estimates, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953," NIE-75, 13 November 1952, Directorate of Intelligence, ARC. (U)

²⁶ Brands, 272. (U)

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**The consensus that
Mossadeq had to go did
not result in
agreement on his
replacement.**
”

That same month, State Department officials and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met to discuss the Iranian situation. Eden found American officials more receptive to the British viewpoint than they had been under Truman and Acheson. Washington now considered Mossadeq a source of *instability* and feared that his continued tenure invited a Tudeh coup. (U)

The State Department agreed with Eden that Mossadeq had to be replaced, but its reasons differed from his. For Eden and his government, Mossadeq's policies damaged "British prestige, influence, and vital commercial interest." For the Americans, Mossadeq represented a weakened Iran and its increasing vulnerability to Soviet domination.²⁹

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²⁹ Cottam, 103. (U)

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Next Steps (U)

The emerging consensus that Mossadeq had to go did not result in agreement on his replacement. US officials briefly considered backing religious leader and former Mossadeq loyalist Ayatollah Abul Quassem Kashani. Kashani was attractive because he had a large following and had become a strident—and vocal—opponent of the prime minister. (U)

CIA headquarters viewed the prospect of a Kashani government with alarm and thought a Kashani-led Iran would be worse for Western interests than Iran under Mossadeq. The ayatollah was likely to be even more difficult on the oil issue and more resistant to Western influence, such as it was, than Mossadeq. While Kashani had a large following in Tehran, his support was not deep and he did not command the respect of the military. Consequently, the CIA thought Kashani was susceptible to overthrow by the military or even Mossadeq's followers. Moreover, a Kashani government would probably result in a "progressive general deterioration of Iran possibly leading to the eventual assumption of power by the Tudeh."³¹ (S)

US officials gradually settled on Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi. Zahedi had served as an irregular soldier under the Shah's father, Reza Shah, in 1915, and subsequently had risen through the ranks of the Iranian Army. Zahedi's anti-British views had led him to work for the Germans during World War II, although he was not pro-Nazi. The British arrested him in 1942 for his activities under Nazi agent Franz Mayer and deported him to Palestine; he was released on VE Day in 1945. Zahedi retired from the Iranian army in 1949 and subsequently served in a series of mostly honorary posts. The State Department recognized that he was not ideal but considered him acceptable because he was friendly to the United States and Great Britain. More importantly, he was willing to take the job. (U)

By that time, whoever succeeded Mossadeq was guaranteed American support. In a March 1953 internal memorandum, the State Department's Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs outlined the steps that the United States was likely to take if Mossadeq were to fall. Although American officials would limit their public pronouncements to expressions of unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, privately they would use non-US channels to assure the Shah and the new

³¹ Office of National Estimates, "Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran," SE-33, 14 October 1952, 3; Records of the Office of National Estimates, Directorate of Intelligence, ARC. (S)



CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt in Tehran in 1953. (U)

prime minister that Washington was eager to help. Sensitivity to Iranian concerns that the country was becoming a foreign base precluded ostentatious and immediate American military assistance, but privately the Americans could assure Tehran that meaningful military aid (trucks, communication equipment, and other military-civilian dual-use items) would be forthcoming.³² (U)

³² "Measures Which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq," March 1953, Department of State, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Issues, RG 59, Lot 57, D 529, Box 40, National Archives and Records Administration. (U)

The photo of Kermit Roosevelt is from his book, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). It may be copyrighted and should not be reproduced. (U)

Eisenhower Turns to the CIA (U)

President Eisenhower had several options to promote a regime change in Iran. He could use military force, but that was impractical because it would lead to war. He could hold out hope for a diplomatic solution, but that option, too, was unattractive. Diplomacy had already failed and the political situation in Iran was worsening daily. Finally, he could turn to the CIA to mount a covert political operation—in June 1948, the National Security Council had decided that covert action was a legitimate instrument of US policy.³³ This alternative held the promise of attaining the result that the administration wanted with a minimum of cost and world attention. If such an operation failed, the White House could disavow any knowledge or connection. (U)

Available documents do not indicate who authorized the CIA to begin planning the operation, but it had to be the president himself. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflects the president's style:

Before going into the operation, Ajax had to have the approval of the President. Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax; he received only oral

³³ See National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948. (U)

*reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC. Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency, he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over cocktails, he was kept informed by Foster Dulles, and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA.*³⁴ (U)

Official approval to execute the operation came from the US (b)(3)(n) in July 1953. The CIA had already funded TPAJAX, when, on 6 April 1953, DCI Allen Dulles and DDP Frank Wisner signed an authorization reserving up to (b)(3)(c) for the operation.

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Events Play Out (U)

The CIA was not quite six years old when the Eisenhower admin-

³⁴ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 111. Ambrose repeats this paragraph verbatim in *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 333. (U)

³⁵ Kermit Roosevelt, Chief, Division of Near East and Africa, to Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum, "Support for Special Operation," Directorate of Operations Records, Job 79-01228A, Box 29, Folder 1, ARC. (S)

istration authorized and executed TPAJAX. The "can do" attitude prevalent in the Agency's clandestine service during the initial years of the Cold War was about to face and meet its biggest challenge. (U)

As originally conceived, TPAJAX called for a royalist-led military coup against Mossadeq. The conception of the operation changed when the Shah issued *firmans* (royal decrees) replacing Mossadeq with Zahedi, thus providing Mossadeq's removal with constitutional legitimacy. Mossadeq learned of the *firmans* and made plans for mass arrests on 16 August; royalist troops arrived at his house on the evening of 15 August to arrest him. The prime minister knew they were coming and had troops loyal to him arrest them. Officers and troops not in Mossadeq's custody fled. On the morning of 16 August 1953, Radio Teheran broadcast news that the government had thwarted a military coup.³⁶ (U)

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The demonstration quickly grew in numbers and enthusiasm as the crowds surged through the streets of the Iranian capital, shouting their support for the Shah and demanding that passersby demonstrate their loyalty by displaying the monarch's portrait—even if only on Iranian paper currency held up to a wind-shield. The soldiers that Mossadeq deployed to keep order lined the streets but did not interfere. Military passivity gave way to fraternization, which in turn became overt support. The prime minister fled for his life as the crowd headed for his residence. Monarchist forces seized the government radio station and Mossadeq's authority collapsed. The Shah, who had left Tehran on 12 August and eventually landed in Rome on 18 August, returned to Iran several days later convinced that the people had risen to his defense.³⁷ (S)

Postscript (U)

It is no exaggeration to say that TPAJAX owed its success to Kermit Roosevelt,

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Roosevelt returned to a hero's welcome at the highest levels of government. (S)

Although the CIA did not conduct a post-mortem analysis of TPAJAX, in September 1953 Roosevelt talked about his role before a group that included President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others. John Waller, chief of the Iran Branch in the CIA's Near East and Africa Division, was among the CIA invitees and vividly recalled Roosevelt's presentation. Roosevelt kept his audience enthralled for two hours and emphasized that the operation had succeeded because it enjoyed the support of the Iranian army and the people. It also succeeded, he emphasized, because he did not have Washington second-guessing his every

³⁷ The Shah's reason for leaving Iran is open to interpretation. Roosevelt thought that the monarch's nerves had failed him. The Shah's recollection is dramatically different:

However, following a pre-arranged plan, the Queen and I had left Tehran before learning of the revolution's success. It had been decided weeks before that if Mossadeq should use force to resist his deposition, we would temporarily leave the country. I had decided upon this move because I believed that it would force Mossadeq and his henchmen to show their real allegiances, and that thereby it would help crystallize Persian public opinion.

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961), 104. (U)

move. Cables from Tehran were scarce during the critical days of 16-19 August—for good reason. “Gentlemen,” Roosevelt joked, to general applause, “I made a point of not letting you know what was happening.” No one seemed more amused than Allen Dulles.³⁸ (S)

Ending on a cautionary note, Roosevelt warned those present not to draw the wrong lessons from TPAJAX. “Now we’ll think we can walk on water, everywhere,” he said, “and we’ve got to be careful and restrain ourselves.”³⁹ (S)

Secretary of State Dulles had other thoughts, however; he was already contemplating a similar operation in a country half a world away from Iran and much closer to home.⁴⁰

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Neither the CIA nor the US government heeded Roosevelt’s warnings about the seductiveness and danger of covert action.

³⁸ Author’s interview with John H. Waller, 7 July 1995. (S)

³⁹ *Ibid.* (S)

⁴⁰ Roosevelt, 210. (U)

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**Policymakers
would do well to be
mindful of TPAJAX as
they continue efforts to
marshal Arab public
opinion against
terrorism.**
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The relative rapidity and ease with which TPAJAX

had accomplished their objectives, however, deceived policymakers. They drew the erroneous lesson that, through CIA action, the US government could alter the Third World political landscape at will and with minimal expense. It would take the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 to vindicate Roosevelt, but by then the man who had brought down Mohammed Mossadeq had resigned from the CIA.⁴¹ (U)

It would be a mistake to draw a straight line from TPAJAX to the rise of the current anti-American, Islamic-based terrorism for, as the late British historian Herbert Butterfield observed, “The study of the past with one eye, so to speak, upon the present is the

⁴¹ *Ibid.* (U)

source of all sins and sophistries in history It is the essence of what we mean by the word ‘unhistorical.’”⁴² Nonetheless, Middle Eastern perceptions of the operation and the American role exert a powerful influence on present attitudes toward the West. Policymakers would do well to be mindful of the dynamics surrounding TPAJAX as they continue their efforts to marshal Arab public opinion against terrorism.⁴³ (U)

⁴² Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, (1931), 11, 31–32, quoted in Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History? The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures delivered in the University of Cambridge January–March 1961* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1961), 35–36. (U)

⁴³ One of the participants in TPAJAX assured the author that many Iranians only suspected the American role in the operation, a subject of bazaar rumors for years. The *Cambridge History of Iran*’s assessment is probably more accurate: “Nevertheless, Iranians have never had the slightest doubt that the C.I.A., acting on behalf of the American and British governments, organized the conspirators and paid the pro-Shah mobs led by toughs from southern Tehran, which, together with army units, were in control of the streets by nightfall on 19 August. By 1982, this tenacious rumour had been fully confirmed and is now seen as incontrovertible” (footnote omitted). Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 263. (U)

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THE BATTLE FOR IRAN

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FOREWORD

This account of the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the political action operation that altered the course of history in Iran was written with the enthusiastic cooperation of the Near East Division, Directorate of Operations. It is based on files remaining in the Division (although the great bulk of the correspondence and traffic dealing with the operation was destroyed in 1962), on the draft history written in 1954 by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, on personal interviews with a number of active and retired Agency officers who participated in the action, on Central Reference Service personality files, and on a variety of open sources. Unless otherwise noted, major documentary sources were NE Division files.

Claud H. Corrigan
CIA History Staff

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THE BATTLE FOR IRAN

I. INTRODUCTION

Iran in late 1952 was sliding toward economic and political chaos. Its young ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah, was indecisive and vacillating in the face of the crisis created by his fanatically nationalistic Premier, the 72-year-old Mohammad Mosadeq.¹ His country was involved in a bitter dispute with Great Britain over the oil concession that the British had since 1901 built into a lucrative industry. Iran's nationalists, personified by Mosadeq, had paralyzed this industry rather than allow foreigners to continue to direct its operations and benefit from their natural resources. With the dispute at an impasse and with Mosadeq ruling by decree, the country seemed headed for an economic collapse and political anarchy whose final outcome could well have been the establishment of a Soviet satellite in the Middle East. How the diplomatic and intelligence services of the United States [redacted] worked with Iranians loyal to the Shah to prevent the loss of Iran is the subject of this history. Understanding of how and why this action was taken will be clarified by an initial review of historical events and of Iran's people, economy, and politics.

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II. IRAN, ANCIENT AND MODERN

A. The Nation

1. Imperial Past

The first Persian² empire, that of the Achaemenid dynasty, was founded by Cyrus the Great in the Sixth Century B.C. through conquest

¹ See Appendix B for a brief biography of Mosadeq.

² Persia was derived through Greek from Persis, the name the Greeks used for Parsa, the tribe and province of the Achaemenids. In 1935 Reza Shah insisted that foreigners use Iran, the native usage which means "Land of the Aryans," rather ~~SECRET~~.

of the Medes and other kingdoms of the region now generally known as the Middle East. Cyrus' grandson, Darius, further extended the empire, which he divided into 20 satraps or provinces connected by a network of imperial roads. The Achaemenid empire endured for almost 200 years, until it was destroyed by Alexander the Great of Macedonia. The Greeks were soon succeeded by the Parthian dynasty, which in turn was followed by the Sassanids, who ruled for 400 years from the third to the seventh centuries A.D. and who restored the glory of ancient Persia. In 651, however, the Arab invasion swept across Persia, which for the next nine centuries was ruled by a succession of foreign conquerors. A native Persian dynasty rose again at the beginning of the 16th century when the Safavids came to power; their rule lasted over 200 years and reached its peak under Shah Abbas from 1587 to 1620. Invading Afghans overthrew the Safavids in 1722 and were in turn driven out by Nadir Shah, a Turkic-speaking tribesman who launched a campaign of conquest that included invasions of India and the Caucasus. The succeeding dynasty, that of the Qajars, lasted^{ed} until the early 1920's when Reza Khan³, a colonel in the Iranian army's Cossack Division, seized power in a military coup. He became Shah in 1925, deposing the Qajars and founding the Pahlavi dynasty. When Iran was occupied in 1941 by British and Soviet troops in order to guarantee the Allied supply route to the embattled Russians,^{Reza Shah} abdicated and was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the present Shah.

2. The people

Of Iran's population in 1952 of under 18 million, more than 70% were ethnic Iranians of Indo-European stock; Persians made up

³ See Appendix B for biographic details on Reza Shah.

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50% of the total. The other ethnic Iranians included Kurdish, Gilani, Mazandarani, Lur, Bakhtiari, and Baluchi tribesmen, many of whom were nomadic or seminomadic peoples. Another 22% or so of the population were Turkic peoples, primarily the Azarbaijani of the northwestern provinces but also including the Turkoman and Qashqai tribal groups. Arabs made up about 5% of the population, and the remainder were non-Muslims, including Armenians, Assyrians, and Jews. Persian (or Farsi, as it is known in Iran) was the official language, spoken by most ethnic Iranians, although Turkic and Arabic dialects were also in use.

Almost all Iranians are Shia Muslims, in contrast to the Sunnis who predominate in the Muslim world. Shiites believe that the true succession to the leadership of Islam continued through the line of 'Ali (Mohammad's son-in-law) in the series of the 12 Imams, in contrast to the Sunnis who insist that the Caliphs succeeding Mohammad were selected by the consensus of the Muslim community. Although there is no organized Shia hierarchy, certain titles distinguish special members of the religious community. A cleric of limited theological training is a "mullah," while one who has studied at a higher institution is a "mujtahid" and qualified to adjudicate questions of religious conduct. The most important Iranian religious leaders have borne the honorary title of "Ayatollah," and the leader at the Shrine at the city of Qom may issue decrees which have the force of law to the faithful. A descendant of Mohammad may use the title "Sayyid" as part of his name, but he is not necessarily a religious figure.

The social structure in the early 1950's included an elite composed of the Shah, his court, and the 200 or more ruling families whose wealth

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derived from agricultural landholdings. Below the elite was the upper middle class that included government officials, professional men, importers, bankers, and merchants. The urban middle class consisted mainly of small merchants, craftsmen, lower level clergy, and teachers and as a group had not benefited greatly from the economic development and educational opportunities of the previous two decades. The day laborers, street vendors, and service workers were at the bottom of the urban class structure. Most of the country's people were working in the 1950 era as tenants, bound to their landlords by an almost feudal system. Outside the Iranian social structure were the tribes, whose social system in times of peace impeded the progress and modernization of Iran and was a source of weakness. In times of stress, however, the tribes were a source of strength;

in the 1941-45 period, they remained relatively untouched by the general collapse, but while retaining some internal stability, the tribes nonetheless contributed to national confusion and disorder through their clannish narrow-mindedness, tribal rather than national loyalties, and readiness to resort to violence.

As a people, Iranians have been described⁴ as having an intense national pride that has resulted from a fairly homogeneous stock and a 2,500-year history. In spite of this pride in the achievements of past dynasties and the high level of intelligence among those who have had the means to develop their potentials, the national movement of the 1950's accomplished little.

⁴ John Marlow in Iran: A Short Political Guide, Frederick A. Praeger; New York; 1963.

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Among the reasons accounting for this are the fact that nationalistic feelings and native intelligence are often accompanied by an individualism that inhibits cooperation, by a cynicism that despises enthusiasm, by an impatience that derides calculation, and by a volubility that abhors discretion. Their nationalism thus has lacked an air of common purpose, of willingness to sacrifice, of the dedication that has given impetus to the national movements of other, less well-endowed peoples.

3. The economy

In 1950 Iran was still basically an agricultural nation with a backward economy.

Farming, stock raising, forestry, and fisheries probably accounted for half the gross national product; wheat was the major crop, followed by barley, rice, cotton, and tobacco. Manufacturing was growing in importance, with textiles--cotton and wool--leading the cement, match, and glass industries, although food processing was still the most important non-oil activity.

Oil, of course, prior to 1951 when the effects of the dispute with the British were severely felt, was contributing about a third of budgetary revenue and nearly two-thirds of foreign exchange. Oil revenues started to climb when the war ended, going from £7.13 million in 1946 to → £16.03 million in 1950; by 1952, they were only £8.3 million. In 1950, 31,217,000 metric tons of oil were exported, but this fell to 9,158,000 metric tons in 1951 and to a pitiful 14,000 metric tons in 1952 when the British left.

4. Politics and government

Until the early years of the 20th century, Persia had either been an absolute monarchy or had been under the rule of foreign invaders. In July 1906, however, popular resentment against the excesses of Muzaffir ad-Din, a Shah of the Qajar dynasty whose excursions to Europe were nearly bankrupting his country's treasury, grew so strong that widespread demonstrations and riots forced him to proclaim a constitution. This relatively liberal document, supplement^{ed} in 1907 and amended in 1925, 1949, and 1957, provided for a government of three branches. The power of the executive was vested in the cabinet and in government officials acting in the Shah's name. The judiciary was composed of a hierarchy of civil courts up through the Supreme Court, while the legislative branch comprised the parliament, or Majlis, of 136 members, elected by the people every 2 years, and, after 1949, the smaller Senate, half of whose members were appointed by the Shah and half elected.

Whatever power remained in the hands of the Qajar Shah vanished soon after World War I, in which Iran had maintained a slightly pro-German neutrality that was violated by ^{the forces of} Turkey, Russia, and Britain. In February 1921, a young reformist politician, Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, and Col. Reza Khan, commander of the Iranian Cossack Division,⁵ combined to overthrow the government. Zia ed-Din became Premier and Reza Khan commander-in-chief of the army, but the two soon quarreled, and Zia ed-Din fled into exile.

In May 1921. Reza Khan remained

⁵ The Cossack Division, at that time the only well-organized and effective unit in the army, came into being as a result of Nasr ed-Din Shah's visit to Russia in 1878. The Shah admired his Cossack escort and asked the Czar to send him Russian officers to organize a Cossack cavalry regiment in the Iranian army. It grew to a brigade and then a division, and its White Russian officers and noncoms were retained until October 1920, when Reza Khan replaced Col. Starrosselsky as commander and other Iranians took over for the remaining Russians. SECRET

in power as Minister of War, devoting himself to the reorganization of the army. Unifying the heterogeneous military units into a closely knit, centrally controlled army, he employed it to expel the Bolsheviks, pacify Azarbaijan, and quell the rebellious tribes. Reza Khan took over as Premier in 1923, and two years later he became Shah.

The two focal points of Reza Shah's dictatorial rule were nationalism and modernization, and in this he greatly resembled Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, although his methods and goals were less radical. He improved the status of women and checked the power of the Shia clergy, but he stopped short of Ataturk's romanization of the national language--Farsi retained its Arabic script. As a nationalist, he was suspicious and guarded toward the Soviet Union and challenging toward the British, particularly as to the oil concession, which he felt did not sufficiently benefit Iran. He brought in first American and then German economic advisers to reorganize the country's finances and to serve as a counterweight to Soviet and British influence.

Reza Shah's dictatorial rule ended with the occupation of his country by the Soviets and the British in August 1941--an episode that will be discussed below--and a month later he abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,⁶ who was proclaimed Shah by the Majlis. He left Iran at once and eventually died in exile in South Africa in 1944. The Iranian government he left behind faced a difficult period, with a Russian occupation in the north and a British one in the south. Tehran remained a neutral zone, but the Allies controlled the transportation

⁶ His biography appears in Appendix B.

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system, and wartime shortages of food and consumer goods led to a crippling inflation.

Suddenly brought to power in an occupied country, the young Shah, who had been ^{partially} educated in Europe and who was believed to favor constitutional government, was unable _____ to provide strong leadership to his government. As a result the power of the Majlis increased, a large number of transitory political parties and partisan newspapers were started, the tribes again became defiant, the clergy became stronger, and the Communists--banned as a party in the 1920's--returned in the guise of the Tudeh Party. Tudeh, headed by leftists and former Communist Party members, received funds and direction from Moscow and recruited both members and sympathizers throughout Iran during the war years and until its overt apparatus was crushed in 1954.

Little more than a department of Reza Shah's government in the 1920's and 1930's, the Majlis emerged from the years of occupation as a revitalized if irresponsible political force. It insisted on confirming the appointment of the U.S. financial advisory mission in 1942, it imposed limits on the government's right to negotiate oil concessions, and it took on the selection of a new Premier as its privilege--although the Shah retained the right to approve or disapprove the choice. In its dealings with Premiers or Shahs, the Majlis had a powerful weapon--the quorum veto. The constitution stated that the Majlis could only be considered convened when two-thirds of its 136 deputies had reached Tehran, and half of those present in the capital constituted a quorum. Thus, if 91 deputies were in Tehran, the absence of 46 of them could keep the assembly from functioning.

Political parties in the Western sense had never been strong in Iran, and during the war years their number had multiplied. Only the Tudeh was

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an effective political organization, and it was included among the "minority" parties, as opposed to the "majority" grouping that tended to vote together on key national issues. In general, political forces in postwar Iran had sorted themselves out into left, right, and center groups. Tudeh and its sympathizers were on the left. The right was more heterogeneous and included Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq's National Front,⁷ the fanatical religious organizations Fedayan Islam and Mojahadin Islam,⁸ the several small fascist parties, most Tehran University students and professors, and many small merchants and businessmen. The center was moderate and inclined to be more pro-Western; it included the Shah, most army officers, the Democratic Party, and the wealthy merchants and landowners who favored the status quo. Aided by landowner control over the peasant vote, center candidates usually won the majority of Majlis seats, but in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the nationalistic policies of the right regularly won the voting support of the left and center.

B. Between Russia and the West

1. Aggression from the North

Iran lost wars and territory to Czarist Russia in 1813 and again in 1928 and has lived in varying degrees of dread of its northern neighbor ever since. Great Britain was the counterbalance to Russian power--the British goal was to keep Iran as a buffer between Russia and

⁷ For example, in the 16th Majlis, elected in 1950, the National Front was composed of Mosadeq and eight followers who nonetheless were usually able to carry a majority of deputies with them on key votes.

⁸ Fedayan Islam, numbering at most a few hundred members, carried out terrorist acts in support of its goal of reestablishing Islamic law and practice to a dominant place in Iran. Mojahadin Islam was more political; its religious spearhead in the Majlis included mullah Ayatollah Kashani and Shams Qanatabadi, two influential, politically oriented religious leaders.

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India--until 1907, when Britain and Russia signed an agreement to divide Iran into zones of influence. The British purpose was to secure Russia as an ally in Europe against the growing power of Imperial Germany, and the result was that northern and central Iran as far south as Isfahan was open to Russian economic and political influence. The British zone was southeastern Iran adjacent to Indian Baluchistan until 1915, when in return for rights to the oil-rich southwestern zone the British recognized Russian claims to control of the Turkish Straits.

During World War I, Iranian neutrality was violated by the Turks, the Russians, and the British; the Russians entered northern Iran to counter Turkish advances through Iran toward the Caucasus, while the British sent in troops and organized Iranians into the British-officered South Persian Rifles to counter German attempts at subversion among the tribes and sabotage of the oil pipeline. The Russian military collapse in 1917 left a vacuum in northern Iran and the Caucasus that the Bolsheviks, Turks, Germans, and British attempted to fill. Britain's anti-Bolshevik intervention in Russia and Iran ended in 1919, but a treaty was concluded with Iran in August 1919 that would have made Iran a virtual British protectorate. This treaty was never ratified by the Majlis, however, and when Reza Khan and Seyyid Zia ed-Din seized power in 1921, Iran formally repudiated it.

From the start, Soviet Russia's official policy toward Iran was friendly. In a January 1918 note, the Soviets renounced all Czarist privileges contrary to the sovereignty of Iran and promised to aid the Iranians in expelling British and Turkish occupying forces. Their note

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also declared that the 1907 treaty with Britain was no longer binding. In an additional note of 26 June 1919, the Russians annulled all Iranian debts, renounced all Russian concessions in Iran--including the Russian Discount Bank and all railroads, harbors, and highways built by them--and declared the capitulations (privileges and exemptions guaranteed to Russian citizens in Iran) null and void. The Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of February 1921 formalized the provisions of the 1919 note, renounced any interference in one another's internal affairs, gave Iran the right to maintain naval forces in the Caspian Sea, and permitted Russia to send troops into Iran if it should become a base for a third-country threat to the Soviet Union. (This final provision, which originally applied to White Russian forces, was subject to Soviet interpretation of what constituted a threat and was a significant factor in restraining forceful British response to the Iranian takeover of the oil industry in 1951.)

Iranian relations with the Soviets in the 1920's concentrated on trade, which built up significantly until 1926, when a sudden and strict embargo was placed on Iranian agricultural products, mainly from the northern provinces. The embargo forced Iran to conclude a commercial treaty with the Russians that introduced barter transactions and gave the Soviets exclusive marketing privileges in Iran. This had several results: The Soviet share of Iranian foreign trade rose from 23% in 1926-27 to over 38% in 1928-29; Iranian industrial development was deliberately discouraged by the artificially low prices the Soviets put on competitive manufactured goods; and, Iran began to turn toward Germany as a foreign trade partner.

Germany, in addition to increasing its purchases of Iranian products, also became involved in the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, one

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of Reza Shah's most important accomplishments. Germans ran Iran's internal airlines in the late 1920's and the 1930's, supplied railway rolling stock and motor vehicles, and aided industrialization in Iran by setting up foundries, coal mining equipment, a cement factory, textile and paper mills, and a machinegun factory. A German financial adviser replaced the American Dr. Arthur Millspaugh in 1927, and the Germans and Iranians signed a trade treaty in 1928 and a treaty of friendship in 1929. As a result, Germany's share of Iran's foreign trade rose from 8% in 1932-33 to 45.5% in 1940-41, and by August 1941 the number of German advisers, technicians, and businessmen in Iran reached 2,000.

The nature and extent of this German penetration into Iran became very significant when German armed forces invaded Russia in 1941 and rapidly moved deeply into the Soviet Union. Iran was the shortest and most feasible route for badly needed war materials to be sent to Russia by its new allies in the West. Further, the possibility of a German takeover in Iran was a risk the Russians could not allow. On 19 July and 16 August 1941 the British and Soviet diplomatic missions in Tehran presented notes demanding the expulsion of the Germans in Iran, but Iran insisted it was neutral and that no danger existed. On 25 August, the final Allied demands were presented and the invasion began; the Soviets entered Iran from the north in three columns, the British from the south in two. Iranian armed resistance was negligible except for a sharp fight in Khuzistan that cost 55 British casualties. The Ali Mansur cabinet resigned on 27 August, and the official surrender took place the next day.

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Under its terms, the Soviets were to occupy the five northern provinces and the British the southern provinces, leaving central Iran and the capital to the Iranians; all Germans were to be expelled or turned over to the Allies; Iran was to facilitate the transport of Allied supplies. Reza Shah's position was made untenable by the poor performance of his army and by the subsequent hostile Allied propaganda campaign, and he abdicated in favor of his 22-year-old son on 16 September 1941. Although most Germans were interned or sent back to Germany, a number of key agents escaped and sought to stir up the tribes to sabotage and rebellion; Maj. Julius Schulze^{-Holthaus} worked among the Qashqai, and Franz Mayr^e tried to stir up the Kurds and sabotage the railroads. A number of prominent Iranians were found to be listed among Mayr^e's actual or potential agents, and many of them--including Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who in 1953 became the leading Iranian military man in the coup that ousted Mosadeq and who succeeded him as Premier--were arrested and sent to detention camps in Palestine.

The de facto situation of the occupation was confirmed by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance signed by the Soviet Union, Britain, and Iran on 29 June 1942. In this treaty, the Allies promised to withdraw their forces from Iran not later than six months after hostilities with Germany and its associates had ceased. Although the Iranians feared Russia and disliked the British presence and methods employed in seizing and running the transport system, they declared war on Germany in September 1943; presumably to ensure being on the winning side. When Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met in Tehran in November 1943 (without ever officially consulting or advising the Iranian government), they signed the Declaration on Iran, which recognized Iranian assistance to the war effort, promised economic aid, and reaffirmed Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

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Nonetheless, when the war ended in 1945, there were difficulties with the Soviets. In late 1944, they attempted to get Iranian approval for their exploitation of oil in Semnan in the Soviet zone. The furor over Iran's rejection of this offer, which was backed up by U.S. Ambassador Leland Morris' statement that the U.S. Government recognized the sovereign right of Iran to refuse to grant oil concessions, led to the resignation of Premier Sa'ed. With the new Premier under heavy Soviet pressure, Mohammad Mosadeq introduced a bill into the Majlis making it a crime for any cabinet minister to enter into negotiations with or to grant oil concessions to foreigners without the approval of the Majlis. The bill was passed on 2 December 1944.

Frustrated in their attempts to obtain a solid claim to oil in northern Iran, the Soviets became reluctant to leave Azarbaijan. On 29 November 1945, the United States proposed that all Allied troops be evacuated by 1 January 1946, but the Soviets insisted on the March 1946 date previously agreed to by the British. On 12 December, the "Autonomous Republic of Azarbaijan" was proclaimed, a national assembly elected, and Ja'afar Pishevari, a veteran Comintern agent, was named Premier. At the same time a Kurdish uprising took place in western Azarbaijan, and a Kurdish People's Republic^{was} proclaimed with Qazi Mohammad as president; it promptly allied itself with the "Autonomous Republic."

On 22 January 1946, the Shah asked Qavam as-Saltaneh to form a new government. After dismissing General Arfa, who had pro-British tendencies as Chief of Staff, Qavam went to Moscow in February to negotiate with the Russians. The Soviets proposed that their troops remain indefinitely in parts of Iran, that Iran recognize the internal autonomy of Azarbaijan (whose premier would also be designated governor-

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general), and that rather than a Soviet oil concession a joint Iranian-Russian stock company be set up, with 51% of the shares to be owned by Russia, 49% by Iran. Qavam rejected these demands and returned to Tehran, where he faced a political crisis. The 14th Majlis was due to end its two-year term on 11 March 1946, and it had voted that no elections for the next Majlis could be held while foreign troops were still in the country (U.S. forces ^{had} left Iran 1 January, the British on 2 March). The deputies' attempts to meet and vote to extend their terms were frustrated by Tudeh demonstrators, who until after 11 March physically prevented a quorum from gathering. Qavam was thus left to rule the country ^{alone} until the 15th Majlis could be elected.

Iran then brought the matter of the continuing Soviet occupation before the new United Nations Security Council, and under U.N. and U.S. pressure, the Soviets on 4 April 1946 concluded an agreement with Iran that called for evacuation of all Soviet troops within a month and a half after 24 March 1946, the establishment of a joint stock oil company which would be approved by the Majlis within 7 months after 24 March, and arrangements for improvement of relations between the Iranian government and the people of Azarbaijan.

Accordingly, Qavam worked out an agreement with Pishevari that would have conceded most Communist demands while leaving Azarbaijan under the nominal authority of Tehran. The Soviets appeared to be gaining influence in Iran, an impression that was reinforced when on 2 August 1946 Qavam brought three Tudeh Party members and a Tudeh sympathizer into his "popular front" cabinet. In the meantime, Tudeh had provoked an oil

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workers' strike in Khuzistan that involved 100,000 workers in violence and sabotage.

The inclusion of ^{the} Tudeh in the Qavam government brought British reaction. British troops were moved from India to Iraq, with the stated purpose of securing supplies of Iranian oil that Britain needed. Then, with encouragement from British consular and military advisers in their region, a coalition of Qashqai, Bakhtiari, and other tribesmen was formed which in a demonstration of force besieged Bushire, Abadeh, Kazerun, Bandar Amir, and besieged Shiraz. This was ultimately worked out in mid-October between the tribal leader Khan Qashqai, and General Zahedi, then commanding the garrison in which the government recognized the tribes' demands. On 17 November Qavam resigned and took office again, and the new cabinet had not include the Tudehites; on 24 November Qavam ordered the Azarbaijan to supervise the elections for the 15th Majlis. In the chance to redeem itself for the failure in 1941, the army responded enthusiastically. There was little resistance from the lightly armed Azarbaijan forces, and on 14 December the "autonomous" government collapsed. The army also captured the Kurdish stronghold of Mahabad, executing the leaders of that rebellion. In Tehran, Tudeh headquarters were raided, and the way was opened for the elections to begin on 1 January 1947.

When the 15th Majlis was finally inaugurated in August 1947, opposition led by Dr. Mosadeq began to fight the ratification of the oil agreement. In the face of Soviet pressure on the Iranian U.S. Ambassador, George V. Allen, in a speech on 11 September 1947, the Irano-American Cultural Relations Society, made it clear that Iran was not before the world that Iran was

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free to accept or reject the Soviet offer, and that in any case Iran would be supported by the United States against Soviet threats or pressure.

Citing American policy aimed at removing the fear of aggression anywhere in the world, Allen said:

The United States is firm in its conviction that any proposals made by one sovereign government to another should not be accompanied by threats or intimidation. When such methods are used in an effort to obtain acceptance doubt is cast on the value of the proposals.

Our determination to follow this policy as regards Iran is as strong as anywhere else in the world. This purpose can be achieved to the extent that the Iranian people show a determination to defend their own sovereignty. Patriotic Iranians, when considering matters affecting their national interest, may therefore rest assured that the American people will support fully their freedom to make their own choice.

Iran's resources belong to Iran. Iran can give them away free of charge or refuse to dispose of them at any price if it so desires.⁹

Thus convinced of U.S. support, on 22 October 1947 the Majlis rejected the Soviet oil agreement by a vote of 102 to 2 and instead passed a bill that forbade further oil concessions to foreign governments or partners and called for negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for a greater share of the profits. This measure was to have far-reaching effects on Iran's relations with Great Britain and the United States.

2. The Oil Dispute, 1949-53

The involvement of Great Britain in Iranian oil went back to the original D'Arcy concession of 1901, the first of a series of grants that were renegotiated at various times to keep up with the growth of the oil industry and world demand for oil. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded in 1909, but it took on a new complexion in 1914 when the British government became the major shareholder. The reason for this

⁹ The New York Times, 12 September 1947

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official investment was obvious; Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 and forced the decision, which had been debated for nearly a decade, to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to burning oil. On the brink of a major war, the navy had to be assured of a source of oil, which was both efficient and cheap. ^{The} Anglo-Persian (Anglo-Iranian, after 1935) Oil Company,

continued to extract oil under its original concession for the next 30 or so years, building pipelines as well as a large refinery at Abadan. The concession was renegotiated in 1933 to give Iran a greater share of the net profits and to modify the concession area. Managers and technicians continued to be either British or Indian, with the Iranians providing unskilled or semiskilled labor.

Following the passage of the Majlis legislation of 1947 rejecting the Soviet oil concession, the Iranian government presented to Anglo-Iranian a list of 25 points to be discussed. Chief among these were British taxation on Iran's share of company profits, Iran's rights to the company's installations at the end of the concession in 1993, a reduction in the number of British employees, the royalty basis--that is, the price to be paid to Iran for each barrel extracted and sold through AIOC's marketing and transporting system, and Iranian tax and custom exemptions. After lengthy discussions, the so-called "Supplemental Agreement" raising the royalty payment from 4 to 6 shillings a ton and giving Iran 20% of distributed profits and general reserve was sent to the Majlis on 19 July 1949.

Debate began shortly thereafter, but the term of the 15th Majlis ended before a vote on ratification could be taken. Elections for the 16th Majlis were finally completed in March 1950, and Mosadeq and his eight National Front colleagues led the balloting in Tehran. Ali Mansur

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was named Premier, and the proposed Supplemental Agreement was turned over to the Majlis Special Oil Commission for study in June 1950, the same month in which Gen. Ali Razmara, a former Chief of Staff, became Premier. The commission's report to the Majlis stated that the agreement did not adequately secure Iran's rights and should not be ratified. Razmara's Minister of Finance then withdrew the agreement and reopened negotiations with the AIOC, which by February 1951 was willing to agree to a 50-50 profit sharing similar to the agreement that Aramco had worked out with Saudi Arabia. Razmara, however, had asked a group of experts to study the feasibility of nationalization of the oil industry; their view was that Iran lacked sufficient technical expertise to run the industry, that the concession could not legally be cancelled, that heavy compensation would be due Britain, and that both foreign exchange and prestige would be lost by hasty nationalization. When Razmara opposed immediate nationalization as impractical under the circumstances, he was assassinated on 7 March 1951 by a member of Fedayan Islam, the rightist religious terrorist group. Hosein Ala briefly succeeded Razmara as Premier, and the Majlis approved the principle of nationalizing oil. When Ala resigned in April, the Majlis voted to recommend Mosadeq to the Shah as Premier, and he was appointed to the post on 29 April. Acting swiftly, the Majlis approved on 1 May a nine-point nationalization law. This act began a summer of hectic but fruitless bargaining that culminated in impasse and the departure in October 1951 of British managers and technicians.

Because the true issue in the dispute was political, in that the Iranians had come to identify oil with their own resurgent nationalism, the two governments were never able to understand

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one another's position. The British, attempting to deal with a political problem in economic terms, believed that the Iranians had to sell their oil or go broke and that the best approach was to wait them out, at first for workable terms and later--after nationalization--for adequate compensation. The Iranians, assuming that the West could not do without their oil, were convinced that by hiring non-British technicians and leasing tankers they could operate the oil industry on their own. To the British, the Iranians seemed irrational and wasteful; to the Iranians, the British appeared overconfident and condescending. As a result, their negotiations were so unproductive and mutually frustrating that the British even considered military intervention to seize Abadan, although the strong possibility that the Soviet Union would invoke its 1921 treaty with Iran to oppose such a British move served as an effective deterrent. The legalistic approach of the British government, which as the major stockholder in the AIOC regarded the oil concession as a treaty or, at the very least, an agreement between nations, was to take the matter first before the International Court of Justice and then to the Security Council of the United Nations. In the end, the Security Council deferred to the decision of the ICJ as to its own jurisdiction, and when in June 1952 the court ruled that the concession was not a treaty and hence not a proper matter for it to consider, all legal approaches were exhausted. The dispute was at an impasse, and by October 1952 diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off.¹⁰

3. Iran and U.S. Foreign Policy

United States foreign policy under President Harry Truman has

¹⁰ A more detailed but still necessarily brief description of the oil dispute is included as Appendix B to this history.

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been generally characterized as the "containment" of Communist aggression. Whatever its name, the policy evolved in 1947 when the British Government informed the United States that it could no longer afford to support Greece and Turkey--militarily and financially--against the very real threat of Soviet aggression and subversion. In assuming this burden, Truman said in a message delivered before Congress in March 1947:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter...

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East.... 11

Usually credited with originating the containment theory behind the Truman doctrine is George F. Kennan, who in February 1946 as counselor of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow sent the Department of State a long telegram in which he analyzed Soviet postwar policy aims. His telegram struck responsive chords in Washington; James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy and later the first Secretary of Defense, gave the telegram wide circulation within the national security bureaucracy. When Kennan returned from his tour of duty in Russia, Forrestal sponsored him for the post of director of the National War College, where he stayed for less than a year before becoming head of State's new Policy Planning Staff.

11 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947. U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, D.C.; 1963; pp.178-9

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Kennan's article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which appeared in Foreign Affairs for July 1947 and which is credited with the initial statement of the containment policy, was an amplification of his Moscow telegram. It was originally written for Forrestal in response to a paper on Marxism and Soviet power prepared by a Forrestal staffer and sent to Kennan for comment.¹² In January 1947, Kennan addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on his views on the Soviet Union, and Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong asked him for a paper along the lines of the talk for publication in that journal. Rather than write another paper, Kennan asked Forrestal's permission to publish the one he had done earlier, and when this was forthcoming, sent it to Armstrong with the request that it be signed "X".

In the "X" paper's description of the exercise of Soviet power, Kennan noted the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism that was deeply imbedded in the minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow invariably assumed that the aims of the capitalist world were antagonistic to Soviet interests, and that, said Kennan, "means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with." Thus, he continued, "...the main element of any U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." These could be contained "by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be

¹² Much of this background is taken from John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors; D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., Toronto, and London; 1974.

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charmed or talked out of existence." ¹³

However, in Kennan's view and in that of former Secretary of State ¹⁴ Dean Acheson, he was not the author of a containment policy or doctrine; he merely described what was happening. That he did it well, in a way that met the approval of a number of key policymakers of the time is obvious, but it was continued Soviet intransigence in pursuing openly aggressive policies that led to the U.S. reaction to the ^{North} Korean invasion in 1950, and the Korean War in turn institutionalized ¹⁵ a set of operational premises along these lines:

A. The Soviet Union would resort to military expansionism if it were not checked by visible countervailing military power;

B. Local imbalances of military power which favored the Soviets or a Soviet satellite would lead to further "Koreas";

C. The most appetizing local imbalance to the Soviets was in Central Europe;

D. The global balance of power would shift in favor of the Soviets if they were able to swallow the rest of Central Europe, i.e., West Germany and Austria; only the Greco-Turkish flanks had such a critical function for the balance of power (Japan was next most critical);

E. Local imbalances in secondary and tertiary areas must not be neglected; the capability and clearly communicated will to defend whatever areas the Communists chose to attack was necessary to prevent them from picking and choosing easy targets for blackmail and aggression. A number of small territorial grabs could add up to a critical alteration of the global balance, and our failure to defend one area would demoralize nationals in other such localities in their will to resist the Communists.

It was against this background of U.S. policy and planning that the status of Iran in late 1952 was considered, and although Dwight D.

¹³ In later years, writing in his Memoirs--1925-50, Kennan said that the X article's most serious defect was "the failure to make clear that what I was talking about when I mentioned the containment of Soviet power was not the containment by military means of a military threat but the political containment of a political threat." Whatever such hindsight is worth, Kennan's words were generally taken to mean political and military containment on a universal scale.

¹⁴ In "Three Comments on the 'X' Article," by W. Averell Harriman, Arthur Krock, and Dean Acheson, Foreign Policy, No. 7, Summer 1972.

¹⁵ In the view of Seyom Brown in The Faces of Power; Constancy and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson; Columbia University Press; New York & London.

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Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President on 20 January 1953 and John Foster Dulles became his Secretary of State with the avowed intention to go beyond containment toward "dynamic liberation," U.S. policy in Iran continued to stress the need to contain Soviet power there as elsewhere.

The U.S. involvement in Iran's oil problems was admittedly reluctant; we had backed the Iranian government in 1947 when it resisted the oil concession the Russians were seeking to arrange in the north. Our statements at that time probably did much to encourage the Iranian mood to challenge the British concession as well, and ^{as} that challenge grew into a bitter dispute, the United States found itself caught in the middle of an argument between its chief European ally and an underdeveloped Middle Eastern country to which it was providing military and economic aid. As a result, the U.S. role became not so much one of mediator but rather as an honest broker attempting to bring two clients into an agreement for their mutual benefit. Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had proposed¹⁶ in July 1951 that the President send Averell Harriman, his foreign policy adviser, to Tehran to reopen negotiations. Despite violent anti-American rioting by Tudeh the day he arrived, Harriman did get the two sides talking again, but to little avail. When the British brought the case before the Security Council in October 1951, Mosadeq argued Iran's position before the Council; afterward, he visited Washington and met with Truman and Acheson, but their talks came no closer to reaching a basis for settlement.

¹⁶ As recounted in Acheson's story of his years at State, Present at the Creation, W.W. Norton & Co.; New York; 1969; pp. 499-511 and 680-685.

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With the British out of Iran, the United States continued to look for solutions, and proposals involving both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the American oil industry were put forth, without success. By the end of 1951 the Conservatives, under Churchill, were back in power in Britain and less willing than Labor to be frustrated by Iran, and Mosadeq's position, increasingly dependent on Tudeh support, grew more precarious. By February 1953 he was at odds with the Shah, and both Britain and the United States were ready to look for realistic alternative solutions.

Old No.

New No.

Introduction

I. Introduction

Operational Plan

II. Operational Plan

I. Preliminary

A. Preliminary Support

II. Role of the Shah

B. Role of the Shah

1. First stage
2. Second stage
3. Third stage

1. First stage
2. Second stage
3. Third stage

III. Arrangement with Zehedi

C. Arrangement with Zehedi

IV. Orgn to Mount Overthrow

D. Orgn to Mount Overthrow

A. Orgn to Mount Coup

1. Orgn to Mount Coup

1. Mil Secretariat
2. Duties of Secretariat
3. Action on coup day

- a. Military Secretariat
- b. Duties of Secretariat
- c. Action on coup day

B. Orgn to Create

2. Orgn to Create

1. General programs
2. Duties of specific
 - (a) Press & Publicity

- a. General programs
- b. Duties of specific
 - (1) Press & Publicity

1. Mossadegh
2. Mossadegh
3. Mossadegh
4. Mossadegh
5. Mossadegh
6. Mossadegh
7. Consistent

- (a) Mossadegh
- (b) Mossadegh
- (c) Mossadegh
- (d) Mossadegh
- (e) Mossadegh
- (f) Mossadegh
- (g) Consistent

1. Make maximum
2. Through Tehran
3. Give maximum
4. Brief all

- (a) Make maximum
- (b) Through Tehran
- (c) Give maximum
- (d) Brief all

(b) The Majlis

(2) The Majlis

(c) Political elements

(3) Political elements

(d) Religious leaders

(4) Religious leaders

1. Spread
2. Give
3. as
4. The
5. Ensure
6. after

- (a) Spread
- (b) Give
- (c) as
- (d) The
- (e) Ensure
- (f) after

(e) Bazaar merchants

(5) Bazaar merchants

3. Final action —
 (A) on the —
 (B) other —
 (C) a number —
 (D) at this —
 (E) at the —
 (F) simultaneously —
 (G) in the —
 (H) just after —

C. Final action —
 (1) on the —
 (2) other —
 (3) a number —
 (4) at this —
 (5) at the —
 (6) simultaneously —
 (7) in the —
 (8) just after —

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III. COVERT ACTION

A. The Genesis of TPAJAX

The many chroniclers of Central Intelligence Agency misdeeds, whether in their books, magazine articles, or newspaper columns, have long placed the August 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mosadeq near the top of their list of infamous Agency acts. Complete secrecy about the operation that was known under the cryptonym of TPAJAX has been impossible to enforce under existing laws, and enough talkative people, including many Iranians, were privy to segments of the operation to make it relatively easy for journalists to reconstruct the coup in varied but generally inaccurate accounts.¹⁷ The point that the majority of these accounts miss is a key one: the military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government. It was not an aggressively simplistic solution, clandestinely arrived at, but was instead an official admission by both the United States and United Kingdom that normal, rational methods of international communication and commerce had failed. TPAJAX was entered into as a last resort.

The target of this policy of desperation, Mohammad Mosadeq, was neither a madman nor an emotional bundle of senility as he was so often pictured in the foreign press; however, he had become so committed to the ideals of nationalism that he did things that could not have conceivably helped his people even in the best and most altruistic of worlds. In refusing to bargain--except on his own uncompromising terms--with the

¹⁷ A number of these are included in Appendix C.

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Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, he was in fact defying the professional politicians of the British government. These leaders believed, with good reason, that cheap oil for Britain and high profits for the company were vital to their national interests. There had been little in their experience to make them respect Iranians, whom company managers and Foreign Office representatives saw as inefficient, corrupt, and self-serving. That the British misjudged their adversaries badly is obvious; they were convinced that when Iran felt the financial pinch, its resolve would crumble, and an agreement could be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. Henry Grady, who spent two unhappy years as U.S. Ambassador to Iran during the height of the oil dispute, quoted¹⁸ the British theme that he had heard in so many variations as: "Just wait until the beggars need the money badly enough--that will bring them to their knees."

In fact, of course, the loss of oil revenue did not bring the Iranians to their knees; it merely forced them to take the risky steps that increasingly endangered their country's future. It was the potential of those risks to leave Iran open to Soviet aggression--at a time when the Cold War was at its height and when the United States was involved in an undeclared war in Korea against forces supported by the U.S.S.R. and China--that compelled the United States in planning and (b)(1)
executing. TPAJAX. (b)(3)

How real were the risks in what Mosadeq was doing? Had the British sent in the paratroops and warships, as they were to do a few years later against the Egyptians at Suez, it was almost certain that the Soviet Union

¹⁸ In his article in the 5 January 1952 Saturday Evening Post, entitled "What went Wrong in Iran?"

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would have occupied the northern portion of Iran by invoking the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of 1921. It was also quite probable that the Soviet army would have moved south to drive British forces out on behalf of their Iranian "allies." Then not only would Iran's oil have been irretrievably lost to the West, but the defense chain around the Soviet Union which was part of U.S. foreign policy would have been breached. The Soviets would have ^{had} the opportunity to achieve the ancient Russian dream of a port on the Persian Gulf and to drive a wedge between Turkey and India. Under such circumstances, the danger of a third world war seemed very real. When it became apparent that many elements in Iran did not approve of Mosadeq's continuing gamble or the direction in which he was pushing their country, the execution of a U.S.-assisted coup d'etat seemed a more desirable risk than letting matters run their unpredictable course. Mosadeq was already openly threatening to turn to other sources for economic help--the Soviets--if Britain did not meet his demands or if the United States did not come forth with massive aid to replace his lost oil revenue. Peacefully or in war, the Soviet Union appeared to be the only potential beneficiary of Mosadeq's policies.

TPAJAX had its beginnings

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in a political action operation designed to change the course of events in Iran.

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the aged Premier was rapidly become a "prisoner of the left" because of his growing reliance on the support of the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party,²⁰ which had a membership in 1952 of about 25,000 plus many more thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

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so that he did not reach Washington and report to his new post as/branch in NEA/4, NEA Division, Directorate of Plans, until late October 1952.

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met with Kermit Roosevelt

(Chief, NEA Division), the Chief of the Iran Branch of NEA, the Deputy Chief of NEA and the Chief, NEA in Washington, planning for Iran.

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political action to remove Mosadeq, and NEA representatives agreed to study the proposition and to keep policy channels advised. High-level approval to explore the matter was obtained through Department of State

²⁰ As the organization replacing the Communist Party of Iran, outlawed by Reza Shah, Tudeh had been receiving Soviet financial support and advice since 1941.

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a CIA NEA Division officer who was there
 channels, / recalls attending a decisive meeting²¹ at
 State in company with Kermit Roosevelt at which Gen. W. Bedell Smith
 presided, shortly after he left the Agency to become Under Secretary of
 State early in February 1953. Smith's affirmative response to the
 question, "Do we go ahead?" was the informal green light that the planners
 in NEA Division had been waiting for; his laconic, unprintable answer
 was Smith's main contribution to the meeting, at which the reasons for
 overthrowing Mosadeq were carefully discussed.

Coincidentally, during March 1953, the Tehran Station reported to

Headquarters

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The officially approved reply, after consultation with
 Washington, was that the United States was interested but could promise
 no specific assistance at that time.

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²¹ No minutes of this meeting are available in DDO files.

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Final official approval of TPAJAX came on 11 July 1953^{2(b)(1)}
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as an action based on NSC Report 136/1, "U.S. Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran," which had been adopted by the National Security Council as action No. 680 and approved by the President on 20 November 1952.

The fact that this decision and the staff work preceding it were very closely held in Washington is borne out by a memorandum of 10 June 1953 from the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (GTI) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs recommending policies more supportive of Mosadeq. It reasoned that since conditions ^{in Iran} were deteriorating almost to the point of no return and since an attempt to remove Mosadeq would risk a civil war and would, even if successful, alienate the Iranian people, we should increase our financial and technical assistance to Iran in the hope that Mosadeq would be able to muddle through. The desk officers' position paper recognized that increased U.S. aid would, of course, frustrate British policy, which was to undermine Mosadeq's position. By late June, however, State was aware of the planned operation, and a further position paper that stipulated certain conditions to be met by the British was prepared on 25 June, as described in the discussion of planning, below.

B. The Planning Phase

To carry out a [REDACTED] operation involving [REDACTED] (b)(1)
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[REDACTED] a great deal of advance planning was necessary, and in early (b)(1)
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²⁴ No documentary evidence of this approval is available in the CIA Executive Register or the remaining files on TPAJAX.

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Maj Donald H. Wilber,²⁵ an NEA contract consultant who knew Iran well,

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Their first point of agreement was that Maj.

Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi²⁶ was the logical choice to head the coup, despite the fact that his career balance sheet had nearly as many minuses as pluses. Zahedi's obvious assets were his record as a leader and combat officer, his devotion to the Shah, and his aggressive desire to change the course of his country's destiny. His debits were many: his wartime reputation as a pro-Nazi and suspected agent who had been arrested by the British and sent to Palestine was further tainted by charges of corruption. In addition, he had been out of the army for four years and had only limited contacts with active duty officers at the regimental and battalion levels. He nonetheless was regarded by Wilber

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as the sole Iranian with sufficient support among Iranian army officers and pro-Shah politicians to be the central coup figure.

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²⁵ Donald Newton Wilber was an Agency contract employee as a consultant in NEA Division and (in 1952) In the 1930's he had taken part in archaeological explorations and excavations in Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran, subsequently writing a number of survey-type books on those areas.

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²⁶ See Appendix B for biographic details.

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The planning discussions

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also took

up the assumptions on which the plan would be based. These were: that Zahedi was the best candidate for coup leader; that the Shah must be brought into the operation, against his will if necessary; that the army would follow the Shah rather than Mosadeq if given a clear-cut choice; that a genuine legal or quasi-legal basis must be found for the coup; that public opinion must be aroused against Mosadeq;

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and, that

the new government to be established in power must be guarded from possible Tudeh countercoup attempts. Tehran Station and Headquarters

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were kept apprised of these assumptions, with which they did not always agree. The Station, for example, backed Ambassador Henderson when he told Washington that the Shah probably would not act decisively against Mosadeq, while Headquarters was concerned about finding a possible substitute for General Zahedi because of the negative aspects of his background.

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The proposal that anti-Mosadeq leaders seek "religious refuge" was never implemented in the field; it probably reflected the views [redacted] primarily concerned with psychological and propaganda operations was attuned to the utilization of local customs and traditions.

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[redacted] they had

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completed a revision of the plan. Their major change was to concentrate on building up the size and effectiveness of the anti-Mosadeq forces rather than on countering actions by the elements supporting the Premier.

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Reduced to its essentials, the plan called for the following sequence of events, in which timing was of great importance:

The goal of the operation was to replace Mosadeq with a leader whom the Shah and the army would support and who would be willing to negotiate a reasonable oil settlement that would prevent an economic collapse and reduce Iran's vulnerability to the Soviet Union. General Zahedi was such a man, perhaps the only one who met all the requirements.

³⁰ Also included in Appendix D.

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Zahedi would be brought to power through a military coup that would, because of the Shah's participation, be fundamentally legal. The Shah, who had been indecisive under the pressure of the oil dispute and Mosadeq's maneuvering for more power, would be induced to do his part

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The Shah's role would be to sign three documents: a royal decree (firman, in Farsi) naming Zahedi as Army Chief of Staff; another firman appealing to all ranks of the army to carry out the orders of the new Chief of Staff; and, an open letter calling on army officers to support the bearer, General Zahedi. The letter would be used by Zahedi to recruit the coup group of officers in key posts that would enable them to carry out the military objectives of the plan, including the seizure of army headquarters, Radio Tehran, the army radio station, the houses of Mosadeq and his principal associates, police and Gendarmerie headquarters, the telephone exchange, the Majlis building, and the National Bank. Key government figures, army officers, and newspaper editors supporting Mosadeq would be arrested. Special measures would be prepared for dealing with the anticipated violent reaction of Tudeh Party members to Mosadeq's overthrow.

The plan envisaged three different scenarios by which the coup might be carried out: first, a massive religious protest against the government,

31 The Gendarmerie were a national, paramilitary, rural police, whereas the National Police were an urban force.

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followed by military action by the army officers loyal to Zahedi; the second alternative, taking advantage of the crisis that would develop at the anticipated moment when Mosadeq would force the Shah to leave the country, and then starting the military action; or, as the third alternative, starting the military action the moment that Mosadeq, ³² frustrated by the Shah, presented his resignation and sent the Tudeh and National Front mobs into the street. Under any of these scenarios, the military action itself was seen as beginning with General Zahedi assuming the post as Chief of Staff, seizing army headquarters, and ordering the arrest of Mosadeq and his compatriots. The Shah would then appoint Zahedi as Premier, and the Majlis would be called into session to confirm his appointment.

The plan also discussed the use of the press, including propaganda themes, as well as utilization of the Majlis, the political parties, religious leaders, and bazaar merchants in carrying out the operation. Finally, it estimated ³³ the coup's chances of success and the probable implications for the United States if it should fail. It was this plan that [redacted] CIA to the Department of State in order to obtain simultaneous high-level approval. (b)(1) (b)(3)

As a sidelight, it should be mentioned that before Roosevelt left for [redacted] he briefed U.S. Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson, who was in Washington for consultation. The briefing on the proposed operation took place on 6 June 1953 and was attended by General (b)(1) (b)(3)

³² This was a technique Mosadeq had used before to rally the street mobs to his support and to intimidate his opposition. It was anticipated that he would try it again if the Shah put any sort of pressure on him.

³³ No formal estimates as to the potential for success of the coup were prepared by ONE, although that Office was producing special estimates on the situation in Iran. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

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Cabell (the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence), Frank Wisner (the Deputy Director for Plans), [redacted] The latter (b)(1)
[redacted] memo of this (b)(3)

conversation notes that the Ambassador stated categorically that the Shah would not back Zahedi when the time came for action unless extreme pressure was exerted, possibly including the threat of replacing him. Ambassador Henderson also warned that the army would not play a major role in the coup without the Shah's active cooperation, and he urged that an alternate plan be prepared that would utilize the Amini brothers [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] In more general terms, he (b)(1)
(b)(3) pointed out the inconsistency of telling the Shah that no more U.S. aid would go to Iran while Mosadeq remained in power, while at the same time the Point Four (technical assistance) program was in the process of implementing a \$3,400,000 Village Council program. Overall, the Ambassador was negative about many aspects of the plan, although less so than he had been when consulted in Tehran. He agreed to delay his return to Tehran by arranging a prolonged European visit, thereby adding his absence to the war of nerves against Mosadeq.

By mid-June, the purpose of the plan was known to some senior Department of State officers, and the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs prepared a comment on 25 June for the Secretary of State that in general approved of the plan--including the assumption of the risks of failure. However, State set forth two conditions that had to be met:

- 1) the United States must be prepared to offer immediate and substantial economic assistance--an estimated \$60 million the first year--to the new government in Iran in order to stabilize the economy and convince the public that their new government would be able to do more for them than

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the old one, and 2) the British must give a firm commitment to be flexible in approaching the oil settlement and not attempt to force the new government to accept terms that would alienate public opinion. To be acceptable, State said, the oil settlement should recognize nationalization of the oil industry, provide for Iranian control of all property, installations, and production in Iran, allow the Iranian government complete freedom of choice of technical and managerial personnel as well as freedom in the sales of oil and oil product, and dispose of the problem of compensation within the framework of the existing nationalization law and on a basis which would not saddle Iran with excessive indebtedness to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

On 7 July these views were passed to the British by Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and on 23 July British Ambassador Makins gave Under Secretary of State W. Bedell Smith a Foreign Office memorandum which in diplomatic language acceded to the U.S. conditions. The memo set forth the principles that compensation should be left to the impartial arbitration of an international tribunal and that terms of a future arrangement must not appear to provide a reward for the tearing up of contractual obligations or disturbing world oil prices. The British government would thus be ready to cooperate with the new Iranian government in trying to reach an agreement, within the bounds of those two principles. While this answer was obviously not an across-the-board acceptance of the State conditions, it was not a specific rejection and was clearly an affirmative answer to the question of the British taking a reasonable, flexible approach that would not arouse the Iranian people against the new government.

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
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C. Putting the Plan into Action

After formal approval came from the British Foreign Office and the Prime Minister on 1 July and from the U.S. Secretary of State and the President on 11 July, NEA Division organized itself for the support of the operation.

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The news that General Zahedi had virtually no military assets of his own was also painfully confirmed.

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


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The task of recruiting General Schwartzkopf was assigned to the former

[redacted] who on 26 June visited the general, then serving as Administrative

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Director, Department of Law and Public Safety, State of New Jersey. Without revealing specific details, Schwartzkopf's proposed role in convincing the Shah was outlined, and won the general's complete cooperation, contingent on the following: 1) that he be allowed to present himself to the Shah as a major general rather than as a brigadier, for prestige purposes; 2) that he be fully briefed on the political situation and all details of the operational plan; and 3) that he be allowed to give some logical explanation of his trip to Iran to the Governor and the Attorney General of New Jersey. After a discussion of possible cover

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stories; it was agreed that arrangements would be made for the Government of Pakistan to invite General Schwartzkopf to visit Karachi for the purpose of giving advice on police and security matters and that it would be logical for him to stop and visit old friends in Beirut and Tehran along his route. Schwartzkopf also warned that shortly before his departure from Tehran in 1946, General Razmara, then Chief of Staff, had tried to poison the Shah's mind against Swartzkopf because of his resistance to Razmara's desire to absorb the Gendarmerie (over which Schwartzkopf had nominal command as head of the U.S. advisory mission) into the army. As a result of this, Schwartzkopf felt his normally cordial relations with the Shah had become slightly strained by the time of his departure from Iran in 1948.

A question that arose during the planning phase was whether or not to proceed with the U.S. Point Four aid program to Mosadeq's Village Council program (part of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952, under which landlords had to give the government 20% of their profits, 10% to go back to the peasants and 10% to the Village Council for health, educational, and agricultural improvements). Point Four officials had committed \$3,400,000 to the program, which was being exploited in Iran as evidence of U.S. support for Mosadeq, and, despite some misgivings, both Ambassador Henderson and the Department of State felt that cancelling the aid would only serve to irritate Mosadeq and perhaps alert him to the fact that the United States was beginning to actively oppose him. Over Station and Headquarters objections, it was finally decided to proceed with the Village Council commitment. Then, late in July,

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the Station recommended that William Warne, the Point Four representative in Tehran who was closely identified with U.S. support for Mosadeq, be called away from Tehran during the operational phase of TPAJAX, but it was decided that no adequate excuse could be found for the move, which Warne would oppose, and so it was dropped.

D. Involving the Shah

Probably the biggest question mark for TPAJAX planners was the Shah's role in the coup--not only how he would play it, but would he even play it at all? They had little reason to be overconfident, for his indecision and susceptibility to bad advice were notorious. The Shah had his reasons, however. He had assumed the throne in 1941 when his father, a semiliterate strongman, was forced to abdicate by the occupying power, Britain and the U.S.S.R. Leader of a defeated and humiliated country for the first 4½ years of his reign, the young Shah³⁷ attempted to survive by ruling as a constitutional monarch. His very existence was threatened by Tudeh on the left and by Premier Ahmed Qavam on the right; a British correspondent who interviewed him in 1947 described him as "a very frightened young man." Although Qavam, as a strong Premier, was in a position to bring the Pahlavi dynasty to a premature end, he apparently decided to keep the monarchy and took steps to build up the Shah's popularity, crediting him with recovering Azarbaijan from the Soviets. Seemingly stimulated by this appearance of success, the Shah took a more active role as ruler, and in 1947 began to intervene more vigorously in political affairs. The attempted assassination by a Tudeh Party member in 1949 frightened him again, but he survived

³⁷ A biography of the Shah is included in Appendix B.

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the shots and cast about for some stabilizing factors in his situation.

The U.S. Embassy made this assessment of him in 1951:

The Shah is confused, frustrated, suspicious, proud, and stubborn, a young man who lives in the shadow of his father. His fears, questionings, and indecisiveness are permanent instabilities of character. Yet, he has great personal courage, many Western ideals, and a sincere, though often wavering, desire to raise and preserve his country. He is, at all times, eager for and a victim of advice.

How then to convince this mistrusting but gullible ruler of the soundness and effectiveness of the TPAJAX plan in which his own participation was such a key element?

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While the coup organization was being pulled together, Mosadeq had been keeping the political pot boiling. His supporters had held a massive demonstration on 21 July to mark the second anniversary of the riots that ousted Qavam and brought Mosadeq in as Premier; Tudeh participation in the demonstration had been heavy, pointing up Mosadeq's increasing reliance on Communist supporters. Of the crowd of more than 50,000 demonstrators estimated to have met in Majlis Square, Tudeh members and sympathizers probably outnumbered followers of the National Front by ten to one. During the first week in August, Mosadeq carried out a national referendum on dissolving the Majlis that was passed by an enormous majority, despite the insistence of opposition deputies that such a referendum was illegal. [redacted] attempted unsuccessfully to persuade anti-Mosadeq deputies to resist his efforts to oust them by taking religious sanctuary, or bast, in the Majlis building.

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Mosadeq's reasons for wanting a new Majlis were obvious; his National Front had lost much of its cohesion since he had quarrelled with Kashani, Baghai, Makki, ³⁸ Kashani, an influential mullah and political figure, had been a Mosadeq ally and was the elected Speaker of Majlis; Baghai and Makki were members of the Premier's original nine-man National Front that had swung the Majlis toward nationalization of the oil industry (see Appendix A). in 1951

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and other supporters over his proposed constitutional amendments transferring power from the Shah to the Premier. The National Front, primarily composed of nationalistic rightwingers, was alarmed by Mosadeq's growing reliance on Tudeh, and this became a major issue in the propaganda campaign

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[redacted] In an attempt to get across to the Iranian (b)(3)

people the changing attitude of the U.S. Government toward Mosadeq, Secretary of State Dulles in his 28 July press conference replied to a

[redacted] question on Iran as follows:

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The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian government has caused our government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran.

In the early days of August, Roosevelt [redacted]

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were compelled to build up the pressure on the Shah. Alterations were made in the original plan with regard to the firmans the Shah was to sign; one was to name Zahedi as Chief of Staff, while the other would declare illegal the referendum dissolving the Majlis.³⁹ But, getting the actual documents signed was becoming a critical matter. [redacted] saw the Shah on 2 August and left the palace believing he had obtained the Shah's agreement to dismiss Mosadeq and appoint Zahedi as Premier, but when Roosevelt met with the ruler the following day, he had become reluctant to act, saying that he was not an adventurer and could not take chances like one. Roosevelt's argument was that the government could be changed in no other way, and that if the Shah did not join

(b)(1)

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³⁹ One of the most rapidly changing facets of the plan was the content of the firmans; in their final format, there were two--one removing Mosadeq as Premier, the other appointing General Zahedi in his place.

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with the army to oust Mosadeq, either a Communist Iran or another Korean-type conflict was inevitable. These alternatives the United States was not prepared to accept.

At this meeting, the Shah asked for direct assurance from President Eisenhower that he approved of the Shah's taking the initiative against Mosadeq, but before this could be passed to Washington, the President fortuitously inserted an item in his speech to the Governors' Conference in Seattle on 4 August⁴⁰ to the effect that the United States could not sit idly by and watch Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain. Roosevelt used the coincidence of this speech by telling the Shah that the President's comment on Iran had been made to satisfy him, but the ruler continued to balk. On 8 August, the Shah, still irresolute, told Roosevelt that he would send a message of encouragement to the army officers involved, then go to the palace at Ramsar on the Caspian and let the army act, apparently without his official knowledge. If that action were successful, he would name Zahedi as Premier. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3)
but the Shah said that while he approved of the planned action, he would not sign any documents. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3)
Under this extreme pressure, the Shah finally agreed to sign the papers, see Zahedi personally, and then leave for Ramsar. The next day he did meet with the general, but the firmans [redacted] (b)(1)
preparing were not yet ready to be signed. The Shah went on to Ramsar, after promising to sign the decrees as soon as they were brought to him.

⁴⁰ As reported in The New York Times for 5 August 1953.

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Roosevelt

[redacted] then altered the plan one final time by

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deciding that one firman should dismiss Mosadeq from the Premier's post

and the other name Zahedi as his successor.

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E. The First Attempt -- and Failure

The Shah's decrees were now in the hands of the coup group, and the next step was to implement the military action plan as soon as possible.

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One point seems clear, although the exact details are missing--the initial coup attempt was betrayed. Rumors of a coup to be staged by the army had been in the air for some time, and the Iranians' desultory view of security and their tendency to be talkative were notorious, but according

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to Roosevelt, it was probably Colonel Naderi, chief of the secret police,
who told Chief of Staff Riahi that the coup was coming the night of 15
August. General Riahi, [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] had been informed of the plot by 1700 on the 15th; (b)(3)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)
[REDACTED] (b)(3)
General Kiani, [REDACTED]


where he was arrested and held by Colonel Nasiri and other coup officers.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)
[REDACTED] (b)(3)

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What happened to the other coup officers with assigned missions? (b)(1)
number of them heard the news that the coup was blown and so did nothing. (b)(3)
Others were frustrated by the precautions General Riahi took when he learned
the coup was coming that night. (b)(1)

(b)(3)
General Batmangelich, who was to have captured
the Chief of Staff's headquarters, turned back when he saw a large number
of troops and tanks surrounding it. General Guilanshah, who was with
Batmangelich, said that after their abortive attempt on the headquarters
they rode around town looking the situation over until about 0230, when
they separated. (b)(1)

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(b)(3)

The first coup attempt--a conventional military takeover, reinforced by the Shah's signed orders--had taken less than 12 hours, from Saturday night, 15 August, until early in the morning of Sunday the 16th. As the chronology of TPAJAX⁴¹ shows, the next three days were filled with confusion. Mosadeq's forces believed that they had crushed the thing they most feared--an army takeover on behalf of the Shah. Their reaction was to mop up on their remaining enemies and to exploit their victory to the fullest. Monday and Tuesday, the 17th and 18th, the Tudeh Party seized the spotlight, rioting and demonstrating in the streets in a wild outburst of antimonarchical feeling, while Roosevelt and his men waited their chance to reverse things. The second, and winning, phase of the operation was not to come until Wednesday, the 19th.

F. Turning Defeat Around

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[REDACTED]

At noon on 16 August, Radio Tehran broadcast a statement from Mosadeq (b)(1) dissolving the 17th Majlis and promising early elections for the next (b)(3) Majlis. Later that afternoon, the Station learned from the radio that the Shah had flown to Baghdad. As Roosevelt said when he returned to Headquarters after the coup: "He just took off. He never communicated with us at all--just took off." The immediate Station reaction was to try to arrange for the Shah to broadcast to his people from Baghdad as soon as possible. Headquarters was asked to have the Department of State, through the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq, press the Shah to take an aggressive stand about the events in Tehran. State, however, was firmly opposed to any U.S. effort to contact the Shah, [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

The next day, Monday the 17th, the Shah did make a number of statements that were broadcast over the Baghdad [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3)

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radio, insisting that he had not abdicated, that he was confident of the loyalty to him of the Iranian people, and that he had indeed dismissed Premier Mosadeq and appointed Zahedi under his constitutional prerogatives. On his own initiative, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Burton Berry had seen the Shah on Sunday night, the 16th, and had suggested some ideas for the forthcoming statement that by happy coincidence were very much in line with Station thinking.

Foreign Minister Fatemi, who had been released at dawn on the 16th along with the rest of the handful of prisoners taken in the coup attempt, held a press conference at 1400 that afternoon in which he implicated the Court and blamed the Imperial Guard for planning the coup. He said that his own views would be found in an editorial in his paper, Bakhtar Emruz, which was also read over Radio Tehran at 1730--it was a long, inflammatory, and savage attack on the Shah and his dead father. Its broadcast and subsequent printing was credited with doing much to stir up the Tudeh-led anti-Shah mobs that raged through Tehran on 17 and 18 August. At the same time, the violence of its tone and language aroused much public sympathy for the Shah. Fatemi spoke again at 1930 to the crowds massed in Majlis Square, as did a number of pro-Mosadeq Majlis deputies. The Shah was sharply attacked by every speaker; there were insistent demands for his abdication, and the people were told for the first time that he had left the country.

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On Monday the 17th, Radio Tehran began broadcasting lists of those (b)(1)
involved in the coup attempt; (b)(3)
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Rumors that these officers were to be hanged on a large gallows reportedly being constructed were widely circulated. Fatemi continued to rail against the Shah in Bakhtar Emruz, and his editorial on the 17th said, in part: "O traitor Shah, you shameless person, you have completed the criminal history of the Pahlavi reign. The people want to drag you from behind your desk to the gallows." By mid-morning, Tudeh-led mobs were in the streets of Tehran, tearing down statues of the Shah and Reza Shah, defiling them, and dragging them through the streets. When Ambassador Henderson arrived from Beirut, as scheduled, he drove back to the Embassy past the empty pedestals of the royal statues of which only the broken bronze boots remained.

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
Roosevelt had hoped that it would be possible to emphasize the religious aspects of the demonstration to be held the 19th, but if this was to be done, the mullahs wanted to hold it on Friday, 21 August, which was a religious festival day. For a number of reasons, not the least of which was the widespread rumor that the arrested officers were to be hung on the 20th, the operation could not be held off the two extra days the religious leaders wanted.

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⁴⁴ Richard Cottam, in Nationalism in Iran, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964, described (p.37) the bazaar mob in some detail, as follows: "Along with the mullahs and frequently closely allied with them are the professional mob leaders. These men typically center their activities in a varzeshgah (athletic club). There are many varieties of varzeshgahan, some of them respectable clubs which not only serve as centers for athletes but also for other valuable group activities. But the varseshgahan of the mob leaders are centers for athletic young toughs known as chaqu keshan, who can be hired for for any kind of corrupt or terroristic activity....when a sizable political demonstration is desired, the mob leaders purchase the participation of large numbers of unskilled laborers. In 1952 observers claim to have seen workers demonstrating for the Communists, for the royalists, and for the Mosadeqist National Front on successive days."

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In Washington, the Department of State and Headquarters had gotten (b)(1)
the bad news. On the 16th Roosevelt had sent two messages to tell Head- (b)(3)
quarters that the first attempt had failed but that there were still

[redacted] He did not furnish a great deal of detail on just (b)(1)
how bad things were, since he was well aware that the reaction would be (b)(3)
to cut the losses, get everyone out, and scrub the show. His requests for
State Department help in getting Ambassador Berry in Baghdad to instruct
the Shah on what to say in his speech there were, as noted earlier, turned
down. State indicated that in the absence of any satisfactory indication
of possible success of the coup, the United States wished to avoid
assuming responsibility for urging statements on the Shah beyond those

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he himself was disposed to make. Further, the Department said that lacking more satisfactory indications than it had been able to draw from Roosevelt's messages that there was a "real and significant possibility of decisive action in Iran,"

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Tuesday, the 18th, became a day of waiting. The Shah and Queen Soroya flew to Rome from Baghdad that morning; when he arrived at 1500, he made additional statements to the press but did not issue a call to action by the forces supporting him. In Tehran, bands of Tudehites still roamed the streets, and a mob sacked the headquarters of the Pan-Iran Party

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

and small Tudeh and National Front mobs fought each other. The secret police attempted to prevent the publication of opposition newspapers, but a number of them, including Dad and Shahed, were able to get on the streets with replicas of the Shah's firmans. The Tudeh Party newspaper blamed the coup attempt on Anglo-American intrigue and called for a democratic republic to replace

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the monarchy. Mosadeq's spokesmen on Radio Tehran announced that a 100,000-rial reward would be paid for information on the whereabouts of General Zahedi and that all demonstrations were banned. General Riahi addressed a meeting of all senior officers of the Tehran garrison at the lecture hall of the Military School and told them in very strong terms that they should remain loyal to the government.

Despite the ban on demonstrations, there was continued fighting in the streets on the evening of 18 August, [REDACTED] (b)(1)

(b)(3)

Mosadeq's security forces were sent out to clear the streets, and their operations took on a strong anti-Tudeh tone as they beat up demonstrators and forced them to shout pro-Shah slogans. Belatedly realizing what was happening, Tudeh leaders went out into the streets to try to talk the demonstrators into going home, but the excesses of two days of anti-Shah rioting had already done their damage.

For the Station, there was good news from Kermanshah. Farzanegan finally returned from there early Wednesday morning after having had car trouble [REDACTED] (b)(1)

[REDACTED] He reported that Colonel Bakhtiar was willing to march on Tehran (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

No definitive results came from the attempt to persuade the leading Shi'ite cleric in Com to declare a holy war against the agents of communism, although the pro-Shah newspapers had been prepared to exploit the story, if possible. And, Headquarters sent a message that Tuesday evening that

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said in blunt terms that in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary from Roosevelt and Henderson, the operation against Mosadeq should be discontinued.

To the men on the scene, however, the operation seemed far from hopeless. There were strong indications of a resurgence of support for the Shah, bolstered by the propaganda efforts of Station agents. Tudeh violence and demands for a republic were putting the continued life of the monarchy into the hands of the army and of the people of Tehran.

The ultimate choice was to be theirs, [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Early on the morning of the 19th, pro-Shah groups began to gather in the bazaar area in south Tehran. Many of the people assembling were undoubtedly those that Kashani was paying 200 tomans (2,000 rials, or about \$26.65 at the exchange rate of 75 rials to the dollar) a head to be in the streets, but there were also many others who had been stirred up by Tudeh actions and who were looking for leadership. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

As the various groups of demonstrators moved northward out of south Tehran,⁴⁵ they merged as they reached Sepah Square, where they met the troops sent to turn them back. The soldiers fired hundreds of shots over

⁴⁵ The map of Tehran included as Appendix ⁶ shows the area through which the demonstration moved and its targets.

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their heads, but whether the order to fire into the crowd was never given or was ignored, they did not shoot into the mob. Sensing that the army was with them, the demonstrators not only began to move faster but took on a festive, holiday atmosphere. As Roosevelt said later, it had become a mob wholly different from any seen before in Tehran; it was full of well-dressed, white-collar people, carrying pictures of the Shah and shouting, "Zindebah, Shah!" (Long live the Shah!). Then, the troops began to join in the demonstration.

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Troops from the Imperial Guard, which had been disbanded after its involvement in the 15 August coup attempt, had gathered, and truckloads of soldiers began driving through the streets, shouting and waving pictures of the Shah. Drivers kept their lights on, as they had been asked to do as a sign they supported the Shah.

By mid-morning, after the demonstrators had reached Sepah Square and fanned out into the center of the city, General Riahi reported to Mosadeq that he no longer controlled the army, but the Premier told him to hold firm. Mosadeq's house, a prime target of the demonstrators, was being defended by Colonel Momtaz' battalion.

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Radio Tehran was a key target, since it would not only be able to broadcast the news of the success of the Shah's forces in the capital but would also help convince the provinces to join in supporting the Zahedi government. It was important, also, to get it in unsabotaged condition, ready to broadcast. During the morning hours on the 19th it had been broadcasting cotton prices, then switched to recorded music uninterrupted by news bulletins. Shortly before 1430, it suddenly went off the air, apparently as the pro-Shah troops and demonstrators took control of the building in a short, sharp struggle. When it resumed broadcasting, after a short period of "technical difficulties," all that could be heard was a confused babble of happy voices.

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Zahedi

was brought out [redacted] put in the tank, and taken to Radio Tehran, where he made his speech. In it he promised to restore the rule of law, individual freedom, and freedom of assembly, and he added some popular items such as raising wages, cutting the cost of living, providing free medical treatment, and building more roads. The speech was recorded and broadcast again that night.

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Although the Kermanshah division did not reach the capital until after the excitement was over, they had entered Hamadan enroute just as the Tudeh Party there was staging a large pro-Mosadeq demonstration, which Bakhtiar's troopers ended in short order. In the wake of the coup, Zahedi named Bakhtiar as military governor of Tehran, where he enforced martial law and was instrumental in the year that followed in removing hundreds of Tudeh members and sympathizers from the army officer corps.⁴⁶

Mosadeq's forces put up more than token resistance at Staff Headquarters and at the Premier's house, but they were quickly overwhelmed. Newspaper

⁴⁶ This experience led to Bakhtiar eventually being appointed in 1956 as the first chief of Iran's newly formed counterintelligence organization, SAVAK (Sazeman-e Etala'at va Amnyat-e Keshvar).

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accounts of the coup, in particular Bennett Love's dispatch to The New York Times, which was based on local newspaper accounts, grossly exaggerated the casualties. Love's story//said that more than 300 people were killed or wounded, that Mosadeq's house was stormed by Sherman tanks which in turn were battered by shells from loyalist tanks, and that Colonel Momtaz, who led the defenders at the Premier's house, was "torn to pieces" by the mob. "Torn to pieces" was a favorite of Love's; he used it to describe what happened to Foreign Minister Fatemi in his newspaper office. In fact, however, casualties of the coup were relatively light considering the number of people involved; the official toll was 43 dead and 35 wounded, and neither Momtaz nor Fatemi was even scratched, let alone dismembered. And Mosadeq, whom the journalists variously described as slipping up a ladder and over his back wall in his pajamas or lying weeping in bed (also in pajamas) when the troops burst in, was not even in his house when it was attacked. He had gone next door and taken temporary refuge with U.S. Point Four chief William Warne, who was somewhat embarrassed to have a deposed Premier on his hands, even for a brief period. Over the next few days, Mosadeq and other senior officials of his government turned themselves in or were arrested.

News that began to trickle in from the provinces after Zahedi's broadcast on Wednesday afternoon was uniformly good. Radio Tabriz reported that Azarbaijan was in the hands of the army, while the station at Isfahan came on the air at 1300 with strong statements in support of Zahedi and the Shah. Kerman proclaimed its loyalty to the new government at 2000, and Meshed, though not immediately heard from, had changed sides as soon as it heard the news from Radio Tehran. TPAJAX's final details were wrapped up [redacted] under their direction, loyal (b)(1) officers were placed in command of all units of the Tehran garrison, (b)(3) the seizure of key military targets was completed, and the arrest lists were carried out. The nation was under martial law, a curfew was put into

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effect, and at 2200, Radio Tehran signed off for the night.

In Rome, the Shah was preparing to return to Iran in triumph on 22 August. In a formal statement, he said: "It was my people who have shown me that they were faithful to the monarchy, and that 2½ years of false propaganda....my country did not want the Communists and therefore has been faithful to me."

IV. The Aftermath of Victory

A successful TPAJAX left behind a good deal of debris

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to clean up, plus not a few complications.

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Roosevelt himself left Iran shortly after the coup.

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They were curious, of course,

as to why there had been so little reporting from the Station and from Roosevelt during the three days after the failure of the first attempt to overthrow Mosadeq. Roosevelt explained frankly and at length that if he and his men had reported what they were doing, [redacted] Washington (b)(1) would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop at once. Further, (b)(3) had they reported in detail the reasons why they felt justified in taking the actions they were taking, they would have had no time to carry them out. Therefore, their course was to act, while reporting as little as possible and assuming that they have very little more to lose and everything to win. Everyone recognized, of course, that if the outcome had been different, a substantially different attitude toward Roosevelt's decision and actions might have emerged in many quarters.

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The Qashqai had disliked Mosadeq, of course, because of his reliance on the Tudeh, but they also retained a deep-seated animosity toward the Shah, whose father had brutally pacified the tribe. When the vote of the tribal council was taken, it was by a very narrow margin in favor of peaceful acceptance of Zahedi, despite the sentiments of Khosrow and the other Qashqai khans for armed rebellion.

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It was feared that in the confusion of the coup the tribesmen might try to take advantage of the situation by a revolt against the new government. While the army might have been able to put down such a revolt in short order, the situation could have enhanced Tudeh's chances to stage a counter coup.

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When Roosevelt was debriefed at Headquarters on 28 August, he noted that except for an attempt by some Qashqai to disarm certain Gendarmerie posts, Shiraz was very quiet throughout the coup. After Zahedi was securely in control, several of the other tribes volunteered to take steps to control the Qashai themselves if necessary rather than have the army sent in after them. Despite their anti-Shah feelings, however, the Qashqai^{had} accepted the coup with as good grace as they could muster.

As in every fight, there were losers. Both Mohammad Mosadeq and Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi were indicted under Article 317 of the Military Criminal Procedure, which states:

Anyone who devises a plot with a view to either overthrowing the foundation of the State, or the succession of the Monarch, or instigates the people to arm themselves against the power of the Monarchy shall be sentenced to death.

The verdict of the Military Court of First Instance and of the Military Court of Revision against the two accused was guilty, and the

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punishment was set at three years of solitary imprisonment for Mosadeq and three years of imprisonment with hard labor for General Riahi.⁴⁹

As for the other key figures in the coup, General Zahedi served as Premier until April 1955, when he left Tehran for medical treatment in West Germany. His relationship with the Shah whose throne he had helped to save was a stormy one; they quarrelled in February 1954 regarding the elections, and Zahedi angrily objected to what he termed the Shah's "childish vacillation" over official appointments. He and the Shah were also at odds over General Batmangelich, whom Zahedi wished to dismiss from the post of army Chief of Staff.⁵⁰ In general, the Shah resented any attempt by Zahedi to take credit for the coup. In his opinion, he was the primary motivating factor and Zahedi was only his chosen instrument. He had appointed Zahedi as a strong man who could do the job that had to be done; but, once Zahedi had done it, the Shah reverted to the monarch's traditional dislike and fear of a strong man. The general's son, Ardeshir, fared better; he married Princess Shanaz, the Shah's daughter by his first marriage in November 1956 (they were later divorced), and he is currently serving as Iranian Ambassador to the United States.

⁴⁹ A summary of the court proceedings and the verdicts is included as Appendix F.

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Col. Abbas Farzanegan, who played such a key role in building the military organization to carry out the coup, was promoted to brigadier general and became Deputy Minister of Posts, Telephone, and Telegraph before taking over as Minister in April 1954. He retired from the army when the Zahedi government fell a year later, moving to the United States until 1958 when he again returned to Iran. He served briefly as governor of Isfahan and then occupied a series of ambassadorial posts that included Kuwait, Norway, and the Netherlands.

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Col. Nematollah Nasiri, the Imperial Guard commander, was also promoted to brigadier general for his loyal service during the coup. He became chief of SAVAK, the National Intelligence and Security Organization, in 1965 and was made a general in 1971.

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Looking back on TPAJAX after 21 years, the crucial moments obviously were in those four long days when the operation hung in the balance, shifting toward disaster but ready to swing toward victory if the right breaks came. As it turned out, Roosevelt was fortunate enough to get at least two very important breaks. The first,

lay in the fact that the Tudeh demonstrations of 17 and 18 August went much too far. They degenerated into vicious anti-Shah riots, and the acts of violence and desecration turned a great many people against Mosadeq and his allies. Alarmed by the open threats to the monarchy and disturbed by the Tudeh clamor for a socialist republic, the people and the army rallied to the pro-Shah demonstrators

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on the morning of the 19th. The second break came though the tactical mistakes made by Mosadeq's followers; his Chief of Staff, General Riahi, had almost the whole story of the upcoming military coup attempt by late afternoon on 15 August, hours before the action started. All he had to ^{do} was to order the police and military security forces to start arresting officers suspected of being involved in the plot, and the coup would never have started.

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The failure

of Iranian security in general was part of this break. Roosevelt and

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[redacted] Riahi had some evidence of U.S. involvement (he cited his suspicions [redacted] after the first coup attempt failed), yet his police and military allowed American cars to come and go at will, unstopped and unsearched.

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V. The Long View of the Covert Action in Iran

The long-term impact of TPAJAX did not, as Churchill hoped, enable the West to turn things around in the Middle East; over the years since 1953, Western influence in that region has steadily declined. But the course of Iranian history was clearly changed by the events of 19 August. While by no means a dedicated Western ally, Iran retains its fear of the Soviets, and the enormous wealth that it has gained from the increased value of oil in the 1970's has been used and is still being used to build strong military forces not only for self-defense but to support Iranian aspirations for dominance in the Persian Gulf as well. But, a powerful army, a modern air force, and well-equipped navy cannot be built in a vacuum. Changes in the country's social and economic structure to improve national health and educational levels were necessary to provide adequate manpower for these forces. The Shah's program to modernize his country has also made land reform one of its key programs; by 1963 the Crown lands had been sold to the peasants living on them, and by 1971 the government claimed that the task of redistributing the land owned by the wealthy elite was complete. There is little question as to who is running Iran, of course; the Shah has a monopoly of political power, and although parliamentary elections and procedures may furnish the window-dressing of democratic government, it is the Shah alone who determines national policy. The success of the White Revolution--that is, reform and change directed from the top--has solidified the foundations

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of the throne that seemed so shaky and insecure in the violent days of 1952 and 1953.

TPAJAX was also to have a very lasting effect outside Iran, however. It changed, for a time at least, some of the methods of conducting and carrying out U.S. foreign policy. The success of covert action in Iran, where the course of history was altered and a potential ally and its valuable petroleum assets kept from slipping into the Communist world by U.S. backing for a military coup, predisposed U.S. planners to apply the technique elsewhere. Had Roosevelt's luck not held and had 19 August turned from a successful gamble into a nightmare of disaster, the United States might well have avoided committing its covert action forces to assist in the overthrow of the pro-Communist government in Guatemala in 1954. And there is reason to doubt that the attempt in 1961 to overthrow Castro's revolutionary government in Cuba would ever have been planned and staged without the successes in Iran and Guatemala glittering in the background to remind the makers of policy that he who does not venture has scant hope of gain.

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Whose Oil? An Abbreviated History of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, 1942-53

In 1372, the then Shah of Persia, Naser ad-Din, in return for much-needed cash, gave to Baron Paul Julius de Reuter a concession to exploit all his country's minerals (except for gold, silver, and precious stones), all its forests and uncultivated land, and all canals and irrigation works, as well as a monopoly to construct railways and tramways. Although the resulting uproar, ~~especially~~ from neighboring Russia, caused this sweeping concession to be cancelled, de Reuter, who was a German Jew with British citizenship, persisted and by 1889 regained two parts of his original concession--the operation of a bank and the working of Persia's mines. Under the latter grant, de Reuter's men explored for oil without great success, and the concession expired in 1399, the year the Baron died. Persian oil rights then passed to a British speculator, William Knox D'Arcy, whose first fortune had been made in Australian gold mines. The purchase price of the concession was about 50,000 pounds, and in 1903 the enterprise began to sell shares in "The First Exploitation Company." Exploratory drilling proceeded, and by 1904, two producing wells were in. Shortly thereafter, ^{British} interest in oil was sharply stimulated by the efforts of Admiral Sir John Fisher, First Lord of the Admiralty, to convert the Royal Navy from burning coal to oil. As a result, the Burmah Oil Company sought to become involved in Persian oil and, joining with D'Arcy and Lord Strathcona, formed the new Concessions Syndicate, Ltd., which endured until 1907 when Burmah Oil bought D'Arcy out for 200,000 pounds cash and 900,000 pounds in shares. Burmah's first gusher came in ^ta 1,180 feet in May 1908, near Masjed Soleyman, and a year later, after some complicated financial

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dealings in London, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was born, incorporating the shares and rights of the earlier concessionaires. The company chose Abadan as the site of its refinery and made local ~~arrangements~~ ^{physical} for its security with both the Shiekh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari tribal khans; the former was paid an annual rental and was promised continued autonomy from Tehran, while the latter were to receive 3% of net oil revenues (to be paid out of the Persian government's share of 16%).

When Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, his persistent prodding changed the Royal Navy over to oil. To ensure a source of cheap oil, the British government became a major ^(51%) shareholder in the APOC in 1914, adding 2 million pounds in capitalization and signing a 30-year contract for fuel oil at cut rates (Churchill wrote in 1923 that this contract had saved Britain no less than \$7.5 million on its wartime oil purchases).

Differences as to how profits were to be shared between the Persian government and the APOC began after ^{World War I} ~~the war~~. The company claimed that Persia's share of the profits applied to the earnings of the three subsidiaries actually operating in Persia (based on Article 1 of the D'Arcy concession, which defined its limits as "throughout the whole extent of the country"). Persia claimed it was entitled to a share of the profits from all operations, including extracting, producing, refining, and marketing its oil, wherever these operations might take place. There were also problems over British claims for wartime damage to pipelines by Bakhtiaris incited by German and Turkish agents. The British attempt to negotiate a settlement calling for new profit-sharing arrangements fell through in 1920, and the relationship tottered along under the old agreement until 1933.

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In 1921, Reza Khan, a colonel ^{Commanding} of the Iranian ^{Division,} ~~cossacks~~ ~~(formed~~
~~in 1279 by Russian officers loaned by the Czar, whose Cossack escorts~~
~~Nasr-ud-Din Shah had admitted on a visit),~~ seized power by deposing the
 government of the
 last Qajar Shah. He visited Abadan after becoming Shah himself in 1925,
 and his account of the trip gave warnings of things to come. He noted
 that of the 29,000 employees in the oilfields and refinery, 6,000 were
 foreigners, and he expressed concern that so few Persians were being
 trained for higher level posts. He also saw that the British staff
 enjoyed an obviously higher standard of living than the others, and that
 while the refinery area appeared prosperous, the surrounding districts
 had not felt any positive impact from this major industry in their area.
 Finally, he was disturbed by a manager's description of cutting down pro-
 duction in order not to upset world markets--but at a loss to Persia.

So, Persian dissatisfaction continued to build up until November 1932,
 when the government notified the company that the D'Arcy concession, signed
 under the Qajar regime, was annulled and a new concession would be granted
 on the basis of equity and justice. This new concession was not easily
 arrived at--the British government referred the annulment to the League of
 Nations, whose Council sent Dr. Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia to reconcile
 the two sides. Two legal points were thus established that were to affect
 the later dispute in 1951: the right to annul the concession was recog-
 nized, and the League accepted the viewpoint of the British that such a
 case could be brought to the Council under Article 15 of the Covenant (which
 provided for a hearing on disputes between members that were likely to lead
 to a rupture in diplomatic relations and for the solution of which no legal
 recourse existed). The two parties finally worked out a new concession
 agreement that was ratified by the Majlis (the ~~lower house of the~~ Persian

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parliament) and signed by Reza Shah on 28 May 1933; it extended the life of the concession to 1993 and set up a new royalty basis. By its terms Persia would receive 4 shillings on every ton of oil sold in Persia or exported, plus 20% of the dividends over £671,250 distributed to shareholders, with a minimum dividend of £750,000 per year. To avoid Persian taxation, the company agreed to pay a small additional royalty on tonnage, and it would continue to pay British taxes out of gross profits.

It was the oil business as usual until the summer of 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Because German influence in Iran (as Persia was renamed in 1935 by Reza Shah) had grown significantly and because the country was the best route for Allied supplies going to the beleaguered Soviets, the Allies determined to send in occupation forces. In August Russian troops took over the five northern provinces, British forces went into the south, and the area around Tehran was neutralized. Following three days of futile and desultory resistance, the Iranian army collapsed and the Shah abdicated in favor of his young son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; thus Iran was an occupied country until 1946. Abadan continued to produce petroleum products for the Allies, but the Soviets took advantage of the situation and attempted to obtain an oil concession in the north. In late 1944, the Soviets were advised by Premier Sa'ed that the cabinet had ruled out the granting of further concessions until after the war. When pressure was applied through the leftwing parties, Sa'ed resigned, at which point the Majlis passed a bill introduced by Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq forbidding any discussion of or signing agreements for an oil concession with any foreign representatives. The bill passed, despite Communist opposition, thereby blocking a Russian concession, but in the course of the debate the possibility of revoking the

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AIOC concession was seriously raised. Despite the law, Premier Qavam in April 1946 signed an agreement giving the U.S.S.R. an oil concession in northern Iran. The Majlis refused to ratify the concession, and in the bill rejecting it, the legislators declared that it was forbidden to grant any concession to export oil to foreigners; further, they instructed the government to look into possible violation of the rights of the people in connection with the southern oil concession held by the AIOC.

With the wartime occupation over, the British oil managers began to have labor troubles. The 1946 general strike was settled with a pay raise, but this was only the start. In 1947 the Iranian Ministry of Finance sent a delegation to London to discuss money due the Iranian government, various employee grievances, reduction of foreign staff, expansion of local distribution facilities, and the AIOC policy of concentrating refining activities outside Iran. To these complaints, the company, obviously feeling secure in the legality of its concession, was relatively unresponsive.

The law of 22 October 1947 instructed the ^{Iranian} government to open discussions with the AIOC to secure the nation's rights to its oil resources. These "discussions" started more than 5 years of bargaining and debating, proposal and counterproposal, charge and countercharge, until they eventually reached the Security Council of the United Nations. The Iranians led off in August 1948 with a 50-page memorandum that listed 25 points that were to be discussed with the company in implementing the 1947 law. The main items on this list included British taxation of Iran's share of oil profits, Iran's ultimate rights to AIOC installations outside the country at the end of the concession (it had already been promised those in Iran), reduction in the number of foreign employees, ^{termining} ^{duration} the ~~length~~ of the concession (by 1993,

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the Iranians felt, they would have little oil left in the ground), the royalty basis, and tax and custom exemptions. Negotiations with company representatives began the following month, continuing intermittently thereafter. Shortly before the 16 January 1949 attempt by a Tudeh Party member to assassinate the Shah at Tehran University, Premier Sa'ed identified higher profits and more Iranian employees as his main goals in these discussions; he pointed out that Iran's oil royalties for 1947 were just over \$7 million, whereas the AIOC had paid some \$15 million in British income taxes. Specifically, Iran wanted control of the company's operations as well as a 50-50 split of the net profits. On 5 May 1949, AIOC chairman Sir William Fraser came to Tehran with a draft of the "Supplemental Agreement," and this draft was basically the agreement signed by the government and company on 17 July. The royalty payment was increased from 4 to 6 shillings per ton, and Iran was to get 20% of the distributed profits (with a minimum of \$2.5 million) and general reserve, terms well short of the 50-50 sharing Iran wanted and which the American executives of Aramco were in the process of agreeing to give Saudi Arabia. The agreement was sent to the Majlis on 19 July, and debate began on 23 July, lasting 4 days before the 15th Majlis formally went out of existence. The oil agreement bill as well as the new election bill were left over to the next Majlis.

Elections for the 16th Majlis began in the fall of 1949 and were finally completed in March 1950, with Dr. Mosadeq and his eight ^{National Front} followers leading in the balloting in Tehran. Ali Mansur became Premier, and in June the oil agreement was turned over ^{for study} to the 13-man special oil commission that included Mosadeq and five other members of the National Front. Six days later, the Shah dismissed Mansur and appointed General Ali Razmara, former Chief of Staff, as Premier. The commission reported back to the Majlis in

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~~Some~~ that the agreement was not adequate to secure the rights of Iran and that it was opposed to its ratification. The Minister of Finance then withdrew the agreement, announcing that negotiations for increased royalties would be reopened with the AIOC.

In February¹⁹⁵¹, the AIOC offered Iran an agreement similar to Aramco's, including the 50-50 profit sharing, but it was too late; the National Front was intent on nationalizing oil and it dominated the Majlis. The oil commission indicated it, too, favored that course, despite the report from the experts appointed by Razmara to study the feasibility of nationalization. The experts had pointed out Iran's lack of technical and financial expertise, plus the facts that the concession could not legally be cancelled, that Iran would be liable for up to \$500 million in compensation, that heavy losses in foreign exchange and prestige would result, and that it would be unwise to antagonize Britain. On 7 March General Razmara was shot and killed by a member of Fedayan Islam, a rightist terrorist group, and Hosein Ala succeeded him as premier.

When the Majlis in mid-March unanimously accepted the principle of nationalization, the British Foreign Office notified the Premier that an act of nationalization would not legally terminate the oil company's operations. Shortly thereafter, strikes broke out in the south as a result of the company's cutting a hardship allowance for Iranian workers in certain areas plus other grievances. Martial law was declared on 26 March, and in early April rioting began in Abadan that did not end until troops fired into the crowd; 6 were killed and 30 wounded, and two British oil workers and a sailor were also killed.

As members of the National Front were presenting their draft of an oil nationalization law to the special oil committee, Premier Ala resigned.

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The Majlis approved the law and at the same time voted to recommend to the Shah the appointment of Mosadeq as Premier; the Senate followed suit. The Shah acceded, appointing Mosadeq on 29 April; two days later he signed the nine-point law that in broad terms ordered the government takeover from the AIOC. The company's response was to hold up the May monthly advance payment of \$2 million and to ask that entire oil problem be submitted to arbitration, a request that Iran did not acknowledge. On 25 May the British government brought the matter before the International Court of Justice, the same day it despatched the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group to Cyprus; two Royal Navy cruisers and three frigates were already in the Persian Gulf area. In addition to the ^{British} government's request, the AIOC asked the ICJ to appoint an arbitrator, as provided in the 1933 concession agreement. The Iranian view of these appeals to The Hague was simple: Iran did not recognize the competence of the court to deal with the matter, which concerned Iran's internal affairs.

The United States became seriously involved in these discussions for the first time in mid-May 1951. A State Department statement of 13 May urged both sides to try to find an agreeable compromise solution; it noted that the United States recognized the sovereign right of Iran to control its resources and industries but said that the technical knowledge, capital, and transport and marketing facilities were all controlled by the AIOC. It further stated that U.S. oil companies had indicated that they would not, in the face of unilateral Iranian action against the AIOC, be willing to undertake operations in Iran or provide technicians to work there. The note pleased neither Iran nor Britain, which was the object of U.S. pressure to accept the nationalization concept and work toward a compromise. At President Truman's urging, conveyed through Ambassador Grady in Tehran and

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by letters to Prime Minister Atlee and Premier Mosadeq, the British agreed to send a delegation and the Iranians agreed to accept it.

Talks got underway on 14 June, with the Iranians demanding that the AIOC hand over 75% of net oil revenues since 20 March and put the other 25% into a bank, presumably to be eventually paid ^{back} as compensation. The British, 5 days later, proposed that a new company be established by the AIOC to operate the oil industry on behalf of Iran; the profit split would be 50-50. No compromise between these two points of view appeared possible, and on 21 June the British went back to the ICJ with a request for an injunction to halt the nationalization process until the court had ruled on the original U.K. application. Since Iran had already refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction, it was not represented when the court issued an order to maintain the status quo as of 1 May 1951, with a Board of Supervision consisting of two Iranians, two Britons, and one individual of another nationality empowered to run the industry.

Iran ignored this order and prepared to move the managers of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) into Abadan, while the AIOC began to slow down the output of the refinery and prepare for evacuation. Export of oil stopped, and in the face of an antisabotage law introduced in the Majlis, the British staff resigned. Mosadeq wrote to President Truman on 27 June, complaining about the British attitude and the actions of the British technicians, whom he wished to retain as contract employees to run the oil industry. Truman's reply on 9 July stressed the U.S. desire for a peaceful settlement and urged Mosadeq to go along with the ICJ order; he also offered to send his foreign policy adviser, Averell Harriman, to Iran to help work out a solution. Mosadeq agreed to accept

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Harriman as a mediator, provided that any scheme he suggested would be consistent with the nationalization law. Harriman's arrival in Tehran on 15 July was hardly auspicious; in the course of a massive demonstration against the United States, Tudeh mobs fought with the National Front and other elements; the police and then the army intervened, and 15 people were killed, over 200 wounded (the Minister of Interior, General Zahedi, resigned as a result of the criticism he received over the handling of the demonstration).

Seeking to find some common ground for agreement, Harriman persuaded Mosadeq to enter into further discussions on how to implement the law, contingent on the British accepting the principle of nationalization. He flew to London to arrange for a new British mission to Iran but found the Labor cabinet insistent on an improvement in conditions in the oil area, including "an end to provocation of British staff." Compromise versions of the messages between the two governments were worked out by Harriman, and Prime Minister Atlee and Foreign Secretary Morrison agreed to send Richard Stokes, Lord Privy Seal, as the head of a high-level delegation to Tehran. Stokes' proposal, after preliminary meetings with the AIOC staff in Abadan, was very similar to the earlier British suggestion that an AIOC purchasing organization, with Iranian representation, handle the marketing of the oil as a monopoly, with profits evenly divided. Iran, of course, would not give up the idea of nationalization and said it would discuss only three points--the purchase of oil for British needs, AIOC claims for compensation, and conditions required for continued employment of British technicians. At a private meeting of Harriman, Mosadeq, and Stokes, the latter suggested that a British general manager be appointed, to act under direction of the NIOC. The Iranians would not

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accept this, proposing instead a board of management composed of experts from countries "with no special political interest" in Iran. Stokes would not even discuss this point and returned to London on 23 August. ¹⁹⁵¹
 U.S. Ambassador Grady was replaced in Tehran on 11 September by Ambassador Loy Henderson, and Mosadeq was advised by Harriman from Washington that his proposals were not workable since they did not conform to the practical and commercial aspects of the international oil industry. Iran told the small British staff still in Abadan that it must leave the country within a week from 27 September, and on 4 October the last of the AIOC personnel duly left Iran.

In the meantime, the British government asked that the case be considered by the U.N. Security Council as a potential threat to world peace, and on 1 October the Council agreed to put the question of intervention on its agenda. Mosadeq flew to New York to present Iran's case. The Security Council listened to both sides, debated the British resolution from 15 to 19 October, and finally decided to adjourn the question until after the ICJ had ruled on its own jurisdiction. In the British general elections shortly thereafter, the Conservatives were returned to power, with Winston Churchill as Prime Minister and Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary; in a speech in Commons, Eden declared there were three elements that would be involved in a satisfactory solution to the problem--first, the Iranian economy depended on efficient operation of the oil industry; second, the benefits must be shared between Iran and the developers of the oil resources; and finally, fair compensation must be paid for the act of nationalization.

The ICJ met on 9 June 1952, and the legal arguments eventually were reduced to the interpretation of the Iranian declaration of 2 October 1930

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recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice (predecessor to the ICJ) in disputes "arising after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or fact relating directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions subsequent to the ratification of this declaration." The legal points at issue were whether the dispute related to a treaty or convention and, if so, was it a treaty or convention covered by the declaration? The court finally ruled that the word "subsequent" referred to "treaties" and not "situations" and that since the oil concession was not a treaty, it did not have jurisdiction. The British thus lost their ICJ case and with it their chance to have the Security Council pass on their resolution.

The matter nonetheless remained at an impasse. While the nations involved waited nearly 8 months for the ICJ ruling, other compromise solutions were sought. In November 1951, officials of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) proposed that the bank finance, as trustee, the production and refining of Iran's oil and then sell it to the AIOC at current Persian Gulf oil prices, Iran to receive payment at these prices, less an agreed discount which would go to the AIOC. The British were willing to go along with this if AIOC technicians would be employed, but Iran would not agree to either the technicians or the discount. The IBRD tried again, proposing a neutral board of management responsible to the bank which would arrange a bulk export contract for the sale of oil through established distribution channels; the profits would be divided three ways--one share to Iran, one to the bulk purchaser, and one to be held in reserve by the bank. However, on the question of non-Iranian management, the use of British technicians, and the selling price of the oil, the negotiations ultimately broke down. The IBRD

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mission returned to New York on 23 March 1952. At about the same time, President Truman notified Mosadeq that the United States would not give Iran a loan of \$120 million at a time when the country had an opportunity to get "adequate revenue" from its oil resources; he thus none too subtly pressed Mosadeq to settle the oil dispute.

Relations between the Iranian and British governments deteriorated steadily. Iran attempted to sell the oil stored in the tanks at Abadan to Italian and Japanese firms, but AIOC action in the courts plus the cooperation of the international oil industry with the British limited the amounts of oil that could be delivered. In January 1952, Mosadeq had ordered all British consulates closed; he followed that by closing all foreign information and cultural centers in Iran. He made some attempt to reach agreement with the British on compensation, but his proposals included large offsetting amounts for unpaid royalties and other payments stopped by the cessation of oil production in 1951. When the British in October 1952 described his final proposals as "unreasonable and unacceptable," Mosadeq broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

The premier in the meantime had scored internal political victories of his own. Relected by the new Majlis in July 1952, he asked for six months of emergency powers to rule by decree in order to deal with the critical economic situation. When the Shah refused, Mosadeq resigned, and Qavam was appointed in his place; the result was four days of rioting by both Tudeh and the National Front. Qavam ^{then} resigned, and on 23 July Mosadeq again became premier; his political ally and one of Tehran's best known religious figures, the mullah Ayatollah Kashani, was named Speaker of the Majlis, which then voted Mosadeq decree powers for one year. The Senate and the Shah concurred, and the stage was set for the anti-Shah

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political maneuvering of early 1953, during which Mosadeq permitted the Tudeh Party and its front groups considerable freedom, perhaps with the idea of pressuring the United States to come to Iran's aid. Implied threats to turn to the Communists were contained in a Mosadeq letter of 28 May 1953 to President Eisenhower requesting a large loan, and the Eisenhower reply, as a matter of policy, was cold in its rejection of this threat and its accompanying bid for help. Eisenhower's letter concluded:

I fully understand that the Government of Iran must determine for itself which foreign and domestic policies are likely to be most advantageous to Iran and the Iranian people. In what I have written, I am not trying to advise the Iranian Government on its best interests. I am merely trying to explain why, in the circumstances, the Government of the United States is not presently in a position to extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.

In case Iran should so desire, the United States Government hopes to be able to continue to extend technical assistance and military aid on a basis comparable to that given during the past year.

I note the concern reflected in your letter at the present dangerous situation in Iran and sincerely hope that before it is too late the Government of Iran will take such steps as are in its power to prevent a further deterioration of that situation.

Following the August 1953 coup that overthrew Mosadeq, the oil dispute was settled along the lines that had been proposed to Mosadeq-- the oil industry was nationalized, but its operations were directed by a group of foreign oil companies. The details of this arrangement were worked out by a series of conferences, but Herbert Hoover Jr., as special oil adviser to the Secretary of State, had an important role in convincing the Iranians of the wisdom of dealing with a "consortium." Between Hoover's initial visit to Tehran in October 1953 and the announcement of a new agreement in August 1954, Britain and Iran resumed diplomatic relations. Under the terms of the agreement, the National Iranian Oil Company delegated basic operations in 100,000 square miles of southwestern Iran* to an international consortium known as Iranian Oil Participants, Ltd., until

* See attached map of concessions.

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1979, with an option of extension to 1994. British Petroleum, the new name of the AIOC, owned 40%, Royal Dutch-Shell 14%, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 6%, and U.S. oil companies 40% (7% each to Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of California, Socony Mobil Oil Company, The Texas Company, and Gulf Oil Corporation, and 5% to Iricon Agency, Ltd., comprised of nine small U.S. oil companies). Since 1954 the AIOC has carried out a number of operations of its own, and, after the passage of a new oil law in 1957, has allowed Italian, U.S., and Canadian companies to explore for oil and conduct operations outside the consortium's territory. The consortium has produced 90% of Iran's oil, however, and the rate of production has been the highest in the world, increasing at an annual rate of almost 14% in the 1960's and reaching 1.7 million barrels in 1971, which was 10% of world output and second largest production in the Middle East. Price increases levied by Iran and other Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies in 1971 and 1972 resulted in an estimated \$14 billion for those years, and the Middle East oil crisis of late 1973 raised prices even higher. Iran is currently very concerned about its estimated reserves, which at current rates of extraction may barely last until 1994. Oil accounts for 23% of Iran's GNP, including some 85% of its foreign exchange earnings and 60% of its budgetary revenues.

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
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Map, Appendix A



Oil Concession Boundaries

- APOC concession, 1901 - - - - -
- APOC concession, 1933 - + + + + +
- Consortium concession, 1954 -

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Biographic Sketches

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MOHAMMAD MOSADEQ:

The bare bones of the life of the man who was Premier of Iran from 28 April 1951 to 19 August 1953 and who was the target of TPAJAX ^{are these:} ~~are these:~~

He was born about (b)(1)
(b)(3)
1331 (1873 or 1879 are probably more accurate dates, but 1331 was always given as his official birth year because of the restrictions on the ^{maximum} age of Majlis deputies) in Tehran, his mother being a member of the ruling Qajar dynasty and his father the Minister of Finance for some 30 years. His family background was thus the elite, wealthy, landowning class. His secondary education ~~barely~~ complete, Mosadeq was sent to Khorasan as the Shah's financial agent while barely out of his middle teens. In 1906, forced into exile because of his role in the Constitutional Revolution that year, he went to Europe to study law at Paris, Liege, and Neuchatel, earning his LL.D. from the last institution in 1914. Returning to Iran, he was elected to the Majlis in 1915, serving on its financial committee. As Under Secretary of Finance in 1917, he resigned after only a few months in office because he was prevented from carrying out reforms in the notoriously padded payroll system. He became governor of Fars Province in 1921, but his criticism of Reza Shah led to arrest in 1930 and exile to the villages. He was again arrested in 1941 but was released in the general political amnesty after Reza Shah's abdication. Mosadeq was again elected to the Majlis in 1944, where in 1947 he organized the National Front, a small, tightly knit, and highly influential group. As a member of the oil commission, he gained in influence not only in the Majlis but among the people, and his April 1951 appointment as Premier was at the Majlis' request. From then until his removal from office in August 1953, he concentrated his energies on expropriating the British-owned

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oil industry in defiance of Western attempts to negotiate a settlement that stopped short of complete nationalization. Sentenced to three years in prison in a post-coup trial, he was eventually pardoned by the Shah in August 1956, but he was forced to remain in his village of Ahmadabad under virtual house arrest for the 11 years until his death in March 1967. He had suffered from cancer of the jaw and finally succumbed to internal bleeding after two operations in Tehran.

The above facts do little to explain his ^{often bizarre} behavior as a politician, but

most of his actions, even his most emotional and apparently irrational ones, were probably well calculated. The popular world image of him as an enfeebled old man, given to hysterical weeping and fainting spells, served his own purposes and gave him tremendous leverage among his people. He used the accepted belief that he was ill and weak to avoid things or people he did not want to face, and his apparent physical debility added to the drama of his personality, which in public speeches was capable of moving ^{even} his opponents.

Mosadeq's power rose from his consummate ability to appeal to national aspirations and emotions. By attempting to deal with a heated political problem in logical, rational terms based on economic facts, the British were unable to achieve anything in the oil dispute but to unify the people of Iran. Reza Shah had held power for 20 years by appeal ^{ing} to latent Iranian nationalism; Mosadeq used this awakened nationalism and the desire for independence to keep himself in power and to defy Britain. His speeches and programs appealed to social discontent, xenophobia, religious fanaticism, and national pride in past glories. His enormous gamble on the oil issue, based on his belief that Britain

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and the United States would not let Iran go Communist, was part vanity, part Islamic fatalism. He utilized foremost the technique of opposition--his nine-man National Front opposed every government in power, whether under Sa'ed, Mansur, Razmara, or Ala--and then, once Premier, his single plank was opposition to the British over the oil question.

Mosadeq was antagonistic to the Shah for many reasons: his mother was a Qajar, whose family was overthrown by the Shah's father, the same man that had exiled and then imprisoned him; in addition, he had long believed in constitutional reform to reduce the power of the monarchy. He opposed the army because it had brought Reza Shah to power and was the main source of support for Mohammad Reza Shah; by retiring senior officers and putting in his own Chief of Staff, the young, French-trained Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi, he had obtained a degree of control over the army. But, by so doing, he set the stage for the officer corps to turn against him. His own extreme nationalism, fantasies of omnipotence, and lack of conscience--in manipulating Tudeh, at the risk of it getting out of control as it did in the streets of Tehran on 18 August, were the seeds of his own eventual downfall. But he was a most unusual man, one whose character caught the world's fancy, even as he drove his countrymen toward disaster. At any time in 1951 or 1952 he could have had the same compromise through which his successors gained a nationalized oil industry efficiently run by foreign experts to give Iran the revenue that financed the Shah's White Revolution. He chose to gamble on total victory over Britain, the United States, and the international oil industry--and he lost.

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MAJ. GEN. FAZLOLLAH ZAHEDI

Born in 1897 in Hamadan, Zahedi graduated from the Military School in Tehran and served during the years of World War I and the postwar period under Reza Khan, then a colonel in the Cossack Brigade*. As a combat officer, he was decorated for action against assorted bandits and insurgents, including rebellious Kurds, Lurs, and Turkomans. He had become a division commander by 1942, after service as head of the Gendarmerie and the Tehran Police, but he was arrested by the British that year for pro-German activity (his name was found in the papers of Franz Mayer, a principal Nazi agent in Tehran, as an officer who would protect German agents) and deported to Palestine, where he was held until 1945. Despite his arrest and subsequent three years in a detention camp, he did not become fanatically anti-British as did many xenophobic Iranians. Returning to Tehran after the war in 1945, he was given command of the Fars Division and promoted to major general. In 1948, as Inspector General of the army, he was severely injured in a tank accident, losing four ribs, and after 7 months of medical treatment in Germany, some of it by U.S. Army doctors, he was retired in May 1949. The Shah made him his honorary adjutant, and in November 1949 appointed him Director General of the Tehran Police. In April 1951 Zahedi became Minister of Interior in the Ala cabinet and was retained in that post by Mosadeq when he became Premier. He resigned in August 1951, following

* There was a Cossack Brigade in the Persian Army solely because Nasr-ed-Din Shah visited Russia in 1878 and was provided with a Cossack escort by the Czar. The Shah was so impressed by the Cossacks that he asked the Czar to send him Russian officers to organize such a unit in his own army. The Brigade retained Russian senior officers and noncoms until 1920, and as long as it was in existence, it was the best trained and most professional unit in the army

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the anti-U.S. riots in Tehran on 15 July in which the mob got out of hand and the army had to be called in to fire on them, with the result that many died and hundreds were wounded, on both sides. He was a prime suspect of the Mosadeq government as a potential coup leader and was briefly arrested in February 1953.

ARDESHIR ZAHEDI

Born in December 1927, General Zahedi's son, Ardeshir, was educated at the American University in Beirut and at Utah State University where he earned a BS degree in 1950. Because of his training and language ability, he served with the Rural Improvement Commission which was administering U.S. technical assistance until he was forced to resign in 1952 by Mosadeq. During the planning and operational phases of the coup, he acted as the communications channel to his father and performed very well under difficult circumstances. He was married for a time to the Shah's daughter by Queen Fawzia and has never remarried since his divorce. He has retained the Shah's favor and, in fact, introduced the Shah to Farah in May 1959, the girl who later became Queen and mother of the Shah's sons. Ardeshir was the Iranian Ambassador to the United States in 1960-62 and returned again in April 1973 to the post. In the interim, he was Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1962-67, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1967-71.

MAJ. GEN. NADR BATMANGELICH

General Batmangelich (also spelled Batmanqilich or Batmangelij) was born in Tehran about 1905 and educated in Germany, the Iranian Military School, and the German Staff College. He fought in the Luristan and Fars tribal campaigns and was interned by the Allies from August 1943

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to June 1945. He visited the United States on a purchasing mission in 1950 and was put on the retired list in 1952 by Mosadeq. Named Chief of Staff of the army immediately after the 1953 coup, he retained that post despite friction with Premier Zahedi until December 1955 when he was made Ambassador to Pakistan to ease him out of the army command. Clashes with General Hedayet, Chief of the new Supreme Staff, were the probable cause of his reassignment. He then became Ambassador to Iraq in January 1957, was Minister of Interior in 1958-59, and became Adjutant to the Shah in 1959.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

After serving as Governor of Khorasan, 1965-68, he retired to private life. He had served as Permanent Iranian Delegate to the CENTO Military Committee before retiring from the army 1965.

Batmangelich never lived down his behavior on the night of 15 August, details of which were known only to few insiders in the Zahedi coup group. He failed to take his objective, the Staff Headquarters, and breaking down, he either turned himself in or was arrested by troops loyal to Mosadeq. There was reason to believe he talked freely to interrogators, providing them with a list of other officers involved in the coup.

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MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

When Mohammad Reza became Shah in 1941 at the age of 22 following his father's abdication, Iran was occupied by foreign troops--Soviet, British, and American--and its army was demoralized. He had no solid power base and no political machine, and as a result he spent the first 10 years of his reign in conflict with the traditional political power structure bent on regaining the influence it had lost to Reza Shah. The military coup that ousted Mosadeq in August 1953 was thus a major milestone in the Shah's political life.

Mohammad Reza was born on 26 October 1919; he studied 6 years as a cadet at the Military School of Tehran and then went to Switzerland in 1931 for his secondary education. Returning in 1936, he attended the Iranian Military College, from which he graduated 2 years later as a second lieutenant. His first marriage, in 1939, was to Princess Fawzia of Egypt, sister of King Farug, and a daughter, Shanaz, was the only child of this marriage. Divorcing Fawzia, he married Sorya Esfandiari, a half-German, half-Bakhtiari beauty to whom he was very devoted, but the marriage was childless and the throne needed an heir. After the inevitable divorce, he married Farah Diba in 1959, and Crown Prince Reza was born in 1960, followed by two daughters and Prince Ali Reza, securing the succession of the Pahlavi line.

Although various sources criticized the young Shah as suspicious and indecisive to the point of permanent instability, others saw his strengths. An OSS report in 1943 said:

Mohammad Shah is a man of much stronger purpose than is generally realized. He stands almost alone, distrusts most advisers, is honest in his efforts to secure a democratic form of government for Iran. He is not easily influenced and cannot

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be shaken. Installed as a figurehead during the 1941 crisis, he may yet surprise the factions in his country and the outside powers. He thinks along Western lines, and he is inalienably attached to his Iranian army. The military budget is half the national expenditure just now. Yet, of course, the army is almost his only backing within Iran.

In 1951, also on the positive side, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran noted:

It is important to observe that the Shah, in ten years of political wavering, has never turned against the intellectual interests, sports, and hobbies which he learned from European sources. His mind remains alert and his principles, although often betrayed, retain great similarity to Christian ethics and philosophy. The tragedy in the conflict of this healthy intellect against the vicious Persian scene carries some triumph since the Shah, so far, has not become corrupted.

The Shah took the successful coup of 1953 as a popular mandate to seize control of his country from the political factions and the ambitious generals; he has never since allowed them to threaten his position or his program. His hasty flight to Baghdad and Rome was either forgiven or forgotten in the triumph of the moment, and although General Zahedi was often angered by the Shah's vacillation and lack of decisiveness, those very characteristics enabled him to frustrate the volatile Zahedi and eventually bring about his resignation and voluntary exile. Given confidence by the popular support he saw during the coup, he pressed ahead to consolidate his power, carefully controlling political activity, which he has said can be permitted to function freely only after economic and social development have taught the people to act responsibly. His reforms launched in 1962 as the "White Revolution" have accomplished much; without the power and prestige of the throne coupled with the Shah's authoritarianism and determination, the reforms and development probably could not have taken place.

The rapid escalation of oil prices in 1973-74 has enhanced the Shah's prestige as spokesman for the more extreme oil-producing countries, and he

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has been quick to resent criticism of the view that oil is the main resource of those countries, a resource that cannot be replaced and that must be conserved, if only by the pressure of cost. The situation has clearly made the Shah a man whom the world listens to, and he has made the most of it.

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APPENDIX C

THE LEGEND: HOW THE PRESS VIEWED TPAJAX

The world of journalism--ever on the alert for the mote in somebody else's eye--found long ago that the Central Intelligence Agency made great copy. Proceeding on the theory that their readers will believe anything dealing with "spies," "agents," and "the secret world of espionage," a number of writers have told what they insist is the inside story of the CIA involvement in Iran in 1953. A sampling of these is included here, without extensive comment, since the distortions and guesses will be obvious to those who have read this history.

Andrew Tully, for example, in CIA--The Inside Story devotes Chapter 7, "King-Making in Iran" to a version of TPAJAX most notable for the purple of its flamboyant prose. Some significant passages are:

It was in 1953, of course, that the CIA stage-managed the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, that celebrated compulsive weeper, who had seized Britain's monopolistic oil company and was threatening to do business with the Kremlin. At the time CIA's coup was hailed as a blow for democracy, which it was. But after disposing of Mossadegh, CIA and the State Department reverted once again to a weakness that so often has been disastrous. In the setting up of the new regime, in which CIA took a major part, no consideration was given as to whether the new men had any

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intention of attempting to relieve the misery of the Iranian people. It was enough for the United States that they were anti-Communist.

When Mossadegh announced the expropriation of Anglo-Iranian Oil and nationalization of Iran's oil fields, the international uproar was thunderous. Mossadegh could not do that, and the Western bankers would prove it to him. Iranian oil was virtually boycotted. Mossadegh promptly tried to swing some deals with smaller, independent companies to work the Iranian fields, but the State Department gave these companies little encouragement - which is to say it told them "hands off." Meanwhile, Iran was losing its oil revenues and going broke. Even American financial aid was not enough although the State Department, with understandable reluctance, donated \$1,600,000 for a technical rural improvement program in 1951 and followed that with a foreign aid grant of \$23,000,000 in 1952. Most of the latter was used to make up Iran's foreign exchange shortages, but Iran remained financially unstable.

Meanwhile, CIA learned that Mossadegh was carrying on a clandestine flirtation with Iran's furtive Communist party, the Tudeh. Soviet intelligence agents flocked into the ancient capital of Teheran and the traffic jam between them and Allen Dulles' energetic young men was almost ludicrous. Almost daily, emissaries from the Soviet danced attendance on Mossadegh as he lolled recumbent on his couch, alternately dozing and weeping. Inevitably, the old dictator put it squarely up to President Eisenhower. In a letter received by the President on May 28, 1953, Mossadegh overplayed his hand - he attempted to blackmail the United States by warning that unless Iran got more American financial aid he would be forced to seek help elsewhere.

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Elsewhere was the Soviet Union, with which Mossadegh suggested he would conclude both an economic agreement and a mutual defense pact.

Since Iran otherwise was broke, that meant Mossadegh would have to pledge the rich Iranian oil fields and the refinery at Abadan, the world's largest, in return for financial assistance from the Soviet. The danger to the West was clear. With Iran's oil assets in its pockets, the Russians would have little trouble eventually achieving a prime object of Russian foreign policy since the days of the Czars - access to a warm water outlet on the Persian Gulf, the free world's life line to the Far East. But even if Russia were to get just Iran's oil, the Western world would be weakened throughout the Middle East and Soviet prestige would soar. It was clear, too, of course, that Anglo-Iranian Oil had a stake of billions of dollars, and when private enterprise of that magnitude is involved State Departments and Foreign Offices are apt to react most sensitively.

The time had come for the United States to embark on an international gamble. CIA reports were that Mossadegh, although popular with the masses, had never been able to undermine the young Shah with his people. If something were to happen whereby the Shah was able to take over more firmly the reins of government, there was a good chance Mossadegh could be unseated. In any event, the Shah had a better than even chance of winning any popularity contest with Mossadegh.

So for a month the White House stalled Mossadegh, avoiding a direct reply in a welter of polite diplomatic notes seeking further discussions. Then President Eisenhower favored Mossadegh with a blunt reply: "No." Everybody agreed it was a calculated risk, a gamble that Mossadegh could be dealt with in such a fashion that he would be powerless to carry out his threat. The CIA forthwith set the wheels in motion for dealing with this tough old man.

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First, on August 10, Allen Dulles flew to Europe to join his wife for a "holiday" in the Swiss Alps. Although the political situation in Teheran was becoming more ominous - Mossadegh was conferring daily with a Russian economic mission - United States Ambassador Loy Henderson decided he would like a vacation to Switzerland, too. Almost simultaneously, the Shah's sister, the pretty and tough-minded Princess Ashraf, marched into the royal palace and gave her brother the rough side of her tongue for his hesitancy in facing up to Mossadegh. Then she, too, flew off to Switzerland.

Certainly, the Russian espionage network must have surmised that something was cooking as Dulles, Henderson and Princess Ashraf turned up at the same Swiss resort. Their suspicions were strengthened when an old Middle Eastern hand named Brigadier General H. Norman Schwartzkopf suddenly was discovered in the midst of a leisurely flying vacation across the Middle East. He had been to Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon and, while the Russians fumed, he ultimately turned up in Iran.

The Reds had a right to be fearful, for Schwartzkopf had long been an anathema to the Kremlin. Americans remember him most vividly as the man who ran the Lindbergh kidnapping investigation in 1932, when he was head of the New Jersey State Police. But the world of international politics knew him better as the man who, from 1942 to 1948, had been in charge of reorganizing the Shah's national police force. In this job, Schwartzkopf spent little time tracking down ordinary criminals; he was kept busy protecting the government against its enemies, a job that required the setting up of an intelligence system to keep watch on various political cliques which might seek the Shah's overthrow.

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In the course of these intriguing duties, Schwartzkopf had become a close friend and adviser to the Shah and, more important, to Major General Fazlollah Zahedi, one of his colleagues on the police force. So when Schwartzkopf turned up in Teheran in August he could explain with a straight face that he had come merely "to see old friends again." The Russians stormed and protested over his presence in Iran but Schwartzkopf went his casual way, dropping in to see the Shah one afternoon, spending the morning with General Zahedi, and renewing contacts with other old pals in the police and army.

And suddenly the Shah seemed to have located his courage and authority. On Thursday, August 13, the Shah handed down a ukase that sounded as if it had been written in collaboration by Schwartzkopf and Zahedi. Mossadegh was ousted as Premier and his successor was to be General Zahedi. The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadegh, and the wheels seemed to be turning.

But for some reason the colonel seemed seized by inaction. It was not until two days later, on midnight of August 15, that the colonel and a platoon of his troops showed up at Mossadegh's residence. There they found themselves surrounded by an array of tanks and jeeps, manned by hard-faced Army veterans Mossadegh had rounded up while the colonel vacillated.

The colonel, of course, was clapped into jail and Mossadegh announced that a revolt against the rightful government of Iran had been crushed. He also had some unkind things to say about the youthful Shah, and Iran's king of kings and his queen took the hint and hopped a plane for Rome by way of the then royally safe country of Iraq.

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Schwartzkopf, however, held his own ground on the Iranian stage. He took over as unofficial paymaster for the Mossadegh-Must-Go clique. Certain Iranians started to get rich, and the word later was that in a period of a few days Schwartzkopf supervised the careful spending of more than ten million of CIA's dollars. Mossadegh suddenly lost a great many supporters.

The climax came on Wednesday, August 19, four days after Mossadegh had "crushed the revolt." The tense capital was filled with troops, mounted against a new uprising, but none of them looked very happy. There seemed no reason for alarm when a long and winding procession of performers appeared on the scene for one of these impromptu parades common in Teheran. In the procession were tumblers, weight-lifters, wrestlers, boxers -- all performing their specialties as they moved slowly along the streets. As usual, crowds flocked out into the streets to watch the show and to follow the parade.

Then, apparently, somebody gave a signal. The weird procession suddenly broke into an organized shouting mob. "Long Live the Shah!" they cried. "Death to Mossadegh." The crowd joined in the shouting, some of them undoubtedly keeping one hand tight against pockets where their American wages were secured. Soon the entire capital was in an uproar, and when the din was at its loudest troops who had remained loyal to the Shah launched their attack.

For more than nine hours the battle raged, with Mossadegh's troops fighting fiercely but gradually giving ground. Obviously, they were confused by the tactics and swift logistical maneuvers of the Shah's forces, who had been exposed to some American who knew the ropes. Anyway, by midnight Mossadegh's soldiers had been driven into a little ring around the Premier's palace and they were forced to surrender. Troops forcing their way into the palace captured Mossadegh as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in silk striped pajamas. Somebody telephoned Rome and the Shah and his queen packed again, to return to Teheran and install Zahedi as Premier.

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This was a coup necessary to the security of the United States, and probably to that of the Western World. But it was another case of the United States not requiring tough enough terms in return for its support. It is senseless, as some observers have written, to say that the Iranians overthrew Mossadegh all by themselves. It was an American operation from beginning to end. But at the end, CIA -- and the American government -- stood by while a succession of pro-Western and anti-Communist administrations, uninterested in the smallest social reforms, brought Iran once again to the edge of bankruptcy. And, of course, the American taxpayer has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to this corruption.

Then, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross in their "explosive bestseller" The Invisible Government provided yet another version, as follows:

1953: Iran

But guerrilla raids are small actions compared to an operation that changes a government. There is no doubt at all that the CIA organized and directed the 1953 coup that overthrew Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and kept Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi on his throne. But few Americans know that the coup that toppled the government of Iran was led by a CIA agent who was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt.

Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, also a seventh cousin of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, is still known as "Mr. Iran" around the CIA for his spectacular operation in Teheran more than a decade ago. He later left the CIA and joined the Gulf Oil Corporation as "government relations" director in its Washington office. Gulf named him a vice-president in 1960.

One legend that grew up inside the CIA had it that Roosevelt, in the grand Rough Rider tradition, led the revolt against the weeping Mossadegh with a gun at the head of an Iranian tank commander as the column rolled into Teheran.

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A CIA man familiar with the Iran story characterized this as "a bit romantic" but said: "Kim did run the operation from a basement in Teheran -- not from our embassy." He added admiringly: "It was a real James Bond operation."

General Fazollah Zahedi,* the man the CIA chose to replace Mossadegh, was also a character worthy of spy fiction. A six-foot-two, handsome ladies' man, he fought the Bolsheviks, was captured by the Kurds, and, in 1942, was kidnapped by the British, who suspected him of Nazi intrigues. During World War II the British and the Russians jointly occupied Iran. British agents, after snatching Zahedi, claimed they found the following items in his bedroom: a collection of German automatic weapons, silk underwear, some opium, letters from German parachutists operating in the hills, and an illustrated register of Teheran's most exquisite prostitutes.

After the war Zahedi rapidly moved back into public life. He was Minister of Interior when Mossadegh became Premier in 1951. Mossadegh nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in April and seized the huge Abadan refinery on the Persian Gulf.

The refinery was shut down; thousands of workers were idled and Iran faced a financial crisis. The British, with the backing of Western governments, boycotted Iran's oil and the local workers were unable to run the refineries at capacity without British techniques.

Mossadegh connived with the Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, and London and Washington feared that the Russians would end up with Iran's vast oil reserves flowing into the Soviet Union, which shares a common border with Iran. Mossadegh, running the crisis from his bed -- he claimed he was a very sick man -- had broken with Zahedi, who balked at tolerating the Tudeh party.

* He died September 1, 1963, at age sixty-seven.

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It was against this background that the CIA and Kim Roosevelt moved in to oust Mossadegh and install Zahedi. At the time of the coup Roosevelt, then thirty-seven, was already a veteran intelligence man. He was born in Buenos Aires. His father, the President's second son, was also named Kermit. Kim was graduated from Harvard just before World War II, and he taught history there and later at the California Institute of Technology. He had married while still at Harvard. He left the academic life to serve in the OSS, then joined the CIA after the war as a Middle East specialist. His father had died in Alaska during the war; his uncle, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, died on the beaches of Normandy a year later.

The British and American governments had together decided to mount an operation to overthrow Mossadegh. The CIA's estimate was that it would succeed because the conditions were right; in a showdown the people of Iran would be loyal to the Shah. The task of running the operation went to Kim Roosevelt, then the CIA's top operator in the Middle East.

Roosevelt entered Iran legally. He drove across the border, reached Teheran, and then dropped out of sight. He had to, since he had been in Iran before and his face was known. Shifting his headquarters several times to keep one step ahead of Mossadegh's agents, Roosevelt operated outside of the protection of the American Embassy. He did have the help of about five Americans, including some of the CIA men stationed in the embassy.

In addition, there were seven local agents, including two top Iranian intelligence operatives. These two men communicated with Roosevelt through cutouts -- intermediaries -- and he never saw them during the entire operation.

As the plan for revolt was hatched, Brigadier General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who used to appear on radio's "Bang Busters," turned up in Teheran. He had reorganized the Shah's

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police force there in the 1940s. He was best known for his investigation of the Lindbergh baby kidnaping case when he headed the New Jersey State Police in 1932. Schwarzkopf, an old friend of Zahedi's, claimed he was in town "just to see old friends again." But he was part of the operation.

On August 13 the Shah signed a decree dismissing Mossadegh and naming Zahedi as Premier. The uncooperative Mossadegh arrested the unfortunate colonel who brought in his notice of dismissal. Mobs rioted in the streets; the thirty-three-year-old Shah and his queen (at that time the beautiful Soraya) fled to Baghdad by plane from their palace on the Caspian Sea.

For two chaotic days, Roosevelt lost communication with his two chief Iranian agents. Meanwhile, the Shah had made his way to Rome; Allen Dulles flew there to confer with him. Princess Ashraf, the Shah's attractive twin sister, tried to play a part in the international intrigue, but the Shah refused to talk to her.

In Teheran, Communist mobs controlled the streets; they destroyed statues of the Shah to celebrate his departure. Suddenly, the opposition to Mossadegh consolidated. The Army began rounding up demonstrators. Early on August 19 Roosevelt, from his hiding place, gave orders to his Iranian agents to get everyone they could find into the streets.

The agents went into the athletic clubs in Teheran and rounded up a strange assortment of weight-lifters, muscle-men and gymnasts. The odd procession made its way through the bazaars shouting pro-Shah slogans. The crowd grew rapidly in size. By mid-morning it was clear the tide had turned against Mossadegh and nothing could stop it.

Zahedi came out of hiding and took over. The Shah returned from exile. Mossadegh went to jail and the leaders of the Tudeh were executed.

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In the aftermath, the British lost their monopoly on Iran's oil. In August, 1958, an international consortium of Western oil companies signed a twenty-five-year pact with Iran for its oil. Under it, the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company got 40 percent, a group of American companies* got 40 percent, Royal Dutch Shell got 14 percent and the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles 6 percent. Iran got half of the multimillion-dollar income from the oil fields under the deal, the Anglo-Iranian was assured a compensation payment of \$70,000,000.

The United States, of course, has never officially admitted the CIA's role. The closest Dulles came to doing so was in a CBS television show in 1962, after his retirement from the CIA.¹⁰ He was asked whether it was true that "the CIA people spent literally millions of dollars hiring people to riot in the streets and do other things, to get rid of Mossadegh. Is there anything you can say about that?"

"Well," Dulles replied, "I can say that the statement that we spent many dollars doing that is utterly false."

The former CIA chief also hinted at the CIA's Iran role in his book The Craft of Intelligence. "... support from the outside was given ... to the Shah's supporters," he wrote, without directly saying it came from the CIA.

Magazines did their part as well. In The Saturday Evening Post for 6 November 1954, Richard and Gladys Harkness co-authored an article entitled "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," which appears to have been a key source for both Tully and Wise-Ross. Richard and Gladys said:

* Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of New Jersey and California, The Texas Company and Socony-Mobile.

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Another CIA-influenced triumph was the successful overthrow of Iran in the summer of 1953, of old, dictatorial Premier Mohammad Mossadegh and the return to power of this country's friend Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlevi.

On May 28, 1953, President Eisenhower received a letter from Mossadegh amounting to a bare faced attempt at international blackmail. ...

The White House stalled Mossadegh for one month; then turned down the crafty premier with a blunt no. This was a calculated risk at best. It was a daring gamble, in fact, that Mossadegh would not remain in power to carry out his threat. It was, as well, a situation which required a little doing. The doing began in short order through a chain of stranger-than-fiction circumstances involving [Allen] Dulles, a diplomat, a princess and a policeman.

On August tenth Dulles packed his bags and flew to Europe to join his wife for a vacation in the Swiss Alps. The political situation in Teheran was becoming more conspiratorial by the hour. Mossadegh was consorting with a Russian diplomatic-economic mission. Loy Henderson, United States Ambassador to Iran, felt he could leave his post for a short "holiday" in Switzerland. Princess Ashraf, the attractive and strong-willed brunette twin sister of the Shah, chose the same week to fly to a Swiss alpine resort. It was reported that she had had a stormy session with her brother in his pink marble palace, because of his vacillating in facing up to Mossadegh.

The fourth of the assorted characters in this drama, Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf, at this time took a flying vacation across the Middle East. His itinerary included apparently aimless and leisurely stops in Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon -- and Iran. Schwartzkopf is best known to the public as the man who conducted the Lindberg kidnapping investigation in 1932, when he was head of the New Jersey state police. But from 1942 through 1948 he was detailed to Iran to reorganize the Shah's national police

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force. Schwartzkopf's job in Iran was more than the tracking down of routine criminals. He protected the government against its enemies -- an assignment requiring intelligence on the political cliques plotting against the Shah, knowledge of which army elements could be counted on to remain loyal and familiarity with Middle East psychology. Schwartzkopf became friend and advisor to such individuals as Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, his colleague on the police force, and the Shah himself.

Schwartzkopf returned to Iran in August of 1953, he said, "just to see old friends again." Certainly the general will deny any connection with the events that followed his renewal of acquaintanceships with the Shah and Zahedi. But as Mossadegh and the Russian propaganda press railed nervously at Schwartzkopf's presence in Iran, developments started to unfold in one-two-three order.

On Thursday, August thirteenth, the Shah suddenly issued a double-edged ukase: Mossadegh was ousted by royal decree and his successor as premier was to be General Zahedi. The Shah ordered the colonel of the Imperial Guards to serve the notice on Mossadegh. Two days later, at midnight of Saturday, August fifteenth, the colonel went to Mossadegh's residence to find himself and his platoon surrounded by tanks and jeeps. The colonel was clapped in jail, and Mossadegh proclaimed that the revolt had been crushed. The Shah and his queen, taking events at face value fled to Rome by way of Iraq.

On Wednesday, August nineteenth, with the army standing close guard around the uneasy capital, a grotesque procession made its way along the street leading to the heart of Teheran. There were tumblers turning handsprings, weight lifters twirling iron bars and wrestlers flexing their biceps. As spectators grew in number, the bizarre assortment of performers began shouting pro-Shah slogans in unison. The crowd took up the chant and then, after one precarious moment, the balance of public psychology swung against Mossadegh.

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Upon signal, it seemed, army forces on the Shah's side began an attack. The fighting lasted a bitter nine hours. By nightfall, following American-style military strategy and logistics, loyalist troops drove Mossadegh's elements into a tight cordon around the premier's palace. They surrendered, and Mossadegh was captured as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in striped silk pajamas. In Rome a bewildered young Shah prepared to fly home and install Zahedi as premier and to give Iran a pro-Western regime.

Thus it was that the strategic little nation of Iran was rescued from the closing clutch of Moscow. Equally important, the physical overthrow of Mossadegh was accomplished by the Iranians themselves. It is the guiding premise of CIA's third force that one must develop and nurture indigenous freedom legions among captive or threatened people who stand ready to take personal risks for their own liberty.⁴⁵

More than a year later, Crosby Noyes, writing in the Washington Star for 27 September 1953, discussed obliquely the significance of Ambassador Henderson, CIA Director Dulles, and Princess Ashraf being in Zurich the same week in August, and mentioned General Schwarzkopf's visit in detail. Without making any direct accusations, he hinted: "It is possible that the CIA agents whose departure from Iran was observed and reported were on purely routine intelligence missions. It is possible -- as a leading columnist has suggested -- that Mr. Henderson's trip to Switzerland was no more than a 'policy of studied indifference' on the part of the State

⁴⁵ Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA." The Saturday Evening Post, November 6, 1954, pp. 66-68. Reprinted by special permission of The Saturday Evening Post. © 1954 The Curtis Publishing Company.

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Department toward the Mossadegh regime. A friend of the Princess Ashraf here in Washington holds stoutly to the view that her visit with the Shah was undertaken simply to ask him for money. It is possible that Allen Dulles is genuinely fond of mountain-climbing and that Gen. Schwarzkopf just happened to show up in Teheran at a critical moment.

"It is all perfectly possible. But as long as the practice of putting two and two together continues, the argument about what really happened in Iran last summer seems likely to continue."

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APPENDIX D

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(b)(3)

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a. Presentation to the Shah



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

- (2) Major issue is to maintain independence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be removed.
- (3) Present dynasty best bulwark national sovereignty.
- (4) While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from United States.
- (5) Mossadeq must go.
- (6) US-UK financial aid will be forthcoming to successor government.
- (7) Acceptable oil settlement will be offered but successor government will not be rushed into it.

b. Demands on the Shah

- (1) You must take leadership in overthrow Mossadeq.
- (2) If not, you bear responsibility for collapse of country.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

II. Arrangement with Zahedi

- A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform Zahedi he chosen to head successor government with US-UK support.
- B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in office.
 - 1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi Prime Minister by royal firman.
 - 2. Military coup.

Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If successful at least part of machinery for military coup will be brought into action. If it fails, military coup will follow in matter of hours.

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APPENDIX D

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APPENDIX D

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(b)(1)

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B. Would be widely publicized that this refuge movement on basis two grounds popular dissatisfaction with Mossadeq government as follows:

1. Ground one that Mossadeq government basically anti-religious as most clearly demonstrated ties between Mossadeq and Tudeh; and Mossadeq and USSR.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

2. Ground two that Mossadeq is leading the country into complete economic collapse through his unsympathetic dictatorship.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

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C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day. Immediately followed by effort have Majlis pass a motion to censure the government. This is to be followed by the dismissal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor. If successful, the coup would be completed by early afternoon. Failing success, the coup would be mounted later that evening.

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APPENDIX C

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APPENDIX E

(b)(1)
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APPENDIX E

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
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APPENDIX F

The following is a U.S. Embassy translation of the Court of Revision verdict against Mosadeq and Riahi, handed down on 12 May 1954. It reviews the case, sums up the charges against the two defendants, and examines their respective defense. It objects to and overrules the verdict of the Military Court of First Instance and concludes by resentencing the defendants.

Under the indictment issued by the Army Prosecutor, the accused were charged with the following:

In connection with Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq--

1. Order for the arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (now brigadier general), Commander of the Royal Guards, who carried the order for the dismissal of Mosadeq;
2. Unlawful arrest of official and nonofficial persons;
3. Disarming of the Royal Guards protecting HIM the Shah and the royal palaces;
4. Sealing of the royal palaces, dispossessing the officials and guard of the Royal Court from the properties and palaces of the Shah;
5. Issue of telegrams to the Iranian Ambassadors abroad instructing them not to contact HIM the Shah;
6. Issue of instructions for omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers in the military centers;
7. Issue of instructions for the holding of meetings by taking advantage of Government propaganda facilities with a view to insulting the monarch and the constitutional regime, and broadcasting the meetings by radio;
8. Issue of instructions for pulling down and breaking the statues of the late Shah and the present Shah with a view to humiliating the royal household and encouraging insurgents to rise against the constitutional monarchy in Iran;
9. Issue of instructions for the dissolution of the Majlis;
10. Issue of instructions for keeping under surveillance the members of the royal household in Azerbaijan;
11. Issue of instructions for the unlawful arrest of General Zahedi, the Prime Minister appointed by the Shah, and the offer of a reward to the person capturing him;
12. Elimination of the royal anthem from the program of Tehran Radio; and
13. Action for the formation of a regency council by referendum.

In connection with Brig. Gen. Taqi Riahi:

1. Arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (now brigadier general) who was carrying the order for Dr. Mosadeq's dismissal, and other officers without any legal warrant;
2. Disarming of the Royal Guards;

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3. Issue of instructions for the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers; and
4. Issue of instructions that the demonstrations of the Tudeh Party should not be checked and insurgents should not be prevented from making demonstrations against HIM the Shah and that those people pulling down the statues of the late Shah and those of the present Shah should not be checked.

By virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, capital punishment was demanded for the above-named. The case was referred to the Court of First Instance, which Court after performing the legal formalities and investigating the case, affirmed that Dr. Mosadeq's offences corresponded with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. With due regard to Article 413 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, Article 44 of the Criminal Code, and Article 46 of the same Law, since the accused is over 60 years of age, he was condemned to three years of solitary imprisonment; General Riahi's offence was found to conform with paragraph (b) of Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and he was condemned to two years of correctional imprisonment and permanent dismissal from the Army (according to Article 298 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law).

After the communication of the verdict issued, the Military Prosecutor and the accused appealed for a revision according to Articles 217 and 218 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and Article 219 of the same Law. The case was referred to this Court according to File No.108, on December 26, 1953.

The Court of Revision was formed on April 8 after pass through the necessary formalities, and listened in nine sessions to the explanations of the Prosecutor and the objections of the accused and their defense counsels about the defects of the file and the incompetence of the Court.

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On April 22, 1954, the original members of the Court by a majority vote of six to one did not find the objections of the accused and their defense counsels about the defects of the file and incompetence of the Court plausible, and declared their preparedness to investigate the substance of the accusations levelled against both of the accused. The Court of Revision, in 17 sessions held from April 23 to May 12, listened to the objections of the Prosecutor, the accused, and their defense counsels in respect to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance, and to the last defences of the above-named. At 12:20 p.m. on May 12, 1954, it declared that the matter had been sufficiently debated and announced an adjournment of the trial. The Court immediately started its deliberations, and with due regard to the substance of Article 209 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law completed the deliberations at 3:30 p.m. on May 12, 1954, and issued the following verdict:

Court's Verdict

A. The main objections of the Prosecutor and the accused to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance are as under:

Summary of the objections of the Army Prosecutor to the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance in regard to Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq.

1. HIM's statements to the effect that he waived his claims for the injustices rendered to him by the accused have been interpreted by the Court of First Instance as the pardoning by HIM of his personal claims, while in fact a personal right has a special interpretation from the judicial viewpoint. The Court's interpretation is not proper, because HIM the Shah had not lodged a personal claim against Dr. Mosadeq so that he could withdraw his claim in due course.
2. Since the Court of First Instance has ruled that the crimes attributed to Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq correspond with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and has issued its verdict with due regard to Article 46 of the Criminal Code, and since the above-named's crime is borne out by the circumstances mentioned in the above, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq apparently should have been condemned to ten years' solitary confinement.

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3. Another mistake made by the Court is that reference has been made in the verdict to Article 44 of the Criminal Code, while this Article refers to a mitigation of the original punishment, and Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq has been condemned to three years' solitary confinement. These two facts are contradictory.

4. The Court of First Instance has not stated in the verdict whether the verdict was issued by a unanimous or majority vote.

Summary of the objections raised by the Army Prosecutor against the Court's verdict in connection with General Riahi.

1. The Court has not observed Articles 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law (the Court's verdict must be substantiated and borne out by facts in connection with the crimes attributed to the accused and their conformity with the relevant regulations). Moreover the subordinate punishment (dismissal from Army service) which must never be mentioned in the verdict has been mentioned contrary to Article 293 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

2. The Court's reasoning in regard to the defenses put up by the defense counsels of the accused supports the bill of indictment and the Prosecutor's statements made in the Court. The Court has considered the General's actions as hostile and as having been carried out with ill-will and for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchy. However, the punishment decreed has been made to conform with Article 330 of the Judicial Law, i.e., the negligence of duty vis-a-vis the orders of the Army.

3. The Court has considered General Riahi responsible for the actions attributed to him and has affirmed the bill of indictment; but has made an oversight in fitting the crime to the relevant article of the Law. For the Court has in its verdict made clear that the issue of the instructions for the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers, and the failure to check the pulling down of the statues and the explicit announcement that the Shah was a fugitive were meant to overthrow the monarchy. Therefore the crime committed by the above-named conforms with Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

Summary of the Objections Raised by General Riahi and his Defense Counsel to the Verdict issued by the Court of First Instance:

1. With regard to Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, General Riahi was not neglecting his military duties while executing the orders of his superiors, so that the Court of First Instance should not have condemned him according to Paragraph (b) of Article 330 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

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2. The Court has, by setting forth its reasons, considered that the Article referred to by the Prosecutor did not correspond with the accusations levelled against General Riahi and the Court exonerated the accused of the charges levelled against him. Therefore, there were no grounds for the Army Prosecutor to request that the same accusations be again levelled against the accused.

3. During August 16-19 Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq held a legal and official title as far as all army officers were concerned and no one was aware of the command dismissing him; hence the legalization of Mosadeq's orders. Moreover, ever since HIM the Shah ordained that General Riahi, the then Chief of General Staff, should receive his orders directly from the then Minister of National Defense, the Minister was the only lawful commander of General Riahi.

4. In connection with the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers to which the Court has alluded, this had nothing to do with the direct will of General Riahi, hence the Article regarding the cancellation of an instruction could not apply to him. The Commander of the Officers' College asked for instructions in this connection in order that probable incidents might be averted, and the then Chief of General Staff reported the matter to the Minister of National Defense and communicated the order issued by the Minister.

The Summary of the Objections of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq and his Lawyer to the Verdict of the Court of First Instance:

1. Concerning the arrest of Col. Nematollah Nasiri (presently a brigadier general), if I meant to conceal the disposal order, I would not have given a receipt for it. This order could not possibly have remained a secret even though Colonel Nasiri was arrested. His followers and some other no doubt knew of it. He was detained because he had come to my house at 1:00 a.m. to arrest me and complete his coup d'etat. When he understood that the guards of my house were increased, he only submitted the order of His Majesty.

2. The Court of First Instance said that I issued a notice about an imaginary coup d'etat in order to call the Royal Guards aggressors and to provoke the followers of His Majesty, and that I detained the faithful servants of the monarch so that people might be incited against this regime. I did not issue any order to arrest the followers of the monarchy. The police forces were responsible for all the actions which took place. The duty of the Royal Guards is to protect His Majesty and the royal palaces. It cannot arrest ministers or Majlis deputies.

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3. The Court of First Instance said that I ordered the Royal Guards to be disarmed so that when His Majesty returned he would have no one to protect him and hence the mobs could have freedom of action. My purpose was to prevent another coup d'etat.
4. You said that I sealed the royal palaces in order to deprive His Majesty of his own properties. Because His Majesty left the country without any previous notice, my action was simply to protect the royal properties.
5. The Court of First Instance mentioned the fact that telegrams were sent to the Embassies of Iran in foreign countries, forbidding the members to meet His Majesty. I have no knowledge of such telegrams and if Fatemi should say that I told him to do so, I shall bear any punishment set by law.
6. The Court of First Instance also said that I ordered the omission of the name of His Majesty from the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers. It was thought that His Majesty did not wish to have his name prior to that of Iran, so the order was given to the soldiers to pray only for the perpetuity of Iran. After all, if the soldiers pray for the perpetuity of Iran, this does not mean that treachery was meant to his Majesty.
7. The Court of First Instance said that Mosadeq and his friends meant to insult His Majesty by allowing the people to demonstrate and take part in meetings. Whenever the representatives of the guilds or the National[ist] parties asked to be allowed to demonstrate, they were given the right to do so provided that the leftwing parties were not permitted to take part, to talk, or to demonstrate. The meeting of that day had no other basis. If the speakers said things and did wrong, it was not my fault and I should not be blamed for their actions.
8. The Court of First Instance believed the destruction of the statues of His Majesty and his father was to excite the people against His Majesty and his powers. I know nothing of the destruction of the statues. In the first place, installation of the statues was against the Shariat. I was told on August 17 that the leftwing parties intended to destroy the statues of Reza Shah. If they would have done so, the Government would have been accused of having cooperated with them. To prevent this, the National[ist] parties and guilds did so and their actions were taken only on the basis of opinion and not to excite the people against the monarchical regime.
9. About dissolving the Majlis, the Court of First Instance said: "The proclamation of the accused to dissolve the Majlis had no precedence in the parliamentary history of Iran and indicates that he want to put an end to the parliamentary regime and to the fundamentals of the government of this country." First

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I must say that if an act which has not been done before and is not written in the laws is carried out, one cannot say that it is a crime. Secondly, our Constitution is based upon government of the people and by the people so a referendum which is also based on the same principles is completely logical and legal. Thirdly, referendum is a good tool in the hands of governments by which they can rely upon the people. For these reasons, a referendum was for the benefit of the country and democracy.

10. About the arrest of the royal family in Azerbaijan I must say that I know nothing and the police have done their duty.

11. The Court of First Instance referred to the order for the imprisonment of General Zahedi, the elected Prime Minister. He was appointed after I was dismissed and because my government could not arrest him, no crime has taken place that I may be punished for.

12. The Court of First Instance thought that the omission of the National Anthem from Radio Tehran was against the customs of the country. I did not give an order for the omission of the National Anthem, but I personally believe that some authorities could cause trouble for those persons who go to places for fun and hear the Anthem but might not honor it as they should. I am sure you do not want the people to be bothered by every possible method.

13. The Court referred to the formation of the Regency Council through a referendum. This action of mine is the best clue to show that my deeds did not follow the contents of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. If my deeds were according to the three subjects of that article, I did not have to form a Regency Council through a referendum. I intended to send some representatives to Rome so that they might beg His Majesty to return or to appoint the Regency Council in case His Majesty did not wish to return. If His Majesty would not appoint the Regency Council, there was no Majlis and the Government had no right to do so either. The only possible solution was through a referendum, which in turn is neither against the laws nor the benefits of the country.

B. Considering the objections in the appeals of the Army Prosecutor, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq (accused No. 1), Gen. Taqi Riahi (accused No. 2) and their lawyers, which seemed to be acceptable, for the following reasons the verdict of the Court of First Instance is invalid:

In the case of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq:

First, as the Army Prosecutor object, the Court of First Instance thought that the communication of the Royal Court meant that His Majesty overlooked his personal rights. This is not so because His Majesty's position is so high that it does not allow him to become a private plaintiff. Moreover, the offense was not a personal one so that the offended party would overlook his rights.

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In addition to that, according to Article 55 of the Criminal Code, pardon can only be given when the crime has been established. For these reasons, the reference of the Court to the above communication is invalid.

Secondly, considering the nature of the accusation and the reasoning used by the Court of First Instance whereby it compared the punishment to that of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, and observing Article 46 of the Criminal Code, the punishment fixed for him was solitary confinement. Because the said Article has fixed the maximum and minimum penalties of solitary confinement, without taking the mitigating circumstances into consideration, the period of solitary confinement could be fixed without any trouble. Although the Court tried to reduce the sentence and referred to Article 46 of the Criminal Code, the effect of this Article is not noticed in the fixing of the punishment.

In the case of General Riahi:

According to Article 78 of the Constitution and Articles 202 and 217 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, the verdict of the Court had to be reasonable and the Court had to pay careful attention to the accusations. Not only is the verdict of the Court about Gen. Taqi Riahi unreasonable, but also his deeds do not correspond to section 6 of Article 33 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law (this Article concerns the failure of commanders to fulfill their military duties in special circumstances). On the other hand, the Court of First Instance reasoned that the actions of Dr. Mosadeq (accused No. 1) corresponded to Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. The Court also related all the accusations against General Riahi (accused No. 2) to some of the deeds of Dr. Mosadeq, directly and indirectly. Therefore, the verdict was given on the basis of the unity of their crimes, although considering their confessions, one can see that the crimes were not the same for both of them. For this reason the verdict of the Court of First Instance is not correct.

For the above reasons, the verdict of the Court of First Instance is cancelled in accordance with Article 233 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and the verdict of this Court is now announced for Dr. Mosadeq (six votes to one) and General Riahi (five votes to two):

For Dr. Mosadeq:

He confessed to some of his crimes and by means of fallacious and confusing arguments he tried to escape the punishment for the rest. Considering his file and the testimony of witnesses in the Court, his defense did not influence the verdict of the Court, and none of it had any judicial value. His ignorance of some of the events (such as the telegrams to Iranian ambassadors ordering them not to meet His Majesty, formation of meetings through governmental facilities, the speech at the meeting of August 15, 1953 by Dr. Hosain Fatemi, who was regarded by the

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accused as his Foreign Minister, the destruction of the statues of His Majesty and those of Reza Shah, and the arrest of the royal family) does not seem acceptable because he was Prime Minister, though illegally, and according to Article 61 of the Constitution, a Prime Minister is responsible for all events.

In some places he has shown good will such as concerning the formation of a Regency Council through a referendum about which he frankly said, "My intentions were to send some representatives to Rome in order to beg His Majesty to return and if His Majesty did not wish to do so, to beg him to appoint the Regency Council. In case His Majesty did not agree to either of those two requests, the Regency Council was to be appointed by a referendum." The Prosecutor of this Court believes that his statement is neither legal nor logical; therefore he does not accept it. If Mosadeq were right, he would have sent the representatives to Rome during the four days of his illegal regime. Although he had all possible means of transportation and so on in his hands, he did not do so. No action was taken for the appointment of representatives to be sent to Rome. His good will did not even induce him to send wires directly or indirectly (through the Embassies of Iran in Baghdad and Rome) to His Majesty although he could have done so. On the contrary, the telegrams sent to the Iranian ambassadors in foreign countries show and prove that he did not intend to show goodwill in this case.

Likewise in connection with the omission of the Shah's name from the morning and evening prayers in military centers, his statements are contradictory to those made by General Riahi because the accused has stated: "Since it was assumed that HIM the Shah did not wish his name to precede that of Iran, it was ordered that the soldiers should pray for the country, in order that HIM the Shah might reign in an independent and free country; the morning and evening prayers of the soldiers for the continued existence of Iran does not indicate any treason against HIM the Shah."

General Riahi has alleged that on the proposal of the Commander of the Military College in order to prevent undesirable events the prayer in question was changed with the advice of Dr. Mosadeq; however, the said accused (Dr. Mosadeq) has not been able to prove his good will in altering the morning and evening prayers or in omitting HIM the Shah's name from the prayers, and has not shown why he did not take this action before receiving his dismissal order, or how it happened that these events which were against the monarchy occurred after the issue of the dismissal order and his refusal to obey it. Therefore, in short, the activities of the above-named from August 16 at 1:00 a.m. until August 19, singly and collectively, clearly fall under Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law. Considering the fact that the Army Prosecutor applied for a revision of the verdict issued by the Court of First Instance, the above-named is, by virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law, condemned to three years of solitary imprisonment, considering the fact that his age is over sixty years.

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The period of his detention since August 19, 1953, must be deducted from the period of his imprisonment.

For General Riahi:

In all the actions committed by him, General Riahi's aim was merely to facilitate the achievement of the aims of the accused No. 1 (Dr. Mosadeq). While having full knowledge of the aims and objectives of the above named, he has colluded with accused No. 1 to weaken the sense of royalty, shake the position of the monarchy, eliminate the monuments which indicated the existence of the monarchy, encourage the adversaries of the monarchy and the army, and prosecute those whose hearts were kindled with the fire for the love of the king and the monarchy. The issue of the instruction for the alteration of the morning and evening prayers by omitting the Shah's name from the prayer, the despatch of telegrams to the 6th Army Division of Fars and the Military Governor of Abadan to the effect that the Shah was a fugitive, the fact that he did not prevent the pulling down of the statues, and the instruction for shooting on August 19 at individuals who manifested their royal feelings are, in the opinion of the jury, sufficient proofs to corroborate his collaboration and complicity with accused No. 1, Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq.

Therefore, the above-named was an accomplice of Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq, and by virtue of Article 317 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law and Articles 23 and 29 of the Criminal Code, and Article 30 of the said Law, he is condemned to three years imprisonment with hard labor. The period of his detention since August 19 will be deducted from his term of imprisonment.

An appeal may be made to the Supreme Court against the above verdict within ten days of its declaration, with due regard to the circumstances mentioned in article 243 of the Army Judicial and Penal Law.

President of the Court of Revision for the Events of
August 16 to 19, 1953.....General Javadi

Signature of the Jury: General Isa Hedayat
Ebrahim Vali
General Kasrollah Khoshnevisan
General Ahmad Ajudani (substitute)
General Esatollah Zargani (assistant)
Lt.Col. Alahyari, Army Prosecutor

May 12, 1954 (3:30 p.m.)

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Appendix G



- 1 - Ministry of War
- 2 - The Majlis
- 3 - Arsenal
- 4 - Telegraph Office
- 5 - U.S. Embassy
- 6 - Police HQ
- 7 - Guards Barracks
- 8 - The Bazaar

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HISTORIAN'S NOTE

This paper, entitled Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, was written in March 1954 by Dr. Donald N. Wilber who had played an active role in the operation. The study was written because it seemed desirable to have a record of a major operation prepared while documents were readily at hand and while the memories of the personnel involved in the activity were still fresh. In addition, it was felt advisable to stress certain conclusions reached after the operation had been completed and to embody some of these in the form of recommendations applicable to future, parallel operations.

Documents pertaining to the operation described in this paper are in the Project TPAJAX files which are held by the Iran Branch of the Near East and South Asia Division.

All proper names mentioned in this paper have been checked for accuracy and completeness. A serious effort has been made to supply the first name and middle initial of each individual. The omission of any first names and middle initials indicates that such information could not be located.

Dean L. Dodge
NE Division
Historical Officer
March 1969

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[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.]

Because the introductory summary and the main body of the document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not published here. In addition, certain names and identifying descriptions have been removed from the documents available on the Web.]

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SUMMARY

By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries; was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal, deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq's desire for personal power; was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran. In view of these factors, it was estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if that happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East. No remedial action other than the covert action plan set forth below could be found to improve the existing state of affairs.

It was the aim of the TPAJAX project to cause the fall of the Mossadeq government; to reestablish the prestige and power of the Shah; and to replace the Mossadeq government with one which would govern Iran according to

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constructive policies. Specifically, the aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party.

Once it had been determined definitely that it was not in American interests for the Mossadeq government to remain in power and CIA had been so informed by the Secretary of State in March 1953, CIA began drafting a plan whereby the aims stated above could be realized through covert action. An estimate entitled "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was completed on 16 April 1953. It was here determined that an overthrow of Mossadeq was possible through covert operations. In April it was determined that CIA should conduct the envisioned operation jointly with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). By the end of April, it was decided that CIA and SIS officers would draw up a plan on Cyprus which would be submitted to CIA and SIS Headquarters, and to the Department of State and the Foreign Office for final approval. On 3 June 1953, US Ambassador Loy Wesley Henderson arrived in the United States where he was fully consulted with regard to the objective and aims, as stated above, as well as CIA's intentions to design covert means of achieving

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the objective and aims.

The plan was completed by 10 June 1953 at which time Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, CIA (who carried with him the views of the Department of State, CIA, and Ambassador Henderson); Mr. Roger Golran, CIA Chief of Station, Iran; and two CIA planning officers met in Beirut to consider the plan. With minor changes the operational proposal was submitted to the SIS in London on 14 June 1953.

On 19 June 1953, the final operational plan, agreed upon by Mr. Roosevelt for CIA and by British Intelligence in London, was submitted in Washington to the Department of State; to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA; and to Ambassador Henderson for approval. Simultaneously, it was submitted to the British Foreign Office by SIS for approval. The Department of State wanted to be assured of two things before it would grant approval of the plan:

1. that the United States Government could provide adequate grant aid to a successor Iranian Government so that such a government could be sustained until an oil settlement was reached;
2. that the British Government would signify in writing, to the satisfaction of the Department

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of State, its intention to reach an early oil settlement with a successor Iranian Government in a spirit of good will and equity.

The Department of State satisfied itself on both of these scores.

In mid-July 1953, the Department of State and the British Foreign Office granted authorization for the implementation of the TPAJAX project, and the Director of CIA obtained the approval of the President of the United States. The SIS, with the concurrence of the CIA Director and Ambassador Henderson, proposed that Mr. Roosevelt assume field command in Tehran of the final phases of the operation. It was determined by the Department of State that it would be advisable for Ambassador Henderson to postpone his return to Iran, from Washington consultation, until the operation had been concluded. Arrangements were made jointly with SIS whereby operational liaison would be conducted on Cyprus where a CIA officer would be temporarily stationed, and support liaison would be conducted in Washington. Rapid three-way communications were arranged through CIA facilities between Tehran, Cyprus, and Washington. The time set for the operation was mid-August.

In Iran, CIA and SIS propaganda assets were to conduct

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an increasingly intensified propaganda effort through the press, handbills, and the Tehran clergy in a campaign designed to weaken the Mossadeq government in any way possible. In the United States, high-ranking US officials were to make official statements which would shatter any hopes held by Premier Mossadeq that American economic aid would be forthcoming, and disabuse the Iranian public of the Mossadeq myth that the United States supported his regime.

General Fazlollah Zahedi, former member of Mossadeq's cabinet, was chosen as the most suitable successor to the Premier since he stood out as the only person of stature who had consistently been openly in opposition to Mossadeq and who claimed any significant following. Zahedi was to be approached by CIA and be told of our operation and its aim of installing him as the new prime minister. He was to name a military secretariat with which CIA would conclude a detailed staff plan of action.

From the outset, the cooperation of the Shah was considered to be an essential part of the plan. His cooperation was necessary to assure the action required of the Tehran military garrisons, and to legalize the succession of a new prime minister. Since the Shah had shown himself to be a man of indecision, it was determined that pressure

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on him to cooperate would take the following forms:

1. The Shah's dynamic and forceful twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, was to come from Europe to urge the Shah to dismiss Mossadeq. She would say she had been in contact with US and UK officials who had requested her to do so.

2. Arrangements were made for a visit to Iran by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former head of the US Gendarme Mission, whom the Shah liked and respected. Schwarzkopf was to explain the proposed project and get from the Shah signed firmands (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadeq, appointing Zahedi, and calling on the Army to remain loyal to the Crown.

3. The principal indigenous British agent, whose bona fides had been established with the Shah, was to reinforce Schwarzkopf's message and assure the Shah that this was a joint US-UK action.

4. Failing results from the above, Mr. Roosevelt, representing the President of the United States, would urge the Shah to sign the above-mentioned firmands. When received, the firmands would be released by CIA to Zahedi on the day called for

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in the plan. On D-Day, the Shah was to be at some location outside of Tehran so that Zahedi, armed with the royal firmans and with military support, could take over the government without danger of the Shah's reversing his stand, and to avoid any attempt on the Shah's life.

Through agents in the Tehran military, CIA was to ensure, to the degree possible, Tehran Army cooperation in support of the Shah-appointed new prime minister.

The following public statements made in the United States had tremendous impact on Iran and Mossadeq, and contributed greatly to Mossadeq's downfall:

1. The publication, on 9 July 1953, of President Eisenhower's 29 June 1953 letter to Premier Mossadeq made it clear that increased aid would not be forthcoming to Iran.

2. The Secretary of State's press conference of 28 July 1953 stated that ".... The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian Government has caused our government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran."

3. The President's Seattle speech at the Governors' convention, in which he stated that the United States

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would not sit by and see Asian countries fall behind the Iron Curtain, had definite effect.

In cooperation with the Department of State, CIA had several articles planted in major American newspapers and magazines which, when reproduced in Iran, had the desired psychological effect in Iran and contributed to the war of nerves against Mossadeq.

After considerable pressure from Princess Ashraf and General Schwarzkopf, and after several meetings with Mr. Roosevelt, the Shah finally signed the required firmans on 15 August 1953. Action was set for 16 August. However, owing to a security leak in the Iranian military, the chief of the Shah's bodyguard, assigned to seize Mossadeq with the help of two truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers, was overwhelmed by superior armed forces still loyal to Mossadeq. The balance of the military plan was thus frustrated for that day. Upon hearing that the plan had misfired, the Shah flew to Baghdad. This was an act of prudence and had been at least partially foreseen in the plan. Zahedi remained in hiding in CIA custody. With his key officers, he eluded Mossadeq's security forces which were seeking to apprehend the major opposition elements.

Early in the afternoon of 17 August 1953, Ambassador

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Henderson returned to Tehran. General Zahedi, through a CIA-arranged secret press conference and through CIA covert printing facilities, announced to Iran that he was legally prime minister and that Mossadeq had staged an illegal coup against him. CIA agent assets disseminated a large quantity of photographs of the firmans, appointing Zahedi prime minister and dismissing Mossadeq. This had tremendous impact on the people of Tehran who had already been shocked and angered when they realized that the Shah had been forced to leave Iran because of Mossadeq's actions. US Ambassador Burton Y. Berry, in Baghdad, contacted the Shah and stated that he had confidence that the Shah would return soon to Iran despite the apparent adverse situation at that time. Contact was also established with the Shah in Rome after he had flown there from Baghdad. Mr. Roosevelt and the station consistently reported that Mossadeq's apparent victory was misleading; that there were very concrete signs that the Army was still loyal to the Shah; and that a favorable reversal of the situation was possible. The station further urged both the British Foreign Office and the Department of State to make a maximum effort to persuade the Shah to make public statements encouraging the Army and populace to reject Mossadeq and to accept Zahedi as prime minister.

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On 19 August 1953, a pro-Shah demonstration, originating in the bazaar area, took on overwhelming proportions. The demonstration appeared to start partially spontaneously, revealing the fundamental prestige of the Shah and the public alarm at the undisguised republican move being started by the Communists as well as by certain National Frontists. Station political action assets also contributed to the beginnings of the pro-Shah demonstrations. The Army very soon joined the pro-Shah movement and by noon of that day it was clear that Tehran, as well as certain provincial areas, were controlled by pro-Shah street groups and Army units. The situation was such that the above-mentioned military plan could then be implemented. At the station's signal, Zahedi came out of hiding to lead the movement. He first broadcast over Radio Tehran and announced that the government was his. The General Staff offices were then seized, Mossadeq's home was gutted, and pro-Mossadeq politicians and officers arrested. By the end of 19 August, the country was in the hands of the new Premier, Zahedi, and members of the Mossadeq government were either in hiding or were incarcerated.

The Shah returned shortly to Iran where he was given a rousing popular reception. The Shah was deeply moved by the fact that his people and Army had revolted in the

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face of adversity against a vindictive Mossadeq and a Communist Party riding the crest of temporary victory and clearly planning to declare Iran a republic. The Shah felt for the first time that he had the mandate of his people, and he returned determined to regain firm control of the Army.

In order to give Zahedi badly needed immediate financial assistance so that month-end payrolls could be met before the United States could provide large scale grant aid, CIA covertly made available \$5,000,000 within two days of Zahedi's assumption of power.

June 18, 2000

Editor's Note:

The C.I.A.'s history of the 1953 coup in Iran is made up of the following documents: a historian's note, a summary introduction, a lengthy narrative account written by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, and, as appendices, five planning documents he attached. On April 16, 2000, The New York Times on the Web published the introduction and several of the appendices.

The Times has now decided to publish the main body of the text after removing certain names and identifying descriptions. The editing was done after consultations with historians who believed there might be serious risk that the families of some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.

The introductory summary and the main body of the document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts. In its reporting on the document, the Times has relied upon details presented in the main body of the text.

The table of contents provides navigation throughout the document. Each entry is linked to the relevant section of this file. The table of contents page appears at the end of each chapter and appendix.

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I. PRELIMINARY STEPS

Representatives of British Intelligence met with Near East and Africa (NEA) Division representatives in Washington during November and December 1952 for the purpose of discussing joint war and staybehind plans in Iran. In attendance for British Intelligence were Mr. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, recently Chief of Station for British Intelligence in Tehran; Mr. Samuel Falle of the British Intelligence station in Tehran; and Mr. John Bruce Lockhart, SIS Washington representative. In attendance for NEA Division were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of Division, Mr. John H. Leavitt, Chief of Iran Branch; Mr. John W. Pandleton, Deputy Chief of Division; and Mr. James A. Darling, Chief of NEA Paramilitary Staff.

Although it was not on the previously agreed agenda of the meeting, British Intelligence representatives brought up the proposition of a joint political action to remove Prime Minister Mossadeq. The NEA Division had not intended to discuss this question at all and was unprepared to do so. The meeting concluded without any decision being made and with the NEA Division committing itself only to study in more detail the political action proposals advanced by British Intelligence.

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In March 1953 a telegram was received from the Tehran Station which stated that General [REDACTED] had contacted the assistant military attache and had requested Ambassador Henderson's views as to whether or not the US Government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq. A meeting was held in the Embassy at which Headquarters personnel, then in the field, and station personnel were in attendance. A cautiously worded reply was drafted at Headquarters and its substance delivered to General [REDACTED]. The reply did not commit the United States in any way but was mildly encouraging and revealed some US interest in the idea.

On the basis of the [REDACTED] overture and other clear signs that determined opposition to Mossadeq was taking shape, and in view of the totally destructive and reckless attitude of the government of Prime Minister Mossadeq, General Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, determined that the US Government could no longer approve of the Mossadeq government and would prefer a successor government in which there would be no National Frontists. The change in policy was communicated to CIA, and the NEA Division was informed that it was authorized to consider operations which would contribute to the fall of the Mossadeq government. The Department of State and CIA

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jointly informed Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station, Roger Goiran, of the new policy and of the operational authorization. The Director, on 4 April 1953, approved a budget of \$1,000,000 which could be used by the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadeq. Full authority was given to Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station enabling any part or all of the \$1,000,000 to be used without further authority, as long as the Ambassador and the station concurred.

On 16 April 1953 a comprehensive study entitled: "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was completed. The Study indicated that a Shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mossadeq, particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizeable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mossadeq's orders.

Subsequent contact was made with General [REDACTED]. Although his motives appeared serious, it soon became apparent that he had no concrete plan and was in fact in no position to take action against Mossadeq.

General Zahedi, who at one time was a member of Mossadeq's cabinet, stood out as the only major personality in undisguised opposition to Mossadeq. For this reason

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he attracted to himself a considerable following. The Tehran Station, in April 1953, reestablished covert contact with Zahedi through Commander Eric Pollard, the US Naval Attache. In order to make the covert liaison with Zahedi more effective and reliable, and also for security reasons, Zahedi's son, Ardeshir Zahedi, was selected as the means of contact with General Zahedi in June 1953. After 21 July 1953, contact with General Zahedi was made directly.

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II. DRAFTING THE PLAN

Near the end of April 1953 Dr. Donald N. Wilber, covert consultant to NEA, was selected by the Division to go to Nicosia and, in close collaboration with SIS, draw up a plan for the overthrow of Mossadeq. The assumption by Headquarters was that the planners would come up with a project which they could conscientiously recommend.

The discussions were begun at Nicosia on 13 May 1953 between Wilber and SIS Officer Norman Matthew Darbyshire. Occasionally Mr. H. John Collins, Chief of SIS station at Nicosia, was also present. Mr. Darbyshire, who was in charge of SIS's Iran branch, had been in Iran for several years and was fluent in the language. Discussions were concluded on 30 May 1953, and the completed draft of a recommended operational plan was cabled by Dr. Wilber to Headquarters on 1 June.

The opening meetings consisted of a review of all the important personalities on the political scene in Iran with a view toward determining whether General Zahedi, the most prominent politician in opposition to Mossadeq, was in fact the sole figure worthy of support and, if so, what individuals and elements should be enlisted in his support. It soon became apparent that Dr. Wilber and

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Mr. Darbyshire held quite similar views of Iranian personalities and had made very similar estimates of the factors involved in the Iranian political scene. There was no friction or marked difference of opinion during the discussions. It also quickly became apparent that the SIS was perfectly content to follow whatever lead was taken by the Agency. It seemed obvious to Wilber that the British were very pleased at having obtained the active cooperation of the Agency and were determined to do nothing which might jeopardize US participation. At the same time there was a faint note of envy expressed over the fact that the Agency was better equipped in the way of funds, personnel, and facilities than was SIS.

Wilber reported the preliminary conversations concerning a three-way channel, set up for this occasion, which was designed to insure immediate relay between Washington, Nicosia, and Tehran. That is, a message originating at any one of these places would be sent by the most expeditious route to the other two. This route was the Middle East Communications Authority (MECA) link, the relay station a few miles outside of Nicosia.*

*Unfortunately, communications between Nicosia and Tehran were not as rapid as was hoped during this period in which more than 45 cables were exchanged.

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Discussions at Nicosia moved on to a disclosure of assets by both parties. Those by SIS were centered upon the contacts of the Rashidian brothers in such fields as the armed forces, the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), religious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and other influential figures. When this material was relayed from Nicosia, the Tehran Station commented that it was their belief that these assets had been far overstated and oversold. In reply it was pointed out that SIS was as aware as we of the weaknesses of the Rashidians, but that one of the strongest points in their favor was their avowed willingness to risk their possessions and their lives in an attempt against Mossadeq. In the critical days of August 1953 the Rashidians did display such a willingness. SIS disclosures were followed by those of Dr. Wilber for CIA. Prior to Wilber's departure a discussion was held at Headquarters to determine which of the station assets should be disclosed to the SIS in return for promised disclosures by the SIS of the assets which they were prepared to put into an operational plan. It was agreed at Headquarters that the identities of the vitally important principal agents of the Tehran Station, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] would not be disclosed. Since the SIS had been

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informed during the November 1952 meetings referred to above that CIA had two major principal agents in Iran, it was necessary to offer two such in place of [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. This was done, naming a station agent and a sub-agent** of [REDACTED] to these important posts. To the best of our knowledge [REDACTED] were not uncovered by the Rashidian brothers or any other SIS agents during the course of this operation.

The continuing conversations at Nicosia were reflected by outgoing cables requesting, principally from the Tehran Station, information which would be helpful in drafting the operational plan.

Discussions now narrowed down to a series of basic assumptions which were stressed both in the draft plan and in its final form. It was determined that the details of the operational plan should be included within a framework of such basic assumptions as these: that Zahedi alone of potential candidates had the vigor and courage to make him worthy of support; that the Shah must be brought into the operation; that the Shah would act only with great reluctance but that he could be forced to do so; that if the

[REDACTED]

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issue was clear-cut the armed forces would follow the Shah rather than Mossadeq; that the operation must, if possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-legal instead of an outright coup; that public opinion must be fanned to fever pitch against Mossadeq in the period just preceding the execution of the overthrow operation; that the military aspect would be successful only if the station were able to review the plan with the Iranians chosen by Zahedi to execute it; that immediate precautions must be taken by the new government to meet a strong reaction by the Tudeh Party. Some of these assumptions were presented in cables sent off before the draft plan was completed. The reactions from the Tehran Station and Headquarters did not always express agreement with the ideas of the planners. The station expressed its feeling that the Shah would not act decisively against Mossadeq, while Headquarters wondered whether we should not support some other individual and whether the Persians themselves might not take the lead in action designed to overthrow Mossadeq. It was, however, agreed that the station should begin at once with its new policy of attacking the government of Mossadeq through grey propaganda. The station relayed this line to its own agents and passed it on to the Rashidian brothers of SIS. The CIA Art Group, a section of the PP Staff Advisory Panel, was

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asked to prepare a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq cartoons.

The meetings were interrupted for several days when one of the Rashidian brothers managed to get permission to leave Iran*--not at all an easy matter during the Mossadeq period--and went to Geneva where he was met by SIS officer Norman Darbyshire. He not only briefed Darbyshire on the current situation but was able to give comprehensive answers to a number of specific questions. It should be noted that the SIS station at Nicosia had been in tri-weekly wireless contact with the Rashidian brothers at Tehran, employing the best of the British trained staybehind operators. This contact, in Persian, was naturally limited in time, and even more limited after we passed word to Darbyshire on his return from Geneva that the Iranian armed forces were now in possession of directional finders supplied under MAAG.

Mr. George A. Carroll (FI Deputy Tehran, Designate) arrived at Nicosia on 29 May, in time to pass along reactions

*It is interesting to note that Rashidian obtained his exit visa to leave Iran and his reentry permit from no less a supporter of Mossadeq than Foreign Minister Hoseyn Fatemi. This lends some evidence to long held CIA views that Fatemi was from time to time susceptible to British overtures and was trying to keep a hand in with the opposition and British in the event Mossadeq fell. He was certainly aware of Rashidian's agent status with the British.

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and suggestions from Headquarters, prior to the completion of the draft plan. As stated, this draft was cabled to Headquarters on 1 June 1953. (See Appendix A for a typed transcript of the cable.)

While Nicosia proved to be a handy point of contact with the British and a fairly good communications intersection point, it did have certain disadvantages. It was remote from the headquarters of either agency and, even worse, the SIS station files were extremely inadequate so that any information on personalities, especially members of the Iranian armed forces, had to be obtained by querying the Tehran Station and Headquarters.

Once the draft plan had been cabled, it was agreed with SIS that their copy would be hand-carried to London where the viewpoint of the SIS headquarters would be incorporated prior to 15 June. In the meantime, as had been agreed with Headquarters, the Agency would conduct a searching scrutiny of the plan at Beirut, and then bring these results to London for amalgamation with the draft as reworked by SIS at London. Carroll remained a few days after the completion of the draft to begin work on the military aspect of the plan. He also returned to Nicosia for a few additional days after the close of the Beirut meetings for this purpose. It must be noted that Miss Helen E. Morgan, CIA representative at Nicosia, gave strong support to the CIA personnel who worked at Nicosia.

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III. CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN

On the afternoon of 9 June all those who were to take part in the discussions arrived at Beirut: Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief NEA and project chief throughout the operation, came in by plane from London; Carroll came from Cyprus by plane; Roger Goiran, Chief of Station at Tehran, drove on from Damascus by car; and Wilber came in from Cairo by air.

On the morning of 10 June the talks got underway and continued for four days. The usual schedule was to start quite early, carry through until about two o'clock, and then assemble again in the late afternoon. The first order of business was a reexamination of all the factors and elements of the political scene in Iran in the light of the current and comprehensive information supplied by the Tehran chief of station. After all the basic principles of the draft plan had been accepted, the attention of the conferees turned to a section by section consideration of the plan. The object of the meetings was to determine how each section could be given the maximum structure and impact. One switch in general outlook was made that was most salutary for all later thinking. The draft plan had implied that definite counteraction would have to be taken against some of the strongest elements supporting Mossadeq, such as

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the Qashqai tribal leaders; but it was now decided that every effort should be devoted to increasing the size and effectiveness of the anti-Mossadeq forces, the assumption being that Mossadeq's supporting elements would not react once their leader was out of the picture.

The Tehran chief of station suggested that an alternative plan to provide for the overthrow of Mossadeq be developed. This was to become the Amini/Qashqai plan which the station kept alive as a possible alternative until the successful conclusion of TPAJAX.

Saturday afternoon the group held its final meeting and on the next morning, 14 June, departed by plane for its several destinations.

Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London on 15 June and reported to the main offices of the SIS at 54 Broadway. They turned over the Beirut revision of the plan. No copy of the original Beirut draft exists, since it was reworked to form the final "London" draft.

The London meetings were held in one of the conference rooms at 54 Broadway, notable only for a large sign with the legend in red, "Curb Your Guests." For the SIS, Commander Maurice W. Firth and Norman Darbyshire, who had come on from Nicosia by way of Geneva (where he had seen Asadollah Rashidian a second time before the latter went

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back to Iran) were always present. Upon occasion Major P. (Paddy) J. Keen, whose post seemed to be that of desk officer for several Middle East countries, also participated. Montague Woodhouse, clearly one of their most highly esteemed officers, attended a single meeting but had little to contribute.

From the moment the discussion began, it was clear that the SIS had no major comments of their own on the draft plan. Nor did they have much to say on the Beirut version beyond a certain close attention to phraseology. As at Nicosia it was apparent that the Americans were to be placated and allowed to run things as they pleased. They did, however, seem to have abundant confidence in the plan and in the successful outcome of the operation, and said that the Rashidians would be ordered to follow completely the orders of CIA's Tehran Station.

At the final meeting those present reviewed the future conduct of affairs. The SIS officers stated that they thought it would take some time to obtain a firm decision from their government as to the approval or non-approval of the plan.

Roosevelt and Wilber left London on 17 June, and Roosevelt was back in his office by noon of the 18th.

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There the plan was immediately reconstructed and typed up. (It is given as Appendix B and it should be read at this point in the chronological account of the operation.)

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IV. THE DECISIONS ARE MADE: ACTIVITY BEGINS

Since the meetings at Beirut and London had taken such a relatively short time, there was not too much that Headquarters could do in the interval from the time of Roosevelt's departure until his return. Progress had, however, been made in setting up a specific and close liaison with the State Department. The fact that an operational plan was being prepared was already known to a very restricted number of individuals in the State Department,* and it should be noted that the security there seems to have been excellent up to the time of the event.

The Greece-Turkey-Iran (GTI) office of the Department of State presented its informed opinion in two papers: one was a top secret paper of 6 June 1953 entitled, "Proposal to Bring about a Change of Government in Iran" and the other a top secret undated GTI memorandum on the subject, "Measures which the United States Government might take in support of a successor government to Mossadeq."

* Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith
Deputy Under Secretary of State, Harrison Freeman Matthews
Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, Mr. Henry A. Byroade
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, Mr. John Durnford
Jernegan
Liaison, Mr. James Lampton Berry

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It was not the task of officers of the State Department to obtain high level decisions on the plan. However, the State Department did assert that, prior to acceptance of the plan, assurance must be forthcoming from the British that they would be flexible in their approach to the government that succeeded Mossadeq as far as the oil question was concerned.

Mr. Leslie Herbert Mitchell, UK Embassy officer (SIS representative) charged with liaison with the Agency, concerned himself with this point and did expedite the required assurances from the British Government. These assurances took the form of a foreign office memorandum presented by British Ambassador to the United States, Roger Mellor Makins, to Under Secretary of State Smith on 23 July 1953. (Copy attached as Appendix C.) Also the Department of State wanted to satisfy itself that an adequate amount of interim economic aid would be forthcoming to the successor government before it would finally approve decisive action.

During this same period discussions between Agency officers and Ambassador Henderson (in Washington, having arrived on consultation 3 June) began 8 June. (This is recorded in a memorandum of conversation contained in TPAJAX files.) The Ambassador appeared to backtrack somewhat from his earlier opinion that the premise of the plan

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that the Shah would cooperate was fallacious, and that the Shah would not issue a firman naming Zahedi unless in response to a vote of inclination by the Majlis. The Ambassador, who was always thoroughly cooperative, was absorbed in a search for constructive suggestions and willingly agreed to delay his return to Tehran by arranging a prolonged visit in Europe. From the standpoint of the plan it was not considered advisable to have the Ambassador in Tehran when the final operation was undertaken. In addition, his continued absence was thought to be an important factor in the war of nerves which was to be conducted against Mossadeq.

The following approvals of the operational plan were obtained on the dates indicated:

Director CIA	- 11 July 1953
Director SIS	- 1 July 1953
Foreign Secretary	- 1 July 1953
Secretary of State	- 11 July 1953
Prime Minister	- 1 July 1953
President	- 11 July 1953

Pending final approval or disapproval of the operational plan, the station was carrying forward activities already authorized toward the achievement of the goal. In addition to the general authorization of April enabling the Tehran Station to spend up to \$1,000,000 in covert activity in support of Zahedi, the station on 20 May was

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specifically authorized to spend one million rials a week (rate of 90 rials to the US dollar) in purchasing the cooperation of members of the Iranian Majlis.

On or about the end of June the station had established direct contact with the Rashidian brothers and was prepared to instruct them as to their role and those of their contacts in the development of the operation.

At Headquarters two groups were organized within the NE/4 Branch on 22 June in support of Tehran Station operational preparations. One group, headed by Carroll who had returned from Nicosia in mid-June, was to make an exhaustive study of the military aspects of the overthrow operation. (Carroll's final report on the military aspect of TPAJAX planning is attached as Appendix D.) The intent was to present Zahedi and his chosen military secretariat with a concrete plan for their modification or improvement. It was felt that every effort should be made to bring the rather long-winded and often illogical Persians into a position where each one knew exactly what specific action was required of him. The soundness of this feeling was demonstrated when the failure of the Persians to maintain security resulted in the initial breakdown. The other group, headed by Wilber, assumed responsibility for the psychological warfare phases of the plan. Overall direction

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of these groups and of relations with the field station were in the hands of Mr. John Henry Waller, head of NE/4 Branch.

Carroll left for Tehran in mid-July. He stopped over at London to discuss his military plan with SIS officer Norman Darbyshire and finally reached Tehran on 21 July. Wilber's group sent guidance cables and dispatches to the station, all intended to flesh up the skeleton of psychological operations as presented in the plan itself. In the meantime a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq articles were written or outlined by the group while the CIA Art Group was given constant guidance in its preparation of a large number of anti-Mossadeq cartoons and broadsheets. In addition, these artists did an effective drawing for a wall poster showing Zahedi being presented to the Iranian people by the Shah. Written and illustrative material piled up rapidly, and on 19 July a special courier took it all to Tehran. On 22 July the station began to distribute the material to several agents. What happened to this material will be described in later pages.

By the time that the go-ahead had been received from all parties involved, the NEA Division had picked out qualified individuals for special assignments connected with the project: Mr. Roosevelt, Chief, NEA, was to be

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field commander in Tehran; John H. Leavitt, NEA/CPD, was to go to Nicosia to be in contact and liaison with the SIS station and to maintain the three-way wireless contact established earlier; while Lt. Colonel Stephen Johnson Meade drew the job of representing the Agency in meetings in Paris with Princess Ashraf, energetic twin sister of the Shah. Mr. Joseph C. Goodwin, Chief of Station in Tehran, was to act for purposes of TPAJAX as chief of staff to the field commander, Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. George Carroll, Chief FI Tehran, was given the military planning responsibility first in Washington, then in Tehran. Dr. Donald Wilber was charged throughout the operation with the propaganda aspects of the plan and worked closely with the CIA Art Group in the preparation of propaganda material. Mr. John Waller, just having returned from service as Chief FI, Tehran, was charged with the Headquarters support responsibilities during TPAJAX and maintained the required liaison with the Departments of State and Defense. Although not present in Tehran for the final implementation of TPAJAX, Mr. Roger Goiran, previous Chief of Station Tehran, directed the early stages and preliminaries of the operation in Tehran. It should be here noted that Mr. Goiran, more than any other officer, was responsible for having developed, over a five-year period, station assets which proved valuable and necessary to the operation.

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V. MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHAH

From the very beginning it had been recognized that the Shah must be forced to play a specific role, however reluctant he might prove to be. Therefore, the plan presented a series of measures designed to rid him once and for all of his pathological fear of the "hidden hand" of the British, and to assure him that the United States and the United Kingdom would firmly support him and had both resolved that Mossadeq must go. The measures were also intended to produce such pressure on the Shah that it would be easier for him to sign the papers required of him than it would be to refuse.

On 23 June the timetable covering all the envoys to be sent to the Shah was drawn up at Headquarters. In execution all these steps went off as planned.

The initial task was to brief Princess Ashraf, who was thought to be in Paris at that time. It was planned to approach her about 10 July in Paris and have her back in Tehran to see the Shah about 20 July. Asadollah Rashidian, still in Geneva, was to call upon her first and prepare her for the joint visit of Darbyshire for SIS and Meade for CIA (SIS had assured Headquarters that this call could be made in Paris at any time.) Meade arrived in London by air on

*
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10 July and went at once to Paris with Darbyshire. Then an unanticipated delay occurred. Princess Ashraf was not in Paris, and it was not until the 15th that she was located on the Riviera and visited by Asadollah Rashidian. He reported that she had shown no enthusiasm at all with regard to her proposed role. However, the next day the "official" representatives had two meetings with her and she agreed to do everything that was asked of her. She did say that her arrival would arouse a strong reaction from the pro-Mossadeq press and hoped that we would be able to put out effective counterblasts. Meade reported in London to Roosevelt and Leavitt. He then returned to Paris and stayed close to Ashraf until her departure for Iran.*

Ashraf reached Tebran as a passenger on a commercial flight on 25 July. As expected, her unauthorized return did create a real storm. Neither the Shah, himself, nor the government of Mossadeq had been asked to permit her to return. Both were furious. The Shah refused to see her but did accept a letter passed on through the medium of [REDACTED],** head of the Shah's household, who was

* Meade's character study of Ashraf is in the TPAJAX file.

** SIS agent within the palace.

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loyal and devoted in an effective way throughout this period. This letter contained news that US General Schwarzkopf was coming to see the Shah on an errand similar to that of Ashraf, herself. The Shah welcomed this news and received his sister on the evening of 29 July. The session opened stormily but ended on a note of reconciliation. On the next day she took a plane back to Europe. This was as had been planned, but it came as a relief to know that she was out of the country in view of the pro-Mossadeq press reaction.

The second emissary arrived on the scene in the person of Asadollah Rashidian, the principal SIS agent. According to the plan, Asadollah Rashidian's initial task with the Shah was to convince the ruler that Rashidian was the official spokesman of the UK Government. The advance plan, that of having the Shah select a key phrase which would then be broadcast on the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) Persian language program on certain dates, was followed. In London the necessary arrangements had been made by Darbyshire to send the phrase over the BBC. On 30 July and again on the 31st the Shah saw Asadollah Rashidian. He had heard the broadcast, but he requested time to assess the situation. Asadollah was, however, able to prepare the Shah for the visit of the American emissary, General

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Schwarzkopf, and to stress the point that this emissary would repeat the message and, hence, give an additional guarantee of the close collaboration between the United Kingdom and the United States in this undertaking.

Schwarzkopf had been chosen by the drafters of the operational plan because of the fact that he had enjoyed the friendship and respect of the Shah in the period from 1942 until 1948 when he headed the US Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie. Approached on 26 June 1953 by John Waller, Chief, NEA/4, briefed at Headquarters on 19 July, Schwarzkopf took to his mission with relish. He said that he had a reputation with the Shah for telling him unpleasant truths that others withheld from him, and he stated that he was sure he could get the required cooperation from the Shah. Schwarzkopf was given a cover mission consisting of a short tour to Lebanon, Pakistan, and Egypt so that his visit to Tehran would appear as a brief stop en route to a principal destination. Schwarzkopf left by air for Beirut on 21 July.

Schwarzkopf's mission was to obtain from the Shah the three papers which are described more fully in the operational plan. They were: (1) a firman naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff, (2) a letter indicating his faith in Zahedi which the latter could employ to recruit army

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officers for the plan in the name of the Shah, and (3) a firman calling on all ranks of the army to support his legal Chief of Staff. It was felt that it would be easier to get the Shah to sign such statements than to issue a firman dismissing Mossadeq. It was also believed that the action of replacing Mossadeq would be initiated through the Majlis.

Certain events of 21 July at Tehran both shocked and aroused from their attitude of complacency the more conservative elements which had firmly supported Mossadeq. Demonstrations marked the anniversary of rioting against the government of Qavam and of efforts made at that time, two years earlier, to settle the oil issue. However, it was obvious to all that the number of Tudeh participants far outnumbered those assembled by the National Front, and it was this fact more than anything else which alerted the thinking public to the strength acquired by the Tudeh under the Mossadeq government. At this time station personnel were active on several fronts. The propaganda campaign against Mossadeq was now gaining momentum. [REDACTED] owner of [REDACTED] was granted a personal loan of some \$45,000 on signed notes in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to our purposes. Headquarters-prepared propaganda material

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was turned over by the station to Asadollah Rashidian, and by the end of the month an entirely separate and specially planned campaign in favor of the Shah as opposed to Mossadeq was under way in Azerbaijan. The parallel and alternative plan of keeping in close touch with the [REDACTED] combination for the purposes of diverting their attention from TPAJAX and of discovering the plans and strength of this group remained in effect. Talks with the [REDACTED] continued. At one point the station suggested sending one of the brothers to this country, and Headquarters made an immediate investigation of the mechanics required for making such a trip. The SIS was informed of these talks, and they suggested that their facilities might be used to stir up tribal revolts in the homeland of the [REDACTED].

The station was now in direct contact with Zahedi, who had left his sanctuary in the Majlis on 21 July. After several meetings Station Chief Goiran and Station Chief Designate Goodwin reported that Zahedi appeared lacking in drive, energy, and concrete plans. They concluded that he must be closely guided and that the necessary plans must be made for him.

By 26 July a number of key individuals had moved into position: Roosevelt and Schwarzkopf were at Tehran,

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Leavitt had been at Nicosia for several days, and Ambassador Henderson had come to rest at Salzburg, where he was to remain, anxious but cooperative, for the next two weeks. At Nicosia, Leavitt did a most capable job of reassuring SIS officials who frequently felt that they were not receiving enough current information. Concomitantly, these SIS officials passed on valuable suggestions coming from London, such as detailed plans for putting the central telephone exchange out of operation.

With Roosevelt's arrival in Tehran the situation was restudied. As a part of the war of nerves against Mossadeq, it was considered advisable to cut down close contacts between high-ranking US officials and officials of Mossadeq's government. Technical Cooperation in Iran (TCI) Director William E. Warne was requested to reduce his normal government contacts, and General Frank McClure, Chief of the US Military Mission in Iran, was requested to appear less friendly with those general officers who were firmly supporting Mossadeq. At this stage it was decided to alter the nature and number of documents which would have to be signed by the Shah. These documents would be limited to one firman naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff and one letter denouncing the government-staged referendum on the question of the dissolution of the Majlis as an illegal proceeding. As

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the month of July ended, station personnel in charge of the propaganda campaign reported on the effective anti-Mossadeq activity of the formerly pro-Mossadeq politicians, [REDACTED]. It was stated that very effective use had been made of the 28 July statement by Secretary of State Dulles* (made at CIA's suggestion). A request was made that US papers reflect the Iranian press campaign against Mossadeq and that inspired articles be placed in the US press.

On 1 August, two days after Princess Ashraf had left Iran and the Shah had heard the BBC message designed to convince him that Asadollah Rashidian was the official spokesman of the UK Government, Schwarzkopf had an extended meeting with the Shah. Fearful of planted microphones, the Shah led the General into the grand ballroom, pulled a small table to its exact center, and then both sat on the table. The Shah rejected the proposal that he sign the required documents at once, asserting that he was not fully confident of the loyalty of the army; that he must give advance approval for all members of a new cabinet;

*This statement, made at a press conference, was as follows: "The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian Government has caused our government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran."

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and that he must have time to make his own estimate as to the probable success or failure of the undertaking. On the other hand, he said that should Mossadeq carry through his referendum and dissolve the Majlis then he, himself, would have full powers under the constitution to dismiss Mossadeq and replace him by a prime minister of his own choice. This meeting was to be followed by a series of additional ones, some between Roosevelt and the Shah and some between Rashidian and the Shah, in which relentless pressure was exerted in frustrating attempts to overcome an entrenched attitude of vacillation and indecision.

On 2 August Roger Goiran, for so long the experienced and valuable chief of station, left Tehran headed for Headquarters duty. While his knowledge had been of inestimable value in the preparatory stages of TPAJAX, it was judged that his departure at just this time would be an important factor in the war of nerves against Mossadeq, and in the planned efforts to confuse and disturb the potential opposition. By this time the Counselor, Gordon Henry Mattison, and the ranking political officer, Mr. Roy Malcolm Melbourne, had been briefed on TPAJAX and were discreetly helpful. Mattison, in interviews with [REDACTED], followed station direction in a successful effort to divert the attention of the [REDACTED] group

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from the real purpose of TPAJAX.

During this period Mossadeq, as always, had been on the alert to try to hold the initiative and keep his growing opposition off balance. His attention turned toward the Majlis, where opposition appeared to be hardening. On 14 July he directed the deputies supporting the government to resign. Several of the neutral or timidly anti-Mossadeq deputies followed suit until a total of 28 had resigned. Headquarters urged that the anti-Mossadeq deputies be given every encouragement to keep their posts and to take up bast (political sanctuary) in the Majlis. The theme to be built up was that those who had not resigned from the Majlis would constitute the legitimate parliamentary body. This stand was at least partially responsible for Mossadeq's growing belief that the body must be dissolved. Such action would leave him as the undisputed dictator of the country since his full-powers bill had several months more to run. However, he still had to get around the provision of the constitution that only the Shah had the authority to dissolve the Majlis. He did this by staging a national referendum in which the people were to state "yes" or "no" to the question as to whether the Majlis should be dissolved. The referendum was a clear and palpable fake. Held throughout the country beginning 4 August, some two million

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were said to have voted for dissolution and only a few hundred against. As a maneuver the action was not as satisfactory as Mossadeq anticipated since it clearly revealed abuse of the constitution. This provided an issue on which Mossadeq could be relentlessly attacked by the CIA/SIS subsidized opposition press. The action also did much to alarm the more stable and established elements of the populace, who were nationalists along with everyone else, but who did not favor such a fraudulent breach of the constitution.

During the days of the referendum the station reported in detail on the multiple efforts of station agents to exploit the illegality of this referendum, both before and during the event. Also every declaration made by a religious leader in these days stressed this point. The station indicated that some 20 local newspapers were now in violent opposition to Mossadeq and that some 15 Headquarters-prepared anti-Mossadeq cartoons had appeared in these papers during the referendum week. On 4 August word reached the station that Mossadeq was aware of the true purpose of the visit of Ashraf, and the personnel on the scene felt strongly that action must be mounted very soon. On 4 August Ambassador Henderson per schedule set out from Salzburg for Tehran. He was to be met on 9 August at Beirut by Leavitt,

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who persuaded him to put off his return in view of the delayed but imminent date for action. In those same days, Henderson, officials of the State Department, and officials of the Foreign Office were drafting proposed statements which their governments planned to issue upon the successful conclusion of TPAJAX.

At Tehran the meetings with the Shah were continuing. On 2 August Asadollah Rashidian had presented His Majesty with specific details concerning the manner in which the operation would be carried out, and reported that the Shah had agreed to dismiss Mossadeq and to appoint Zahedi as both Prime Minister and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. The Shah also agreed to name General Vosuq as Chief of Staff. On 3 August, Roosevelt had a long and inconclusive session with the Shah. The latter stated that he was not an adventurer and, hence, could not take the chances of one. Roosevelt pointed out that there was no other way by which the government could be changed and the test was now between Mossadeq and his force and the Shah and the army, which was still with him, but which would soon slip away. Roosevelt finally said that he would remain at hand a few days longer in expectation of an affirmative decision and then would leave the country; in the latter case the Shah should realize that failure to act could lead only to a

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Communist Iran or to a second Korea. He concluded by saying that his government was not prepared to accept these possibilities and that some other plan might be carried through. In a later meeting with the Shah, the latter requested Mr. Roosevelt to solicit from President Eisenhower assurances that it was advisable for the Shah to take the initiative in removing Mossadeq. Mr. Roosevelt stated that he would pass this request on to the President, but he was very confident that the latter would adopt the attitude that the Shah had already had US desires made adequately clear to him. By complete coincidence and good fortune, the President, while addressing the Governors' Convention in Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script to state by implication that the United States would not sit by idly and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain. Mr. Roosevelt used the President's statements to good effect, by telling the Shah that Eisenhower did indeed feel further assurances of US attitude toward Mossadeq were unnecessary but that his reference to Iran in the Governors' Convention speech was made to satisfy the Shah. In the end the Shah said he would again discuss the question with Rashidian. In the cable describing this meeting, Roosevelt stated his belief that it was hopeless to attempt to proceed without the Shah, and that it must be decided whether to exert

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ultimate pressure for the next two or three days or to accept a delay of up to ten days in which the Shah might finally be won over. On 7 August Rashidian met again with the Shah who agreed that action should be taken on the night of either the 10th or 11th. On 8 August Roosevelt again saw the Shah and struggled against a mood of stubborn irresolution which broke down to the extent that the Shah agreed to give oral encouragement to selected army officers who would participate in the action. Then, he said, he would go to Ramsar* and let the army act without his official knowledge, adding that if the action was successful he would name Zahedi as Prime Minister. On 9 August Rashidian took over the struggle in his turn and reported that the Shah would leave for Ramsar on the 12th, and that prior to his departure he would see Zahedi and key officers and express orally his choice of Zahedi as the new head of the government.

On 10 August Colonel [REDACTED] saw the Shah and informed him of the names of the army officers who were ready to take action upon receipt of an order from the Shah. The Shah again asserted that while he approved of the plan for action he would sign no papers. [REDACTED]

*Royal resort on the Caspian Sea, north of Tehran.

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registered a protest at this decision, and the Shah again sent for Rashidian to discuss this all important point. Rashidian carried a message from Roosevelt to the effect that the latter would leave in complete disgust unless the Shah took action within a few days. At the conclusion of the audience the Shah stated that he would sign the papers, would see Zahedi, and then would leave for Ramsar on the Caspian. The next day he did see Zahedi and did leave for Ramsar, but the papers, contrary to the promise of the Rashidians, were not ready for the signature of the Shah. The Shah thus promised to sign the papers as soon as they were sent to him at Ramsar.

After discussion between Roosevelt and Rashidian, they reverted to a decision closer to the original London draft of TPAJAX, deciding that there should be two firmands (royal decrees), one dismissing Mossadeq and one naming Zahedi as Prime Minister. Rashidian and [REDACTED], the Shah's [REDACTED] and an established UK agent, prepared the documents, and on the evening of 12 August [REDACTED] took them by plane to Ramsar.

At this same time the psychological campaign against Mossadeq was reaching its climax. The controllable press was going all out against Mossadeq, while [REDACTED]

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[redacted] under station direction was printing material which the station considered to be helpful. CIA agents gave serious attention to alarming the religious leaders at Tehran by issuing black propaganda in the name of the Tudeh Party, threatening these leaders with savage punishment if they opposed Mossadeq. Threatening phone calls were also made to them, in the name of the Tudeh, and one of several planned sham bombings of the houses of these leaders was carried out.

The word that the Shah would support direct action in his behalf spread rapidly through the "Colonels' conspiracy" fostered by the station. Zahedi saw station principal agent, Colonel [redacted], and named him as liaison officer with the Americans and as his choice to supervise the staff planning for the action. Then [redacted] took General [redacted] and Colonel [redacted] to see Zahedi. CIA officer Carroll maintained close contact with [redacted] and members of the "Colonels' conspiracy," and on 13 August was present at the final meeting of those individuals to whom would fall the responsibility of carrying out the operational staff plan. However, this meeting was the last one in which the station was represented, and the fact that contact was broken proved to have serious results.

Late on the evening of 13 August, Colonel [redacted]

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returned to Tehran with the firmans signed by the Shah and delivered them to Zahedi; according to his story (which has never been confirmed), it was Queen Soraya who finally convinced the Shah that he must sign. If this is true, here was an ally from a totally unexpected quarter.

On 14 August the station cabled that upon the conclusion of TPAJAX the Zahedi government, in view of the empty treasury of the country, would be in urgent need of funds. The sum of \$5,000,000 was suggested, and CIA was asked to produce this amount almost within hours after the conclusion of the operation. No more news came in from Tehran on the 14th, and there was nothing that either the station or Headquarters could do except wait for action to begin.

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VI. THE FIRST TRY

The precise order of events of the night of 15 August 1953 has not yet been established in all detail. The early accounts of various participants differed widely enough to make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth through the dark night. However, the main outline of this first try is clear, as are two basic facts connected with it. These facts are: that the plan was betrayed by the indiscretion of one of the Iranian Army officer participants--primarily because of the protracted delay--and that it still might have succeeded in spite of this advance warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept or lacking in decision at the critical juncture.

Not until the evening of 14 August were Tehran Station personnel informed that action had been postponed from that night until the next one. Station principal agent Colonel [REDACTED] was no longer in touch with events and the station was unable to guide General [REDACTED], Zabedi's Chief of Staff designate--if, indeed, it was he who had assumed the main responsibility.

According to a statement by Mossadeq's Chief of Staff, General Taghi Riahi, he was informed of all the details of the "plot" at five in the afternoon of 15 August. But curiously enough--and according to his own account--he did

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not leave his house in Shimran, where National Frontists Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas were staying, until 2000 hours and then drove to the staff headquarters in Tehran. Riahi did, however, order the commander of the 1st Armored Brigade to have the brigade ready at 2300 hours. At 2300 hours Riahi sent his deputy, General Kiani, to the Bagh-i-Shah, the army barracks on the western side of Tehran which included the barracks of the Imperial Guard. Kiani was arrested there by Colonel [REDACTED] who had arrived at the Bagh-i-Shah sometime earlier with several officers who supported him.

In the meantime a number of truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers were making arrests. About 2330 hours they came to Riahi's house in Shimran and, finding him out, arrested Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas. Also about 2330 hours several officers and a considerable body of soldiers rushed into the home of Hoseyn Fatemi, Mossadeq's Foreign Minister, and took him away before he had a chance to put on his shoes. This meager haul of prisoners was driven to the guard house of the Imperial Palace (Saadabad) at Shimran.

Officers who were aware that Riahi had been alerted took no action, but others who were not, carried out their tasks.

Sometime before 2330 hours a limited attack had been made against the telephone system. Wires leading to the house of Fatemi and to the houses of others who were to be arrested were cut; the wires between GHQ (staff

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headquarters) and the Bagh-i-Shah were cut; and Colonel [REDACTED] with a small armed force, occupied the telephone exchange in the Tehran bazaar.

When Riahi did not hear from General Kiani, who had gone to the Bagh-i-Shah, he (according to his own account) phoned Colonel Momtaz of the 2nd Mountain Brigade and Colonel Shahrokh of the 1st Armored Brigade and told them to take their forces to the Bagh-i-Shah. At or before this time he also alerted other officers, including Colonel Parsa of the 1st Mountain Brigade; Colonel Ashrafi, the Military Governor and Commanding Officer of the 3rd Mountain Brigade; and Colonel Novzari of the 2nd Armored Brigade. However, according to the accounts of Zahedi men engaged in their operation, Momtaz and Shahrokh were arrested at the Bagh-i-Shah and held there with Kiani for some time.

Government sources differ in their accounts as to what happened when Colonel [REDACTED] tried to deliver to Mossadeq the Shah's firman dismissing him. According to General Riahi, Colonel Momtaz was on his way to the Bagh-i-Shah when he ran into Colonel [REDACTED] in the street and thereupon arrested him. According to the official communique of the Mossadeq government, [REDACTED] showed up before Mossadeq's house at 0100 hours on 16 August with four trucks full of soldiers, two jeeps, and an armored car. He claimed that

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he had a letter to deliver to Mossadeq, but was at once arrested by the guards at the house of the Prime Minister. Farzanegan had still another version, claiming that [REDACTED] was arrested at 2350 hours at Mossadeq's house. After his arrest, [REDACTED] is alleged to have said that a delay of two minutes in the arrival at Mossadeq's house of Lt. Colonel [REDACTED] with two truckloads of soldiers caused the plan to fail.

It does seem fairly certain that Riahi had been able before midnight to get detachments of soldiers to the strategic points most likely to be attacked. Just what incident or what reaction on the part of Riahi and others loyal to Mossadeq caused the pro-Zahedi officers to falter in their duties is not clearly known. It is known, however, that Zahedi's Chief of Staff, General [REDACTED], lost heart and went into hiding. This undoubtedly did much to lower morale at a crucial time, as did the rapidly circulated word of [REDACTED] arrest. Colonel [REDACTED] went to the Chief of Staff's office at 0100 hours on the 16th to meet [REDACTED] and it is known that General [REDACTED] did approach the GHQ with the intention of taking it over but was frightened off when he saw tanks and troops in readiness. He then rushed to Zahedi and told him to flee, but Zahedi only laughed at him. Even the trucks with the

prisoners had come down from Saadabad to the GHQ but, finding it in hostile hands, retreated to Saadabad. Those in charge of the trucks released the prisoners at dawn. Zahedi waited in vain for an escort to come and conduct him to the Officers' Club. By about 0230 hours those Persians who were still willing to carry out the operation were convinced that the cause was lost, as they saw strengthened detachments, more troops moving into the city, and vehicles being stopped for questioning. [REDACTED] and General [REDACTED] themselves, toured the town about 0230 hours; then presumably separated, since [REDACTED] was soon picked up, while [REDACTED] found sanctuary in station hands. At the Embassy the station personnel had spent a nerve-racking period of hours. The army radio-equipped jeep called for in the plan failed to arrive at the compound, and there was no way of knowing what was happening in the city.

VII. APPARENT FAILURE

At 0545 hours on the morning of 16 August 1953, Radio Tehran came on the air with a special government communique covering the so-called abortive coup of the night just ending, and by 0600 hours Mossadeq was meeting with his cabinet to receive reports on the situation and to take steps to strengthen the security forces at government buildings and other vital points. Again at 0730 hours the communique was broadcast.

Station personnel had passed an anxious, sleepless night in their office. From the fact that certain actions provided for in the military plan failed to materialize--no jeep with radio arrived at the compound, and the telephone system continued to function--it was obvious that something--or everything--had gone wrong. At 0500 hours, as soon as the curfew was lifted, Carroll toured the town and reported there was a concentration of tanks and troops around Mossadeq's house, and other security forces on the move. Then Colonel [REDACTED] called the office to say that things had gone badly, and that he, himself, was on the run toward the Embassy in search of refuge. At 0600 hours he appeared, gave a summary of the situation, which was like that of the government communique, and was rushed

into hiding. The station was now suddenly faced with the task of rescuing the operation from total failure, and decisions of far-reaching effect were quickly taken. The first need was to establish contact with Ardeshir Zahedi, son of General Zahedi. At 0800 hours he sent word to the station of his whereabouts, and Roosevelt drove up to Shimran--the summer resort section north of Tehran--to hear that Ardeshir and his father felt that there was still hope in the situation. It was immediately decided that a strong effort must be made to convince the Iranian public that Zahedi was the legal head of the government and that Mossadeq was the usurper who had staged a coup. (It should be noted that all action taken from this time on corresponded to the basic estimate of the operational plan that the army would respond to the Shah if they were forced to a choice between the ruler and Mossadeq.) This action was initiated by employing station communications facilities to relay a message to the New York Associated Press (AP) office stating that: "Unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the Shah, one dismissing Mossadeq and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him." In order to get an authoritative statement that could be distributed for local consumption, the station planned to send General McClure, head of the American

Military Mission, to see the Shah and ask him whether the alleged firmans were valid. Later in the day it was learned that the Shah had fled.

By 0930 hours the city was calm, with shops opening and people going about their normal business. However, tanks, extra soldiers, and police were stationed at key points, including the royal palaces which were sealed off from outside contact. Rumors began to circulate. The one that gained early attention was to the effect that the alleged coup had been inspired by the government in order to give Mossadeq an excuse to move against the Shah. At about this time Roosevelt sent General McClure to see General Riahi, Chief of Staff, to ask whether the US Military Mission was still accredited to Mossadeq or to someone else, as the Embassy had heard that an imperial firman had been issued naming Zahedi as Prime Minister. Riahi denied that the firman had been "authentically signed" and stated that: "Iran and its people are more important than the Shah or any particular government," and that the army was "of the people and would support the people." It was not until a number of hours later that McClure reported to Roosevelt on this meeting, and from the time of the meeting on, McClure seemed disposed to go along with Riahi in the hope that Riahi himself might eventually try to overthrow Mossadeq.

It was now well into the morning, after the papers had been out for some time. Shojat, the substitute for the principal Tudeh paper, Besuye Ayandeh, had been predicting a coup since 13 August. It now stated that the plans for the alleged coup had been made after a meeting between the Shah and General Schwarzkopf on 9 August, but that Mossadeq had been tipped off on the 14th. It should be noted that the Tudeh appeared to be at least as well posted on the coup plans as the government--how is not known. The station principal agent team of [REDACTED] working on their own and with singular shrewdness, had put out a special broadsheet which documented the current rumor but twisted it to read that the alleged coup was arranged to force out the Shah. The morning issue of Mellat-i-Ma told this same story, while a first mention of the firman naming Zahedi was given on an inner page of the large circulation daily Keyhan.

At 1000 hours another communique added a few details to the earlier one. By this time the Tudeh Party members, organized in small groups, were making speeches in many parts of the city, while smaller groups of pro-Mossadeq nationalists were also out in the streets. Then a fresh rumor made the rounds: that a plot had existed but that, when it had failed to materialize, Mossadeq had staged a fake coup. At 1100 hours two correspondents of the New

York Times were taken to Shimran, by station arrangement, to see Zahedi. Instead, they saw his son, Ardeshir, who showed them the original of the imperial firman naming Zahedi as Prime Minister and gave them photostatic copies. These photostats had been made by Iranian participants in the plan. Following this meeting the station took charge of the firman, had its own photostats made, and kept the original locked up in the station safe until final victory. At noon Radio Tehran put out a very brief statement signed by Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq (without his title of Prime Minister being used) stating that: "According to the will of the people, expressed by referendum, the 17th Majlis is dissolved. Elections for the 18th session will be held soon." It was this statement, together with the following violently anti-Shah remarks of Fatemi and the undisguised and freely-preached republican propaganda of the Tudeh Party, that was instrumental in persuading the general public that Mossadeq was on the verge of eliminating the monarchy.

At 1400 hours Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi held a press conference. He stated that for some time past the government had received reports from several sources to the effect that the Imperial Guards were planning a coup and, hence, measures were taken to counteract any such coup. He then went on to review the incidents of the coup, as already

stated by the government communiques. In reply to a question, he said that Abul Ghassem Amini, Acting Minister of Court, had been arrested since it could not be considered that the court was not a part of the conspiracy. He added that his own views would be found in his editorial in Bakhtar Emaruz: this editorial, as printed and as read in full, over Radio Tehran at 1730 hours, was a savage, lengthy, malicious attack upon the Shah and upon Reza Shah--a man for whom the general public still feels a large measure of respect and awe. It may be said that this editorial did a great deal to arouse public resentment against the government of Mossadeq.

During the afternoon the station was at work preparing a public statement from General Zahedi which was prepared with the direct advice of Ardeshir Zahedi, the Rashidian brothers, and Colonel [REDACTED]. When it was ready the agents were unable to find a press in town which was not watched by the government. Therefore, one of the Rashidians did ten copies on a Persian typewriter. These were rushed to General Zahedi for his signature and then given out to the foreign correspondents, to local pressmen and to two key army officers. By the time they were distributed, it was too late to catch the press for the morning of the 17th. However, station agents, [REDACTED] although not

in touch with the station, the Rashidians, or [REDACTED] went ahead on their own. They composed a fabricated interview with Zahedi and had it printed on the 17th, along with a copy of the firman. In this instance, as in a number of others, the high-level agents of the station demonstrated a most satisfying ability to go ahead on their own and do just the right thing. During the day the station was securing the persons of key individuals and sending them to safety. Some were concealed in the house of a station clerk in the Embassy compound and some in the houses of US personnel of the station outside the compound. Thus, Ardeshtir Zahedi was in station hands from the morning of the 16th on, General Zahedi from the morning of the 17th on, the Rashidian brothers from the 16th on with the exception of a venture out on the 18th, Colonel [REDACTED] from the morning of the 16th on, and General [REDACTED] from the morning of the 16th. These people had to be concealed by the station, both in order to secure them from arrest and also to have them in places to which Americans could logically and easily go.

That evening about 1930 hours crowds massed in the Majlis Square to hear speeches, and the proceedings were rebroadcast over Radio Tehran. The speakers included pro-Mossadeq ex-Majlis deputies Mosavi, Dr. Shyyid Ali Shayegan, Engineer Zirakzadeh, Engineer Razavi, and Foreign Minister

Fatemi. All the speakers attacked the Shah and demanded that he abdicate. During the course of these speeches, the public was informed for the first time that the Shah had fled to Baghdad. The station had learned several hours earlier that the Shah had left. By 1600 hours the two principal US Embassy political officers had given up hope, while Roosevelt was insisting there was still a "slight remaining chance of success" if the Shah would use the Baghdad radio and if Zahedi took an aggressive stand. Additional station messages to Headquarters contained the texts of the type of statements the Shah could make over Baghdad radio.

Allowing for the seven hour difference in time, Headquarters received the first message from the station on the non-success of the coup at 0130 hours on the 16th, and a few hours thereafter was working on the station's request to get the Shah to broadcast from Baghdad. As the working day ended, they had to report to the station that the State Department was firmly opposed to any American effort to contact the Shah and suggested the British do it. At Nicosia they responded enthusiastically to the station's suggestion, and the SIS attempted to get permission from London to have Leavitt and Darbyshire flown to Baghdad by RAF jet fighter early in the morning of the 17th, for the

purpose of exerting pressure on the Shah. London refused permission.

As the station personnel entered on another day after a second sleepless night, some real encouragement came from word that, in breaking up Tudeh groups late the night before, the soldiers had beaten them with rifle butts and made them shout, "Long live the Shah." The station continued to feel that the "project was not quite dead" since General Zahedi, General [REDACTED] the Rashidian brothers, and Colonel [REDACTED] were still determined to press action.

Now, on the morning of 17 August, the press was again on the streets. Niruye Sevum stated that Schwarzkopf engineered the plot with the Shah and that "simple-minded Americans thought the Shah was a trump card." Dad and Shahed both blamed the so-called coup on the government, and Keyhan carried the text of an alleged Radio London statement quoting Zahedi to the effect that he had a firman from the Shah and that the Shah had left because his life was threatened. Throughout the morning Iranians with good radios were able to get word from foreign stations of statements that the Shah had made in Baghdad. He said: "What has taken place in Iran cannot be considered a coup d'etat in the real sense." The Shah said he had issued his orders for the dismissal of Dr. Mossadeq under the prerogatives given to him by the

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constitution, and had appointed General Zahedi in his place. He went on to say that he had not abdicated and that he was confident of the loyalty of the Iranian people to him. This line was what the station had in mind, if less strong than desired; and the Baghdad papers hinted that painful, bloody events were still to come in Iran. The station suggested that Imam Khomeini, religious divine at Baghdad, and the Agha Khan be enlisted to give the Shah moral backing, while Headquarters, on State Department instructions, continued to refuse permission for direct US contact with the Shah. In the meantime the US Ambassador to Iraq, Burton Berry, reported on his conversation with the Shah on the evening of the 16th. His statements, made on his own initiative, were quite in line with suggestions reaching him after the event.

About 1000 hours a considerable body of the troops that had been dispersed throughout the city were called back to their barracks, as the government was certain the situation was well in hand. At 1030 hours Radio Tehran called upon General Zahedi to surrender to the authorities, and then began broadcasting lists of those arrested as having taken part in the abortive coup or having had some connection with those events. The separate lists, including those of the next day, contained the following names

(those underlined indicate the individuals who were known to the station to be engaged in the coup attempt):



Rumors circulated to the effect that the arrested officers were to be hanged on 30 August, and throughout the unit commands of the Tehran garrison, the police, and the gendarmerie, officers met to discuss the situation. Several of them resolved to risk all to attempt to rescue their friends.

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The station devoted a great deal of effort during the day to circulating photostatic copies of the firman-- particularly among the army--and in trying to arrange for more and more press coverage. It was now obvious that public knowledge of the existence of the firmans was having an effect. Everyone was asking questions: "Was it true that the Shah had issued firmans? If so, why was Mossadeq lying about it? Wasn't that a most reprehensible thing to do?"

At 1325 hours Fatemi held a press conference at which he dealt with the flight of the Shah to Iraq, read the abjectly pleading letter from arrested Acting Minister of Court Amini, and stated that 14 officers had been arrested. His more detailed views on the current situation were expressed in an editorial in Bakhtiar Emruz and were in the main a repetition of his previous scurrilous attacks against the Shah. He wrote such words as, "O traitor Shah, you shameless person, you have completed the criminal history of the Pahlevi reign. The people...want to drag you from behind your desk to the gallows."

Early in the afternoon, Ambassador Henderson arrived in Tehran from Beirut. On the way out to the airport to meet him, members of the Embassy passed the site of the bronze statue of Reza Shah at the end of the avenue of

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that name. Only the boots of the figure remained on the pedestal. A passing truck was dragging behind it the horse from the equestrian statue of the same ruler that had stood in Sepah Square. In the crowds engaged in this activity, the Tudeh were obviously in the majority.

On behalf of the government, Henderson was welcomed by Dr. Gholam Hosein Mossadeq, son of the Prime Minister, and by Dr. Alemi, Minister of Labor. At 1630 hours the station sent off a cable giving a general survey of the local situation which, although it foresaw Mossadeq's position strengthened for the next few weeks, did insist that a policy of opposition to him be continued. Near the end of the afternoon, the government used the voice of a religious leader, Sadr Balaghi, to attack the Shah over Radio Tehran.

The evening was a most active and trying time for the station. Principal agents [REDACTED] were reached and given instructions. Within the Embassy compound, Roosevelt and Carroll held a prolonged council of war with the heads of their team: General Zahedi and Ardesbir Zahedi, General [REDACTED] the three Rashidian brothers, and Colonel [REDACTED]. These teammates were, when required, smuggled in and out of the compound in the bottom of cars and in closed jeeps. A few hundred yards away

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Ambassador Henderson and General McClure were out in the garden in front of the residency, and Roosevelt wore a path back and forth to reassure them that no Persians were hidden out in the compound, so that they could in all honesty so inform Mossadeq if the question were asked. The council of war went on for about four hours, and in the end it was decided that some action would be taken on Wednesday the 19th. As preparation for this effort, several specific activities were to be undertaken. In the field of political action, it was planned to send the Tehran cleric [REDACTED] to Qum to try to persuade the supreme cleric, Ayatollah Borujerdi, to issue a fatwa (religious decree) calling for a holy war against Communism, and also to build up a great demonstration on Wednesday on the theme that it was time for loyal army officers and soldiers and the people to rally to the support of religion and the throne. In the field of military action, support from outside of Tehran seemed essential. Colonel [REDACTED] was sent off in a car driven by a station agent (US national Gerald Towne) to [REDACTED] to persuade Colonel [REDACTED] commanding officer of the [REDACTED] garrison, to declare for the Shah. Zahedi, with Carroll, was sent to Brigadier General [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] with a similar request. Through station facilities these

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messengers were provided with identification papers and travel papers which stood up under inspection. All those leaving the compound were also given station-prepared curfew passes.

Throughout the long hours of 17 August, there seemed little that Headquarters could do to ease the pangs of despair. A wire sent to the station in the afternoon expressed the strong feeling that Roosevelt, in the interest of safety, should leave at the earliest moment, and it went on to express distress over the bad luck. At about the same time, an operational immediate cable went out to Ambassador Berry in Baghdad with guidance concerning his future meetings with the Shah. Propaganda guidance was sent to the stations at Karachi, New Delhi, Cairo, Damascus, Istanbul, and Beirut to the effect that the Zahedi government was the only legal one. Just after midnight Headquarters urged a Paris Station officer in southern France to get in touch with the Agha Khan at once, in order to urge the latter to send a wire to the Shah expressing his strongest moral support. Much later, Headquarters learned that contact had been established, but there was not the hoped-for outcome. The Agha Khan had at once stated that a ruler who left his throne and country would never return, and after this statement no effort was made to sell him on the idea of backing

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the Shah. Of course, he was later delighted to hear that the Shah did get his throne back after all.

At Nicosia the SIS refused to give up hope, and bucked against their own office in London and against the Foreign Office. Darbyshire continued to try to get permission to go to Baghdad. While the persistence and apparent faith shown by the SIS station at Nicosia was altogether admirable, it should be remembered that they had nothing to lose if the cause had been pressed to ultimate failure and disclosure.

The 18th was to be the most trying day for every person in every country who was aware of the project. At 0730 hours that morning the Shah left Baghdad for Rome on a regular BOAC commercial flight. It would be some hours before this news reached Tehran. In Tehran the day opened with small bands roaming the streets. The Tudeh managed to ransack the Pan-Iranist Party headquarters (██████████ claim credit for this incident) located near the Hajli Square, and then there were minor clashes between gangs of the Tudeh and the Third Force (a Marxist, non-Tudeh opposition group).

Morning papers appeared about as usual, although very few opposition sheets were available since secret police were posted at all printing shops. Those papers supporting Mossadeq announced that the Pahlevi dynasty had come to an

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end, while [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] wrote that the nation expressed its violent disapproval of the coup which was in foreign interests. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Shahed ran a copy of the firman, and Keyhan ran two brief notes on Zahedi's claims. Shojat, replacement for Besuye Ayandeh and, hence, the leading organ of the Tudeh Party, printed a statement by the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party--the first such statement to appear for some weeks. In this statement the party blamed the recent events on Anglo-American intrigue, and added that the watchword for the day must be: "...Down with the monarchy! Long live the democratic republic!" During the morning the AP correspondent wired out a story, destined to get considerable play abroad, which included Zahedi's statement to the officers of the Iranian Army: "Be ready for sacrifice and loss of your lives for the maintenance of independence and of the monarchy of Iran and of the holy religion of Islam which is now being threatened by infidel Communists."

Military communiques read over Radio Tehran indicated that continuing efforts were being made by the government to firm up its control. One announcement offered a reward of 100,000 rials for information as to the whereabouts of

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General Zahedi; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and a third was a reminder that all demonstrations were forbidden by the government. At 1030 hours General Riahi, Chief of Staff, met with the high ranking officers of the army in the lecture hall of the Military School and read them the riot act, stressing that they must be faithful to the government.

Personnel at the Tehran Station, while continuing to make every effort to carry out its decision of the 16th, were also planning for eventualities. One message to Headquarters asked that the means for a clandestine evacuation of up to 15 people from Iran be prepared. Another cited local military opinion that officers would carry out instructions broadcast by the Shah, and then went on to put it up to Headquarters as to whether the station should continue with TPAJAX or withdraw. Nicosia commiserated over the initial failure and stated that they, personally, were continuing to do all they could to induce London to continue to support station efforts. This message was followed by a report on the Shah's statements at Baghdad, and by still another to the effect that SIS Nicosia was asking London's assent to urge the Shah's return on pilgrimage to the holy shrines in Iraq where he would be in

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direct contact with Iranian divines resident there.

During the afternoon most of the news was not of action but of statements from various sources. At his press conference Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi asserted that there had been serious anti-Shah riots in Baghdad--a complete lie. At 1500 hours the Shah arrived in Rome, where he was to make statements to the press which followed a middle ground. These statements did not dash the hopes of his supporters, but neither were they a call to action. Also, in the afternoon, Radio Moscow carried the text of the appeal of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party as it had been printed that morning in Shojat.

In the evening, violence flared in the streets of Tehran. Just what was the major motivating force is impossible to say, but it is possible to isolate the factors behind the disturbances. First, the flight of the Shah brought home to the populace in a dramatic way how far Mossadeq had gone, and galvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force. Second, it seems clear that the Tudeh Party overestimated its strength in the situation. This fault may have been that of the Soviet liaison people, of the leaders of the Tudeh Party, or of the rank and file. During the day the Party not only had defiled statues of the monarchy, but also had erected their own flags at

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certain points. Party members had also torn down street signs in which the Pahlevi dynasty was mentioned or which commemorated events in the reign of Reza Shah, and had replaced them with "popular" names. The party seemed ready for an all-out effort to bring in a peoples' democracy, believing either that Mossadeq would not challenge them or that they could outfight him in the streets. Third, the Mossadeq government was at last beginning to feel very uneasy about its alliance with the Tudeh Party. The Pan-Iranists were infuriated and the Third Force was most unhappy about the situation. Fourth, the climax was now approaching of the [redacted] campaign of alleged Tudeh terrorism. (Details of this campaign have been given on earlier pages.) On this evening [redacted] had gangs of alleged Tudehites on the streets with orders to loot and smash shops on Lalazar and Amirieh streets whenever possible, and to make it clear that this was the Tudeh in action.

During the evening all these factors came together in ferment. Security forces were given orders to clear the streets and serious fighting resulted. Friends of Colonel [redacted] in the Police Department exceeded instructions in preventing Tudeh vandalism by beating up Tudehites and shouting for the Shah.

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The Tudeh did seem to take rapid cognizance of the facts that a covert action was being staged, and that their members were not strong enough to fight the police. They brought people out who tried to argue demonstrators into going home.

Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair. The immediate direction of the project moved from the Branch and Division to the highest level. At the end of the morning a handful of people worked on the draft of a message which was to call off the operation. As the message finally was sent, in the evening, it was based on the Department of State's tentative stand: "that the operation has been tried and failed," the position of the United Kingdom that: "we must regret that we cannot consider going on fighting" and Headquarters' position that, in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary from Roosevelt and Henderson, operations against Mossadeq should be discontinued.

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VIII. "THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS"

While on the 18th only [REDACTED] had published the imperial firman naming Zahedi as Prime Minister, on 19 August, as soon as the city was awake, early risers could see photostats or type-set copies of the firman in the papers Setareh Islam, Asia Javanan, Aram, Mard-i-Asia, Hellat-i-Ma and the Journal de Tehran. The first four of these papers, and Shahed and Dad in addition, ran an alleged interview with Zahedi which stressed that his government was the only legal one in existence--an interview that had been fabricated by [REDACTED]. Somewhat later in the morning the first of many thousand broadsheets which carried a photostatic copy of the firman and the text of the Zahedi statement appeared on the streets. Although each of these newspapers had a normal circulation of restricted size, the news they carried was undoubtedly flashed through the city by word of mouth, for before 0900 hours pro-Shah groups were assembling in the bazaar area. Members of these groups had not only made their personal choice between Mossadeq and the Shah, but they were stirred up by the Tudeh activity of the preceding day and were ready to move. They needed only leadership.

Even before the day had dawned [REDACTED] having been informed that a pro-Shah statement by the

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ranking religious leader, Ayatollah Borujerdi, might be forthcoming during the day, had made definite preparations to utilize any such statement. [REDACTED] and two of their most energetic sub-agents, [REDACTED] were down at the bazaar section with a jeep and trucks ready to set out for Qazvin. Their plan was to print broadsheets at this town some 85 miles west of Tehran should it appear that the Mossadeq government had increased its attempted stranglehold on the urban press. As soon as they noticed that the pro-Shah groups were gathering, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] rushed to supply the needed leadership. [REDACTED] accompanied one group in its progress toward the Majlis, and on the way incited them to set fire to the offices of Bakhtar-i-Emruz, the semi-official paper owned by Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi, which on the 17th and 18th had printed most bitter and scurrilous attacks on the person of the Shah. About the same time [REDACTED] led other elements toward the offices of the Tudeh papers Shahbaz, Bezuys Ayandeh, and Javanan-i-Democrat, all of which were thoroughly sacked.

The news that something quite startling was happening spread at great speed throughout the city. Just when it reached Mossadeq, who was meeting with members of his cabinet, is not known. By 0900 hours the station did have

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this news, and by 1000 hours word had come in that both the Bakhtar-i-Emruz office and the headquarters of the Iran Party had been ransacked. Also about 1000 hours contact was established with the Rashidian brothers who seemed full of ~~el~~ ~~ge~~. Their instructions, as well as orders directed to [REDACTED] were now to attempt to swing the security forces to the side of the demonstrators and to encourage action for the capture of Radio Tehran. To what extent the resulting activity stemmed from the specific efforts of all our agents will never be known, although many more details of the excitement of the day may slowly come to light.

Fairly early in the morning Colonel [REDACTED] one of those involved in the staff planning, appeared in the square before the Majlis with a tank which he had secured from the Second Battalion of the Second Armored Brigade, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Lt. Col. [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED] were on hand and were joined by two trucks from the same battalion, while members of the disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove through the streets. By 1015 hours there were pro-Shah truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares.

While small groups had penetrated to the north of the city by 0930 hours, the really large groups, armed

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with sticks and stones, came from south Tehran and merged as they reached Sepah Square in their progress north toward the center of the city. There the troops held in readiness fired hundreds of shots over the heads of the crowd, but apparently were not willing to fire at these partisans of the Shah. As a result the crowds were able to fan out toward key points. Just up Lalezar, a main shopping street, the Saadi theater, long sponsored by the Tudeh Party, was burned. The surging crowds of men, women, and children were shouting, "Shah piruz ast," (The Shah is victorious). Determined as they seemed, a gay holiday atmosphere prevailed, and it was as if exterior pressures had been released so that the true sentiments of the people showed through. The crowds were not, as in earlier weeks, made up of hoodlums, but included people of all classes--many well dressed--led or encouraged by other civilians. Trucks and busloads of cheering civilians streamed by and when, about noon, five tanks and 20 truckloads of soldiers joined it, the movement took on a somewhat different aspect. As usual, word spread like lightning and in other parts of the city pictures of the Shah were eagerly displayed. Cars went by with headlights burning as a tangible indication of loyalty to the ruler.

At about 1030 hours, General Riahi informed Mossadeq

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that he no longer controlled the army and asked for relief, but Mossadeq visited his office and told him to hold firm. Colonel Montaz was able to assemble only one battalion and disposed that force around Mossadeq's house.

About noon separate elements composing the crowds began to receive direct leadership from the military and police. Those army officers previously alerted to take part in the military operations provided by TPAJAX were now taking separate but proper individual action. By 1300 hours the central headquarters of the telegraph office on Sepah Square had fallen into royalist hands. The AP man filed a cable there shortly after 1300 hours giving a brief report on the fighting. Then fighting moved a few hundred yards away to the police headquarters and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building just across the wide avenue from it. Defenders of the police station held out until nearly 1600 hours.

Also about noon, Roosevelt went to the houses where Generals Zahedi and [REDACTED] were in hiding. They were both fully informed of the events of the morning and told to wait for instructions. An hour later Carroll and Persian-speaking Major William R. Keyser (Assistant US Military Attache) reported on the military situation. By early afternoon more of the important objectives in the

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center of the city, such as the press and propaganda offices, had been taken over by the royalists. With important facilities under control, it was possible to begin the dispatch of streams of telegrams to the provinces urging them to rise in support of the Shah. Even during the greatest heat of the day there was no slackening of activity. Station agent [REDACTED] was still on the streets and, finding a crowd on Firdausi Avenue, urged them to go to military police headquarters and demand the release of Colonel [REDACTED] and General [REDACTED]. This they did. The soldiers on guard put up no resistance. Meanwhile agent General [REDACTED] was touring the city in his car attempting to round up members of the Imperial Guard, soldiers who later took part in the attack on Mossadeq's house. Early in the afternoon the crowds did collect around the approaches to Mossadeq's residence. By this time he had probably already left.

Radio Tehran was a most important target, for its capture not only sealed the success at the capital, but was effective in bringing the provincial cities quickly into line with the new government. During the heat of activity, it broadcast dull discussions of cotton prices, and finally music only. Already at 1030 hours there had been an interruption of its schedule, but it was not until

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early afternoon that people began streaming up the broad avenue toward their goal, some three miles to the north. Buses and trucks bore full loads of civilians, Army officers and policemen. Sheer weight of numbers seemed to have overwhelmed the defenders of the radio station, and after a brief struggle in which three deaths were reported, at 1412 hours the station was in royalist hands. At 1420 hours it broadcast the first word of the success of the royalist effort, including a reading of the firman. A stream of eager speakers came to the microphone. Some represented elements upon whom reliance had been placed in TPAJAX planning, while others were quite unknown to the station. Among the former elements were opposition papers [REDACTED] one of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Among spontaneous supporters of the Shah to come to the microphone were Colonel Ali Pahlevan and Major Husand Mirzadian: their presence was the proof--no longer required--of the truth of the TPAJAX assumption that the army would rally to the Shah under just such circumstances. For some period of time, Radio Tehran was alternately on and off the air. It may have been finally put into good operating condition by those engineers who, as one speaker said, had come along for just such a purpose. Here, as in so many other phases, chance served the cause.

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very well, for, had the original defenders of the radio station managed to damage its facilities, the firm control of the capital might have been delayed.

At the Embassy, station personnel were following the broadcasts of Radio Tehran, and were elated when it suddenly fell into royalist hands. Once again Roosevelt set off toward the hiding place of his valuable charges, meeting them a little before 1800 hours. Told it was time for them to play an active role, both promptly dressed for the occasion. It was agreed that General Zahedi should meet General [REDACTED] at 1630 hours on a certain street corner with a tank, and should proceed with this vehicle to Radio Tehran where Zahedi would speak to the nation. General [REDACTED] was taken from the house by Major [REDACTED] in a jeep; and then along the way, when he spied two Air Force officers, he asked to be let out, saying he would take care of everything. Right on the street these officers greeted him warmly and when he said he would like a tank, they soon rounded one up. Asked if he knew where Zahedi was, he said he did and that he had an appointment to meet him at 1630 hours. His comrades pressured him to make immediate rendezvous with Zahedi, so he directed the tank toward the compound in which the house sheltering Zahedi was situated. Zahedi emerged and the tank set off

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again. At 1725 hours Zahedi spoke over Radio Tehran, and this speech was repeated a little after 2100 hours that evening.

However, Zahedi had been preceded on the air by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] In the dash back from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] car had broken down completely at about the halfway mark, but he was able to get an uncomfortable ride the rest of the way in an oil tank truck. He arrived in Tehran by morning and contacted the station. At the latter's urgent instructions, [REDACTED] sent a telegram to Colonel [REDACTED] which message contained a code phrase* signalling [REDACTED] to lead his division on forced march to Tehran. An interesting sidelight concerning [REDACTED] march to Tehran** occurred en route at Hamadan. The division entered Hamadan just as the local Tudeh Party was holding a large pro-Mossadeq demonstration. [REDACTED] quelled the demonstration in short order. The astonishment of the Tudeh on seeing the [REDACTED] division enter Hamadan was exceeded only by that of the town mayor.

Within Tehran proper the last nests of resistance were being subdued. The Chief of Staff headquarters gave in at

* "Am coming today to see my sick sister."

** The division actually arrived after Tehran was already in Royalist hands.

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the end of the afternoon, and before 1900 hours Mossadeq's house was taken and soon turned into a shambles. Its belongings were dragged out into the street and sold to passersby. Reactions were also being reported from the provinces. At 1450 hours the regional station at Sanandaj in Kurdestan suddenly went off the air. At 1555 hours Radio Tabriz reported the capture of the station itself by forces loyal to the Shah, and stated that all of Azerbaijan was in the hands of the army. As it continued broadcasting, it became apparent that one of the speakers, [REDACTED] and an effective sub-agent of station assets had played an important role in events at Tabriz. By 1800 hours the station at Isfahan was on the air with strong statements in favor of the Shah and Zahedi by such elements as local editors, a member of Baghai's Toller's Party, religious leaders, and staff officers--all groups which we had hoped would react in this fashion. Not until 2000 hours did the radio station at Kerman proclaim loyalty to the new government. Meshed Radio was not heard from at all, but the religious-minded town turned Loyalist almost immediately after the news of the change had been sent out over Radio Tehran. Known Tudehites were pursued and shops of Tudeh sympathizers looted.

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Colonel [REDACTED] following Zahedi's instructions, and Carroll now closed up the operation. While [REDACTED] had [REDACTED] --at that office-- kept in touch by phone and placed known supporters of TPAJAX in command of all units of the Tehran garrison, seized key military targets, and executed the arrest lists.

As the afternoon drew to its close, Radio Tehran seemed to get down to a less haphazard schedule. From 1800 hours on, it made short announcements of government appointees. At 1845 hours the Associated Press representative and the New York Times man made fairly brief statements on the events of the day, intended for their home offices. Brief government communiques dealt with curfew hours, contained warnings against demonstrations, etc. A general news summary at 2100 hours was followed by a statement from Zahedi, installed in the office of the Chief of Police, and before 2200 hours the station had signed off for the night. The hectic day was over and curfew now in effect. Lives had been lost, but not nearly as many as stated in the white heat of the actual events. The security forces were firmly in control and well prepared to destroy any counter-effort.

How had other interested parties weathered the exciting day? One such must have felt real anguish. This was the

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USSR and its people in Iran. Radio Moscow lagged far behind the rest of the world and did not put out a summary of the day's events at Tehran until 2300 hours GMT. Its Persian program that reached Iran early in the afternoon was built around the text of the earlier Pravda article entitled "The Failure of the American Adventure in Iran," and this program was repeated early in the evening. The same Pravda article was broadcast throughout the late afternoon and early evening from Moscow in English, Arabic, Bulgarian, Polish, Czech and Slovak, German, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, and Turkish, although by that time nearly everyone of its listeners must have known that this material was no longer applicable.

The other parties to the original plan felt elated, and possibly even self-satisfied. While the reactions of the Shah at Rome are rather beyond the scope of this account, one or two of his remarks are worth citing as they bear upon some of the original assumptions of the TPAJAX plan. He said, "It was my people who have shown me that they were faithful to the monarchy and that two and a half years of false propaganda were not enough," and again, "My country didn't want the Communists and therefore has been faithful to me."

At Nicosia the earliest FBIS intercepts had not been

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translated and distributed until nearly mid-afternoon local time. As word passed from Leavitt to Darbyshire, the latter became so excited that he drove his friend right to his office outside of the town, something he and his associates had always avoided doing in earlier weeks.

Headquarters had its first word of what the day was to bring just before 0900 hours when someone burst in from the hall pouring out what at first seemed to be a bad joke--in view of the depression that still hung on from the day before--the news that Mossadeq was on the way out. Throughout the morning, the afternoon, and until late that night people hurried down the corridors with fresh slips of ticker tape. During the entire day only two TPAJAX cables were received from the station. However, it was a day that should never have ended for it carried with it such a sense of excitement, of satisfaction, and of jubilation that it is doubtful whether any other can come up to it. Our trump card had prevailed and the Shah was victorious.

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IX. REPORT TO LONDON

Roosevelt arrived in London the afternoon of 25 August. He had been smuggled out of Tehran in Naval Attache Eric Pollard's plane and picked up by a Military Air Transport Service (MATS) plane (the pilot and crew of which were not aware of his identity) at Bahrein. In London Roosevelt was met by Firth and taken to see Maj. General J. Alexander Sinclair and others in SIS that evening. From the very beginning it was made plain to him that SIS was grateful not only because of the success of the operation per se, but because of the effect its success had already had and would continue to have upon SIS's reputation and relations with its superiors. In turn he expressed gratitude for the fine support the station had received and recognition of the fact that such weaknesses as had existed in the support given us were attributable to the paucity of reporting from Tehran, which had resulted in a justifiable lack of hope both in London and Washington. Roosevelt went to some pains to explain the reason for the lack of reporting. He pointed out that if they had simply reported what they were doing, London and Washington would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop immediately; if they had reported the reasons why they felt justified in taking such action

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they would have had no time to take action; accordingly, they followed the third course which was to act, and report practically nothing. This decision was initially made on the assumption that they had very little more to lose by following up the last hopes, and everything to win. As the hours passed, evidence that the action had great hopes of success increased rapidly, but they still had no time or energy to prepare and present the evidence. Sinclair and members of his staff said that they fully understood the situation and were glad that Roosevelt had taken what was in their opinion the best and most constructive decision. We all recognized, however, that if the outcome had been different, a substantially different attitude toward that action might have been found in many quarters. Sinclair commented that it was recognition of the probability that such grave decisions would have to be taken speedily and could only be taken in the field that had led him to request the appointment of a combined theatre commander. He also requested that in Roosevelt's briefing of senior members of the British Foreign Office he should emphasize this aspect of the story. The following days Roosevelt did so, and, without exception, from Churchill through Lord Salisbury all down the line, the decision taken in Tehran was enthusiastically endorsed. (Sir Winston

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made reference to Lord Nelson's blind eye.)

On 26 August Roosevelt was shepherded through a round of appointments at the Foreign Office by the Foreign Office representative attached to SIS. He first saw Sir (Reginald) James Bowker (Byroade's British opposite number--responsible for NEA) and two members of his staff, and gave them an account of developments and the psychological climate in Iran, without giving much in the way of operational detail. He got the impression that SIS was glad to take advantage of any opportunity of selling themselves to this level of the Foreign Office. It appeared that their relationships, at least in this area, were neither close nor cordial at this level. Later in the morning he spent an hour alone with the Acting Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury. As requested by Sinclair, Roosevelt gave Lord Salisbury the full treatment, and he appeared to be absolutely fascinated. His attitude seemed to be very much more flexible and progressive than that of Bowker. He seemed genuinely anxious to help the new Iranian Government and very conscious of the problems which the relations with the United Kingdom presented to that government. He recognized the importance of immediate short-term economic aid which would produce quick and obvious results, but remarked that perhaps long-range aid could be worked out with an "oil settlement in mind."

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Roosevelt reported fully to Salisbury, as he had to Bowker, on the assurances which he had given on behalf of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) to the Shah and Zahedi. Salisbury assured him, as did everyone else, that these statements were justified and properly presented, that the British fully appreciated the necessity of reaching agreement on an oil settlement with the Iran Government as rapidly as possible, and that they were fully prepared to do so.

At 1400 hours Roosevelt was received by the Prime Minister who was in bed at 10 Downing Street. This was a most touching occasion. The Prime Minister seemed to be in bad shape physically. He had great difficulty in hearing; occasional difficulty in articulating; and apparent difficulty in seeing to his left. In spite of this he could not have been more kind personally nor more enthusiastic about the operation. He was good enough to express envy of Roosevelt's role and a wish that he had been "some years" younger and might have served under his command. He repeated the statement that he had already made to Sinclair, that if the success of this operation could be maintained it would be the finest operation since the end of the war. He emphasized his strong feeling that everything possible to help the new government should be

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done. Economic aid to Iran should not wait either for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the British or for an oil settlement. He went so far as to proclaim that if it were necessary he, himself, would provide economic aid to Iran before the restoration of diplomatic relations, although he did not explain how this might be accomplished. He commented that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) had really "fouled things up" in the past few years and that he was determined that they should not be allowed to foul things up any further. Our operation had given us a wonderful and unexpected opportunity which might change the whole picture in the Middle East. In closing he asked Roosevelt to tell the President that he was feeling much better and could "hang on as long as may be necessary." He also asked that Roosevelt write to him after his meeting with the President, and that he keep in touch with him in the future.

The Prime Minister made several references which indicated that he regarded SIS as his service, and that it was very close to his heart. Perhaps due to his physical condition at the time, however, he appeared a bit hazy as to its jurisdiction and the distinction between MI-5 and MI-6. He was definitely hazy on Sinclair and upon the American setup. The initials CIA meant nothing

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to him, but he had a vague idea that Roosevelt must be connected in some way with his old friend Bedell Smith.

At the outset Sinclair had said that he thought it might make a better impression if neither he nor any member of his service were present during Roosevelt's reports to other members of HMG, and although he knew that Roosevelt was to see the Prime Minister and the Acting Foreign Secretary, he suggested only one exception to this procedure. He asked if Roosevelt would have any objection to his sitting in on the discussions with Sir William Strang, the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He explained that Strang was the source of his political guidance and such authorizations as were required from the Foreign Office, and said that he was anxious to see the impact of certain portions of this briefing upon Strang. In the course of the conversation it became apparent that the portion of particular interest to Sinclair was the reason why the station had not reported more fully from Tehran between 15 and 19 August. Sinclair is not a demonstrative person, but there was a definite glow emanating from him when Strang with apparent heartiness responded to the explanations, remarking that Roosevelt had done the only possible thing and that in matters of that sort decisions could only be made on the spot. As they came out of

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Strang's office, one of Sinclair's staff came up to him in great glee with a folder covered with red ribbons, sealing wax, and other objets d'art. Sinclair told Roosevelt that this represented approval of a project on which they had previously been turned down by the Foreign Office and that this reversal of the Foreign Office was due to the success in Iran.

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X. WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERATION *

Two elements lending support to the operation seemed unable to meet the sudden demand for utmost speed and accomplishment. These were Communications and the Psychological Warfare (PW) Senior Staff. Many individual communications officers--at Headquarters, Nicosia, and Tehran--worked many extra hours and displayed commendable zeal and initiative in dealing with a great volume of traffic. Between 14 May and 1 September a total of 990 TPAJAX messages entered or left Headquarters. The unsatisfactory phase of communications was the three-way link between Headquarters, Nicosia, and Tehran by which MECA facilities were made available for almost simultaneous transmission from any one of the three stations named to the other two. Until near the end of the period of the operation, there was considerable delay in Tehran messages destined for Nicosia and for those in the opposite direction. It may also be suggested that transmission time was not as rapid as had been hoped. Very few "operational immediate" messages were originated by any of the three stations, but when Tehran sent such a message it took from three to four hours to get to Headquarters measured from the time the enciphered message was filed for transmission until the deciphered

*For a military critique of the operation, see Appendix E.

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message reached the branch desk.

In July support was sought from the PW Staff. Both the branch and higher levels were anxious to have certain items, including the texts of news articles, commentaries and editorials, appear in papers in this country. The texts themselves were prepared by NE/4 Branch on themes agreed upon by Headquarters and the station. It was planned to cable summaries of such planted material to the station for distribution to the friendly local press and, hence, to backstop the active propaganda campaign against Mossadeq. This support was not forthcoming. It appeared to the branch as if the staff lacked contacts capable of placing material so that the American publisher was unwitting as to its source, as well as being able to see that no changes in theme or emphasis were made. In contrast to this relatively ineffective venture, the Iran desk of the State Department was able to place a CIA study in Newsweek, using the normal channel of desk officer to journalist. Recognizing the fact that the Agency is not able to employ such a channel as just described, it does appear that some improvement of capabilities might be desirable. Either those contacts used to secure the unwitting publication of material should be expanded and improved, or else there should be a provision made for

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passing material directly to cleared editors and owners of press media.

Throughout the course of the operation, members of the Agency were in touch with members of SIS in Washington, Nicosia, London, and--incidentally--Cairo. In all but one of these places, we were on their home ground and, hence, in a position to penetrate their organization, particularly with regard to building up personal histories of its personnel. The apparent fact that this organization was quite ready to act as the junior partner in this operation has been covered in an earlier paragraph, as has the indication that individual SIS officers made a definite effort to win the friendship and confidence of their contacts. The existence of friction between SIS headquarters and the station at Nicosia was also of interest to us. However, of greatest interest from an operational point of view was the very limited number of personnel engaged in Middle East operations. At Nicosia there were only two officers and two typists to deal both with Iran and with several other countries of the Middle East. At London headquarters no individual was exclusively concerned with Iran, and the one specialist in the field appeared to be spread out over the Middle and Far East. This shortage of personnel was directly reflected in a number of ways

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which seemed quite surprising at first glance. An example of this is the fact that the representative in Washington had to spend a good part of his time in enciphering and deciphering. The character of this limited personnel was also of interest for we were informed that all the old colonial hands and all the veterans of the India Office had been dispensed with. Certainly the two Nicosia officers who were dealing with the Agency were both young and had a very sound foundation. The one in charge has had six years in the country and is extremely fluent in the language, while the younger, still a probationer, also knows the language well.

Other lessons learned from the operation relate to Headquarters and station capacities for planning, and to the capabilities of the local agents to execute general and specific directives. First, we may make a brief critique of Headquarters planning.

As had been pointed out in some detail in earlier pages, the operational plan grew directly from a series of basic assumptions, established by CIA in collaboration with SIS. In briefest review, the principal assumptions were:

1. The Shah could be persuaded to take desired action if all-out pressure were applied.
2. Assurance that the Shah was behind him would

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both cause Zahedi to act and would win him the support of many officers in key positions.

3. Forced with a choice between following the orders of the Shah and those of Mossadeq, the rank and file of the army and its officers would obey the Shah.

These assumptions, whether presented as such within the operational plan, or discussed in some unwitting survey of the current situation, were challenged. The American Ambassador and the State Department desk officer for Iran, as well as the Chief of GTI office at State, insisted that assumption number one above was completely unsound. Ambassador Henderson stated that the premise that the Shah would cooperate actively was fallacious.

The station at one point expressed a similar opinion in these words: "it (is) unrealistic (to) expect Shah (to) sponsor a coup supported by army." The Office of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, in a special study, dated 29 July 1953 and entitled "Estimate of the likelihood and possible consequences of Mossadeq's removal as Prime Minister," indicated a positive belief that the opposition to Mossadeq was weak, lacked a plan, and was composed of heterogeneous elements incapable of unified action. How was it that the Headquarters planners could

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be so at odds with every other well informed opinion? This was because the plan had of necessity to avoid acceptance of the status quo and could take a bolder stand because it was based upon the principle of strong, positive action to make the assumptions come true. It should be noted that during the conversations at Beirut and in the later exchange of messages, representatives of the field station accepted the assumptions to which they had objected earlier. Thus, as the time for action approached, complete harmony prevailed.

Not only did the basic assumptions stand their test, but other factors of the plan which had been determined by a detailed estimate of the psychology of the Persians, as discussed at Nicosia and Beirut, worked out about as anticipated. Specifically, it had been realized that not all the Persians involved in the plan would take the action required of them, that even those who took it might not follow through exactly as required and, therefore, that the operational aspect of the plan called for repetitive efforts on the targets. This analysis was correct. That the initial military aspect went astray may be charged directly to the Persians who at the very end refused to continue to accept the guidance which the station felt was so essential.

With regard to the fact that the military aspect of

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the plan was balanced, or complemented, by action designed to result in publicly expressed hostility to the government of Mossadeq, it was in this field that those in charge of executing the plan had to deviate the most from its details. The plan placed emphasis upon a program for a massive bast, or political sanctuary movement, against the government; but it was found impossible to bring this into being because of the dissolution of the Majlis and because the most influential religious leaders were not willing to make the commitments required of them. This unwillingness of the leaders had been foreseen by the planners, but they had been assured by the principal agents of SIS that these leaders would take whatever action was required of them. Failing in this respect, public hostility was fanned in a number of other ways, some suggested by the station to its agents and others thought up by agents. This activity has been covered in the earlier pages dealing with events in Tehran, and here it is necessary to repeat only one conclusion concerning what was learned during the operation as to the influence of the press in Iran. It must be admitted that in the years and months of working with a subsidized press and its venal (or patriotic) journalists in Tehran, the station was still not sure whether it was achieving results comparable to the sums so spent. In July

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and early August every segment of the press with which we or the United Kingdom had working relations went all out against Mossadeq. As judged by the public reactions on the days following 16 August, there can be no doubt whatsoever that this campaign had reached a very large audience and had directly influenced their thinking in a most positive way. A separate analysis of this press operation should be made to serve as basic guidance in mounting future campaigns.

The operation was a time of testing for the US principal agents and for those of the station agents who were committed to the effort. All these agents did a superb job. It is easy to say that they did such a good job because they were not merely carrying out orders but were heart and soul in favor of the operation. This is true, but the fact must not be overlooked that in recruiting these individuals over a considerable period of time the station wittingly selected people whose basic ideologies were in accord with US policy toward Iran and the USSR. This factor should not be overlooked in future recruitment in Iran. A word should be said about the fact that the high caliber of the agents was reflected in their performances. In one of the most critical periods station principal agents [REDACTED] were out of touch with the station, but on their own initiative took actions

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of just the type the station would have assigned to them.

The performance of the indigenous agents is just one factor in the demonstration of the values received from long-term station planning. Another such factor of real importance was the capability of the station to produce indigenous documents on short order, documents which stood serious scrutiny shortly after they had been manufactured. This program had been long under development.

The operation did reveal a need for the development of other long-term assets. Important in this field is the procurement of safehouses, at least two of which should be kept completely uncontaminated until time of real emergency. While the executors of the plan made brilliant use of the grounds of the Embassy and of houses occupied by US personnel, this effort could have been nullified by a careful watch of the Embassy by agents of the government.

Among the other long-term assets which the station feels should be developed are independent printing and reproduction facilities. The station believes that these facilities should be within the Embassy. This matter is now under discussion as it would appear that the movement of supplies into the Embassy and the removal of the finished products for distribution would create a serious security problem.

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The major role in the execution of the operational plan was assumed by US assets. This does not mean, however, that the operation could have been carried through without the active cooperation of the United Kingdom and their assets. For one thing, it would have been impossible to get the Shah to move had he not been finally convinced that both the US and the UK were ready to support him. For another, had not the UK assets been cut in on the operation, they would either have exposed whatever they learned about it to the government or tried actively to see that it failed. The lesson here is clear. As in the larger world picture, US-UK interests and activities must be coordinated. A great deal is to be gained by direct coordination in special fields of activity once both parties have recognized that their aims are really identical.

A final subject of interest concerns the security problem connected with such an operation. From the moment the project got underway, the NEA Division made a serious effort to put special security measures into effect; within the NEA Division and even within the NE/4 Branch the rule of "need to know" came into effect. However, by the time the operation had been concluded, a considerable number of people--British and Americans--were aware of what was going on. From the viewpoint of NE/4 Branch,

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which has listed all the individuals whom it knows were aware of the project and its purpose, the number was excessive--it totaled 89. How many others were told by people without the NE/4 Branch being aware of this, there is no way of knowing. It is true that the knowledge that there was direct US-UK collaboration on the project was kept to a more restricted number. It is, however, suggested that in the future when an operation of similar magnitude and sensitivity is contemplated a special security officer be brought into the operation at its inception and be given the responsibility for keeping track of exactly who knows what about the project.

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APPENDIX A

Initial Operational Plan for TPAJAX
as Cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters
on 1 June 1953

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SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY PLAN PREPARED BY
SIS AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES IN CYPRUS

I. Preliminary Action

A. Interim Financing of Opposition

1. CIA will supply \$35,000 to Zahedi.
2. SIS will supply \$25,000 to Zahedi.
3. SIS indigenous channels Iran will be used to supply above funds to Zahedi.
4. CIA will attempt subsidize key military leaders if this necessary.

B. Acquisition Shah Cooperation

1. Stage 1: Convince the Shah that UK and US have joint aim and remove pathological fear of British intrigues against him.
 - a. Ambassador Henderson call on the Shah to assure him of US-UK common aid and British supporting him not Mossadeq.
 - b. Henderson to say to the Shah that special US representative will soon be introduced to him for presentation joint US-UK plan.
2. Stage 2: Special US representative will visit the Shah and present following:

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a. Presentation to the Shah

- (1) Both governments consider oil question secondary.
- (2) Major issue is to maintain independence Iran and keep from the Soviet orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be removed.
- (3) Present dynasty best bulwark national sovereignty.
- (4) While Mossadeq in power no aid for Iran from United States.
- (5) Mossadeq must go.
- (6) US-UK financial aid will be forthcoming to successor government.
- (7) Acceptable oil settlement will be offered but successor government will not be rushed into it.

b. Demands on the Shah

- (1) You must take leadership in overthrow Mossadeq.
- (2) If not, you bear responsibility for collapse of country.

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- (3) If not, Shah's dynasty will fall
and US-UK backing of you will cease.
- (4) Who do you want to head successor
government? (Try and maneuver Shah
into naming Zahedi.)
- (5) Warning not to discuss approach.
- (6) Plan of operation with Zahedi will
be discussed with you.

II. Arrangement with Zahedi

- A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform
Zahedi he chosen to head successor government
with US-UK support.
- B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable
for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in
office.
 - 1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi
Prime Minister by royal firman.
 - 2. Military coup.

Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If success-
ful at least part of machinery for military coup
will be brought into action. If it fails, mili-
tary coup will follow in matter of hours.

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III. Relations with Majlis

Important for quasi-legal effort. To prepare for such effort deputies must be purchased.

- A. Basic aim is to secure 41 votes against Mossadeq and assure quorum for quasi-legal move by being able to depend on 53 deputies in Majlis. (SIS considers 20 deputies now not controlled must be purchased.)
- B. Approach to deputies to be done by SIS indigenous agent group. CIA will backstop where necessary by pressures on Majlis deputies and will provide part of the funds.

IV. Relations with Religious Leaders

Religious leaders should:

- A. Spread word of their disapproval Mossadeq.
- B. As required, stage political demonstrations under religious cover.
- C. Reinforce backbone of the Shah.
- D. Make strong assurances over radio and in mosques after coup that new government faithful Moslem principles.

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Possibly as quid pro quo prominent cleric Borujerdi would be offered ministry without portfolio or consider implementing neglected article constitution providing body five ✓ mullas (religious leaders) to pass on orthodoxy of legislation.

E.

should be encouraged to threaten direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies.

V. Relations with Bazaar

Bazaar contacts to be used to spread anti-government rumors and possibly close bazaar as anti-government expression.

VI. Tudeh

Zahedi must expect violent reaction from Tudeh and be prepared to meet with superior violence.

- A. Arrest at least 100 Party and Front Group leaders
- B. Seal off South Tehran to prevent influx Tudeh demonstrations.

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- C. Via black leaflets direct Tudeh members not to take any action.

VII. Press and Propaganda Program

- A. Prior coup intensify anti-Mossadeq propaganda.
- B. Zahedi should quickly appoint effective chief of government press and propaganda who will:
1. Brief all foreign correspondents.
 2. Release advance prepared US and UK official statements.
 3. Make maximum use Radio Tehran.

VIII. Relations with Tribes

- A. Coup will provoke no action from Bakhtiari, Lurs, Kurds, Baluchi, Zolfaghari, Mamassani, Boer Ahmadi, and Khamseh tribal groups.
- B. Major problem is neutralization of Qashqa'i tribal leaders.

IX. Mechanics of Quasi-Legal Overthrow

- A. At this moment the view with most favor is the so-called _____ plan" - whereby mass demonstrators seek religious refuge

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in Majlis grounds. Elements available to religious leaders would be joined by those supplied by bazaar merchants, up to 4,000 supplied by SIS controlled group, and additional elements supplied through CIA.

B. Would be widely publicized that this refuge movement on basis two grounds popular dissatisfaction with Mossadeq government as follows:

1. Ground one that Mossadeq government basically anti-religious as most clearly demonstrated ties between Mossadeq and Tudeh; and Mossadeq and USSR. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to all fabricated documents proving secret agreement between Mossadeq and Tudeh.
2. Ground two that Mossadeq is leading the country into complete economic collapse through his unsympathetic dictatorship. Just prior to movement CIA would give widest publicity to the evidence of illegally issued paper money. CIA might have capability to print masses excellent imitation currency which would be overprinted by this message.

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C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of the coup day. Immediately followed by effort have Majlis pass a motion to censure the government. This is to be followed by the dismissal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi as successor. If successful, the coup would be completed by early afternoon. Failing success, the coup would be mounted later that evening.

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APPENDIX B

"London" Draft
of the
TPAJAX Operational Plan

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"LONDON" DRAFT OF THE TPAJAX OPERATIONAL PLAN

I. INTRODUCTION

The policy of both the US and UK governments requires replacement of Mossadeq as the alternative to certain economic collapse in Iran and the eventual loss of the area to the Soviet orbit. Only through a planned and controlled replacement can the integrity and independence of the country be ensured.

General Zahedi is the only figure in Iran currently capable of heading a new government who could be relied upon to repress Soviet-Communist penetration and carry out basic reforms.

The plan which follows is comprised of three successive stages. The first two stages precede action of a military nature. They include the present preliminary support period and the mass propaganda campaign. (See paragraphs below.) These stages will be of real value to the mutual interests of US and UK even if final military action is not carried out in that they will make the position of Mossadeq increasingly vulnerable and unsteady.

The total estimated expenditure required to implement this plan will be the equivalent of \$285,000 of which \$147,500 will be provided by the US Service and \$137,500 by the UK Service.

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I. OPERATIONAL PLAN

A. Preliminary Support of Opposition to Mossadeq Government

For a period of several months both the US field station and the British group (the Rashidian brothers) have been in close touch with Zahedi. The British group has supplied the equivalent of \$50,000 (four to five million rials) for this support.

During this preliminary period beginning 1 June 1953, and for an estimated two months maximum thereafter, the United States will provide \$35,000 and the United Kingdom the equivalent of \$25,000. Initial payments under this allocation have already been made by the US field station.

British funds will continue to be paid through present channels for purposes as directed by the UK or by the US field station on UK behalf.

US funds are to be distributed through direct US field station contacts for the specific purpose of extending and strengthening military and political contacts of Zahedi.

Early in this period Zahedi will be made fully aware of this dual support and of the joint intention that it should lead to even more concrete support.

During this period the impression will continue to be given in the circle of Zahedi's contacts that the Shah

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is supporting him by the provision of funds.

The coordination of UK-US field station activity on the developing plan will be achieved through direct contact between US field personnel and the British group with the former acting on behalf of the United Kingdom by relaying instructions and acting as a secure communications link, to augment that already existing.

Appropriate steps will be taken to ensure that overt US policy will conform as closely as possible with the purpose of this plan.

B. Role of the Shah as Focal Point of Opposition

This plan is based on the assumption that the cooperation of the Shah will be obtained. Such cooperation will give a military coup the best chance of success. However, it also envisages the same type of operation through the involuntary involvement of the Shah in this plan.

To play his role the Shah requires special preparation. By nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears, he must be induced to play his role, and this role must require a minimum of affirmative action and cover as brief a period as possible.

We consider Princess Ashraf, his forceful and scheming twin sister, to be the person most likely to be able to

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induce the Shah to play his role. We are certain that Ashraf will eagerly cooperate to bring about the fall of Mossadeq. Therefore, Ashraf must be approached at her present location, briefed on the task and sent back to Iran. Contact will have to be maintained between Ashraf and the US field station.

The role of the Shah is to be played in three stages, and Ashraf will be preparing him in advance for each successive stage. The first stage will be to convince the Shah that the United States and the United Kingdom have a joint aim in Iran, and at the same time to remove his pathological fear of the "hidden UK hand"; the second stage will be to inform him in specific terms of what the immediate future holds for him. The third stage will be to obtain specific items from him. These stages are detailed below:

1. First Stage:

With prior advice from Princess Ashraf, the leader of the British group will visit the Shah to assure him that the United States and the United Kingdom have common aims towards Iran, and that both want to support him to the utmost in opposing Mossadeq. The leader of the British group will say that he is in a position to prove that the British are supporting the Shah and

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that he, the leader, is authorized to speak for the United Kingdom by stating that any key phrase selected by the Shah out of several proposed will be given on successive dates in the Persian language broadcasts over the BBC.

2. Second Stage:

With advance warning from Princess Ashraf, General Schwarzkopf (former head of the US Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie) is introduced as the US special representative. This representative is already well known to and admired by the Shah as a result of his successful tour of duty in Iran some years ago.

His remarks to the Shah will comprise two parts.

The first part covers the following points:

a. Both governments consider the oil issue of secondary importance at this time, since the major issue is the resolve of both governments to maintain the independence of Iran. Both governments are now determined to help the Iranians to help themselves to keep their country from falling into Soviet hands. If Mossadeq remains in power economic collapse is certain, and since Mossadeq is permitting extensive Communist penetration, the economic collapse would be followed by a Communist takeover of the country.

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b. Both governments feel that the continued existence of the Pahlavi dynasty should be the best bulwark of national sovereignty.

c. As long as Mossadeq is in power the country will get no new financial aid from the United States and indeed present aid may be slashed.

d. Mossadeq must go.

e. His successor will have the strong support of both governments through the same forces that bring him into power.

f. An acceptable oil settlement will be offered, but there is no intention of either rushing this issue or of forcing it on the country.

The second part will cover the following points:

a. The Shah is now, and inevitably will remain, the focal point of all forces opposing Mossadeq.

b. If the Shah fails to go along with these forces he will be solely responsible for the collapse of the country and its loss of independence.

c. If the Shah fails to go along his dynasty is bound to come to an end soon. In spite of the Shah's previous misconceptions, the United States and the United Kingdom have been and are supporting him, but if the Shah fails now, this support will be

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withdrawn. The representative will discuss the implications of this.

d. The Shah has stated that Zahedi is acceptable to him as a successor to Mossadeq. Furthermore, the Shah has asked that funds for Zahedi's support given by the United States and United Kingdom governments should be given out in his name.

e. The US and UK governments agree fully that Zahedi is the only effective candidate. Zahedi will be ready to take over in the near future, aided in every way to achieve success by the United States and United Kingdom. The Shah will be kept fully informed of Zahedi's plans and a minimum of action will be required from him. As soon as possible after the visit of the US representative to the Shah, the leader of the British group will make a visit of identical type to reinforce the above statements.

3. Third Stage:

This stage will be the sole responsibility of Princess Ashraf. Immediately following the visits as described above and while the Shah is still under their effects Princess Ashraf will obtain his signature on three documents. The first of these documents will be

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dated, the second and the third undated.

They will be:

- a. An open letter calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer of the letter in any efforts he feels are necessary to reestablish the prestige of the Army, to restore their own self respect and to show their devotion to the Shah and country.
- b. A royal decree naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff.
- c. A royal decree appealing to all ranks of the Army to carry out faithfully the orders of the Chief of Staff whom the Shah has named.

These documents will then be taken out of the palace at once; the first to be delivered to Zahedi and the other two to be held by the US station against time of need.

Following the effort required of him to produce these documents the Shah may be in a period of elation for some time. Sooner or later he will begin to brood and to doubt, and at this time he must be removed from the capital to make some kind of tour. Preferably he would make a religious retreat to the Meshed shrine. He would remain at this shrine until after Zahedi obtains control and would return to the capital only to give his official

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approval to the new Prime Minister.

C. Arrangement with Zahedi

Continuing contacts by US personnel and British agents with Zahedi or his representatives have helped to bring into increasingly clear focus the picture of his tentative plans and of those elements from which he expects support. This material and related intelligence reports have been used in the preparation of later paragraphs which follow under the subtitle "Organization to mount coup," with its supporting material in the annexes.

Following the phased contacts with the Shah as given above, both the United States and the United Kingdom will inform Zahedi directly that they have secured a firm commitment from the Shah on his behalf and that the time has come to move to a detailed plan of action.

General Zahedi will be given the letter signed by the Shah calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer. He will be instructed to recruit, with the aid of this letter, military aides. Zahedi will also be shown the US-UK proposal for action entitled "Organization to overthrow Mossadeq." It will be discussed with Zahedi who will have the opportunity to amend or modify this proposal should this be necessary to meet his desires and

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capabilities. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the plan provides for full US-UK coordinated covert support prior to the time of the coup. Every element of the potential opposition to Mossadeq will be mustered so that on coup day it may be possible to overthrow the Mossadeq government by legal means. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the future character and reputation of the successor government would be better if military action could be limited to assuring control of the city coincident with this legal success.

However, should the Shah fail to go along with the US representative or fail to produce the documents for General Zahedi, Zahedi would be informed that the United States and United Kingdom would be ready to go ahead without the Shah's active cooperation if Zahedi agrees. We would continue to make every effort to associate the Shah with the undertaking involuntarily and so hope to achieve the same result as if he had actively participated.

D. Organization to Mount Overthrow

The material which follows under this heading is that which is to be presented to Zahedi by the US field station for the purpose of discussion and modification.

Under the headings which follow, elements of existing

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or potential strength are assigned their specific roles. This approach omits any consideration of the strength of the pro-Mossadeq forces.

1. Organization to Mount Coup

a. Military secretariat. This secretariat, headed by an officer named by Zahedi but acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom will be composed of a very limited number of capable senior officers. This secretariat will be in contact with the US field station which will hand over a preliminary staff plan jointly prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom for securing Tehran. A sum equivalent to \$75,000 will be required for the military secretariat to carry out its functions.

b. Duties of the secretariat. Its most urgent duty will be the selection of key officers in Tehran who can be counted upon or won over for action against the Mossadeq government. For security reasons, such officers will be informed of their own actual role at the latest possible date.

This secretariat will make a detailed examination of the US and the UK staff plan with special attention to every action to be carried out on coup day. Some of these actions will be immediate seizure of general

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staff headquarters, army radio station, Radio Tehran, the houses of Mossadeq and his entourage, police and gendarmerie headquarters, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchange, the Majlis and its printing press, and the National Bank and its printing press. Arrests will include the key figures of the Mossadeq government, key army officers cooperating with Mossadeq, and selected newspaper editors.

Special attention will also be given to preparing measures to be taken against the Tudeh Party. Zahedi must expect a violent reaction from the Tudeh Party, and must be fully prepared to meet it with superior violence. There is no possibility of neutralizing the party until after the Mossadeq government has been replaced. However, there will be a breathing spell of several hours after the change of government, before the Tudeh Party will be able to get out on the streets in force. At the time of the coup at least 100 party and front group leaders and journalists must be arrested: these names will come from a list of approximately 80 such leaders recently prepared by the United Kingdom, plus US station additions, plus Zahedi's own additions. Control of the Tehran streets will prevent the massing of Tudeh or other mob elements. Mass distribution of

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black pamphlets, notionally issued by the Central Committee of the Party, will be made with the purpose of confusing Tudeh members and of preventing them from assembling in an effective manner. It may be possible for the United States to supply by air in advance stocks of tear gas, indelible ink, or other materials suitable for the control of mobs. Local air force planes may drop warnings to the public to stay off the streets or take the consequences.

c. Action on coup day. This action will follow basically similar lines although it may be carried out relative to as many as three different situations. These three situations are:

Situation A: The climax of a massive religious protest against the Mossadeq government which is followed immediately by military action.

Situation B: The moment when the Shah is being forced by Mossadeq to leave the country. This action by Mossadeq will have resulted from either the growing strength of the opposition as knowingly led by the Shah or because of its growing strength with the Shah as its involuntary figurehead.

Situation C: The moment when Mossadeq attempts to present his resignation. Such an action might result

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from his real concern over the growing strength of the opposition and might take the form, on past showing, of calling on the Shah for personal support. Failing to win the support of the Shah he might summon the mobs into the streets.

Action to be taken with regard to Situation A will be as follows:

At the climax of Situation A, Zahedi will assume office as Chief of the General Staff by a limited military action against the headquarters of the general staff. He will at once name the selected person as his deputy, and the arrests of Mossadeq and the others will be made at once. The Majlis will be called into session and the opposition will attempt to pass a vote of censure against Mossadeq, and will follow this with a vote of support for Zahedi. However, with or without the possession of a royal decree naming him as prime minister, Zahedi will take over the government and will execute the various requirements of coup day (see above). Once he has firmly established his control, he will have no trouble in obtaining the formal vote of support from the Majlis. Only then will the Shah return to Tehran.

Action to be taken with regard to Situations B and C will be as follows:

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The only change in plan will be the necessary advancement of the timetable for coup day to the day of actual crisis and the necessity of putting all the military aspects of the coup machinery into operation at once.

2. Organization to Create a Maximum Public Opposition to Mossadeq Prior to Coup

a. General Program. The purpose will be to create, extend, and enhance public hostility and distrust and fear of Mossadeq and his government. A sum equivalent to \$150,000 will be budgeted for this program. This will be a phased operation, with the phases as follows:

Phase 1. This is the current preliminary support stage wherein the receipt of US and UK funds permits Zahedi to win additional friends and to influence key people.

Phase 2. A massive propaganda campaign against Mossadeq and his government but with Mossadeq himself as the principal target. This will begin only a week or two before the climax of Situation A so as not to offer too much time for a sharp reaction by Mossadeq and so that the impact will not be dispersed by being long drawn out.

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Phase 3. This is Situation A which is described in full in a following paragraph.

b. Duties of Specific Elements

(1) Press and publicity. In the preliminary support period the British group will continue to use its numerous smaller papers to push an anti-Mossadeq line. At Headquarters and at the field station US personnel will draft and put into Persian the texts for articles, broadsheets and pamphlets, some pro-Shah and some anti-Mossadeq. The material designed to discredit Mossadeq will hammer the following themes:

(a) Mossadeq favors the Tudeh Party and the USSR. (This will be supported by black documents.)

(b) Mossadeq is an enemy of Islam since he associates with the Tudeh and advances their aims.

(c) Mossadeq is deliberately destroying the morale of the Army and its ability to maintain order.

(d) Mossadeq is deliberately fostering the growth of regional separatist elements through his removal of Army control over

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tribal areas. One of the aims of the removal of control by the Army is to make it easier for the Soviets to take over the Northern Provinces.

(e) Mossadeq is deliberately leading the country into economic collapse.

(f) Mossadeq has been corrupted by power to such an extent that no trace is left of the fine man of earlier years, and he now has all the repressive instincts of the dictator.

(g) Consistent with these themes will be the persistent slant that Mossadeq has been the unwitting victim of his unscrupulous, personally ambitious advisers.

It is considered essential that Zahedi make an early choice of the man who will be his director of press and propaganda and who may be deputy prime minister as well. The US field station will obtain from Zahedi the name of the man he has in mind who must be acceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom. One or two weeks before the date set for Situation A, the intensive propaganda effort will begin. The details relative

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to the execution of this campaign will be the primary responsibility of the US field station.

Immediately after the change of government, Zahedi's director of press and propaganda must be prepared to:

(a) Make maximum use of Radio Tehran.

(b) Through Radio Tehran, posters, special news sheets, etc. spread the program of the new government, including elements of broadcast appeal presented in simplest terms, such as immediate slashes in living costs, increased pay for government officials and Army personnel, etc.

(c) Give maximum local publicity to US and UK statements which will have been prepared in advance.

(d) Brief all foreign correspondents.

(2) The Majlis. If the Majlis is in session at the time of the coup, an effort will be made to have the change of government formalized. If it is not in session it will be called into session by one of its elected officers who will have to be a member of the anti-Mossadeq opposition.

To prepare for the change of government, a

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number of the deputies will be approached and purchased. It is yet to be decided whether the purchases are to be made by the British group or directly by Zahedi himself who, as long as he enjoys the sanctuary of the Majlis building, is in an excellent position to achieve such an aim. Following the receipt from one or both of the above elements of a list of deputies with the amounts required for the purchase of each one, a special funding operation will be established within the framework of the joint authorization for the execution of this plan. The US field station will also employ various agents and contacts to support this operation.

Its basic aim will be to secure a majority plus one vote against Mossadeq as required in Situation A. At the present time it is estimated that at least 30 deputies are prepared to vote against Mossadeq if they think there is a good chance that they will be in a majority. It is to be noted that all Majlis elected members would not normally be present at any one session. However, it will also be necessary to attempt to ensure that a quorum can be

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maintained in the Majlis at the moment when the anti-Mossadeq vote is to be taken. The minimum quorum requirement is that two-thirds of the deputies present in Tehran must be in the Chamber before a vote can be taken. Thus an effort will be made to purchase additional deputies solely to have them remain in the Chamber to ensure the quorum and not for the more sensitive role of voting against Mossadeq.

(3) Political elements other than the Tudeh.

Political parties or groups now opposed to Mossadeq will play only a very minor role in this campaign.

Such parties as the Toilers Party, the Sumka and sections of the Pan-Iranists could supply only limited and probably ineffectual street gangs.

The Toilers Party will, however, play a fairly important role in the publicity described above.

It is to be noted that while these parties command only ineffectual street gangs, the British group can muster up to approximately 3,000 street activists to be committed in Situation A.

(4) Religious leaders. It is our belief that nearly all the important religious leaders with large followings are firmly opposed to Mossadeq.

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Both the US field station and the British group have firm contacts with such leaders. The pro-Zahedi capabilities in this field are very great.

These leaders include such assorted and sometimes inimical elements as the non-political leaders and , as well as

and and his terrorist gang,

. During the period of intensive anti-Mossadeq publicity before coup day the leaders and their henchmen will:

(a) Spread word of their disapproval of Mossadeq.

(b) Give open support to the symbol of the throne and give moral backing to the Shah through direct contact with him at the shrine.

(c) As required, stage small pro-religious anti-Mossadeq demonstrations in widely scattered sections of Tehran.

(d) The terrorist group to threaten that they are ready to take direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies and members of Mossadeq's entourage and government.

(e) Ensure full participation of themselves

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and followers in Situation A.

(f) After the change of government, give the strongest assurances over Radio Tehran and in the mosques that the new government is faithful to religious principles.

(5) Bazaar Merchants. These are defined as a relatively small number of long established prominent merchants with a semi-religious outlook and with strong influence over the lower social orders in the bazaar section. Contacts with these merchants exist both through the British group and through the US field station.

These merchants are anti-Mossadeq because the government harms them directly through the stagnation of business, the cutting off of imports, the strenuous collection of taxes, and the general tightness of money.

In the period of intensive publicity preceding Situation A, these merchants will be used to:

(a) Spread anti-Government rumors in the bazaar.

(b) Stage limited protests in the south of Tehran against the economic policies of the

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Mossadeq government. Then, at the time of Situation A, they will:

(c) Close all or part of the bazaar.

c. Final Action Immediately Preceding the Coup.

As noted above, the military action can result from Situations A, B, or C. However, the pre-coup activities of the organization as described above will be primarily for the purpose of creating Situation A which is described below.

(1) On the appointed day, staged attacks will be made against respected religious leaders in Tehran.

(2) Other religious leaders will at once say that these attacks were ordered by Mossadeq as his reaction to the disfavor in which his government is held by the religious leaders of the entire country.

(3) A number of the more important leaders will at once take sanctuary in the Majlis grounds.

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(4) At this time, these religious leaders will release statements through their followers denouncing in the strongest terms the anti-religious attitude and behavior of Mossadeq.

(5) At the same time as 2.b.(4) (d) above, the fullest publicity will be given to the US station fabricated documents which prove and record in detail a secret agreement between Mossadeq and the Tudeh, with the latter promising to use all their force in support of Mossadeq and against the religious leaders, the Army, and the police.

(6) Simultaneously, these leaders will call on their followers to take sanctuary all over Tehran in mosques, telegraph and post offices, banks, etc. The British group and the US station will supply all the demonstrators they can to swell their ranks, and at the same time the merchants will attempt to close the bazaar. (This mass sanctuary is designed to interrupt all normal life and activity in the city and to illustrate dramatically the extent of popular dissatisfaction with the government. It is the local version of passive resistance

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and by long established tradition the military and police are unable to take action against people who take sanctuary.)

(7) In the presence of this increasingly hostile and abnormal atmosphere, Zahedi will take over as chief of staff and make those arrests which are an essential part of the military phase of the coup.

(8) Just after Zahedi moves, the Majlis will be called into session to formalize the change of government and complete the coup.

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II. ESTIMATE OF CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF OPERATIONAL PLAN

The preceding material represents a Western-type plan offered for execution by Orientals. However, it was drafted by authors with an intensive knowledge of the country and its people who endeavored to examine and evaluate all the details from the Iranian point of view. Given the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner, we would never expect such a plan to be re-studied and executed in the local atmosphere like a Western staff operation.

However, we feel that the plan is broad enough and sufficiently comprehensive to offer a reasonable chance of success even if not carried out 100 percent.

Security among all local elements involved is a serious weakness inherent in the Persian character. We must be aware of the fact that security breaches might lead to repressive measures by Mossadeq.

No precedent for this proposed operation exists in Iran in recent years. The Reza Shah coup was of an entirely different nature. Recent coups in other Near Eastern countries were far easier to carry out since they were not complicated by a large pro-Communist opposition or hampered by the presence of a head of government having

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powerful popular following.

Prior to an estimate of the chances of success, the following points in connection with the general concept of the coup are vital:

A. The failure of the coup would result in:

1. A strong tide of Government-directed hostility toward the United States and the possibility of the United States being expelled from Iran.

2. Loss to the United Kingdom only of operational machinery represented by the group which is intended mainly for the overthrow of Mossadeq.

B. Should the coup be attempted and fail, but the United States is not expelled from Iran and should Mossadeq then fall at a subsequent date, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would be in a position to take advantage of that opportunity since the British group and certain US assets may be destroyed by the failure of the coup.

C. If the coup is not undertaken, the United States still stands to be expelled from Iran as the certain economic collapse under the present Mossadeq government would probably be accompanied by internal chaos and a subsequent takeover by the Tudeh under USSR direction.

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D. If the coup plan is rejected at this time, then another plan should be prepared against the time of economic collapse and internal chaos.

Conclusion: Subject to the Shah's support, Zahedi's acceptance of the basic features of this plan, our approval of his modifications, and to our feeling certain that he will act according to an established timetable, the authors of this plan believe that the coup will succeed.

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V. ANNEXES

These proposed annexes are not included in this draft as they must be based upon a great mass of intelligence and information which is still being specifically collected for this purpose.

Annexes would include very detailed listing of all support available or probably available to Zahedi such as names and positions of Army officers backing him, critical examination of the position of the Majlis deputies, appraisal of size and cohesion of religious leaders supporting Zahedi, the proposed cabinet of Zahedi, etc.

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APPENDIX C

Foreign Office Memorandum
of 23 July 1953
from British Ambassador Makins
to
Assistant Under Secretary of State Smith

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"Her Majesty's Government have noted the State Department's views as got out in a report on the conversation between Mr. Byroade and Mr. Bealey on 7 July, and have much sympathy for them.

"The overriding consideration is that the whole question of compensation must be left to the impartial arbitration of an international tribunal. Furthermore the terms of any future arrangements must be such as not to appear to provide a reward for the tearing up of contractual obligations or to disturb the pattern of world oil prices. Subject to this Her Majesty's Government are prepared to go to the utmost to help...with the problem of presenting an agreement to the public locally. They are also convinced that the Company, who have not been consulted, will adopt a generous attitude as regards methods and duration of payments as regards any compensation awarded to them.

"The answers therefore to the specific questions raised in the report from Washington Embassy are as follows:

"(a) The United Kingdom can do without this oil, although it would be an advantage to have it flowing into its traditional markets [the UK] once more.

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Her Majesty's Government are, however, anxious to dispose of the dispute which poisons their relations with the country concerned and is a disturbing element in the area as a whole. They would therefore 'be ready to cooperate' with a new government in trying to reach an agreement, provided that the principles referred to in paragraph 2 above are safeguarded.

"(b) Her Majesty's Government take the wording of the plan to mean that the initiative would be left to the future Prime Minister both as to the priority of an oil agreement in relation to his general programme and as to the nature of it. They hope he would agree to look at the February proposals, and they would of course 'help him in regard to the presentation of the agreement.' If he had any alternative proposals, Her Majesty's Government would consider them with equal sympathy, subject always to the principles mentioned above being safeguarded."

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APPENDIX D

**Report on
Military Planning Aspect
of TPAJAX**

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Military Aspects Operation TPAJAX

In early summer 1953 Carroll was assigned the task of planning military aspects of TPAJAX. Several assumptions first had to be taken into account:

- A. Operation would be joint operation with SIS.
- B. Operation would rely heavily upon military willingness to fight for Shah.
- C. Armed forces in Iran under Mossadeq very strongly led by pro-Mossadeq officers.
- D. Operational assets within armed forces controlled by SIS or CIA were not at the outset capable of executing the military objectives of TPAJAX.

Planning Tasks which had to be accomplished:

- E. Detailed study of the leading military personalities in Iran.
- F. Detailed study of order of battle of the Iranian Army with emphasis on the Tehran garrison.
- G. Detailed military study of communications, supply dumps, ammunition depots, command structure Iranian armed forces, time and distance factors within Tehran and throughout Iran, including road and rail nets.
- H. Detailed study military assets possessed by SIS.
- I. Operational assets to be developed by CIA; almost no military assets were then under CIA control.

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George Carroll in Washington began a staff study preliminary to drafting a military plan. Persons who were particularly helpful in the preparation of this study were Jerome F. Begert, William Fowlkes, Jr., Eugene E. Cilsdorf, Elizabeth E. McNeill, Betty J. Caldwell, and Arthur W. Dubois. This group constituted a branch task force.

Throughout the summer cables were exchanged with the Tehran Station in an effort to procure the latest information on the order of battle of Iranian armed forces. The Iranian desk, G-2, Pentagon, was queried in an effort to obtain whatever information they could get which might help accomplish the above tasks. Information available in G-2 was almost non-existent. Biographical information on leading Army figures was extremely scanty. G-2 did not possess a tactical map showing the military situation in the city of Tehran. It must also be admitted that CIA too was unprepared for this type of operational plan and a heavy burden had to be laid upon the field at a time when the Tehran Station was already occupied with the opening phases of TPAJAX.

The primary difficulty in staff planning at this time was the fact that neither the field nor Headquarters possessed detailed information on military figures in Iran. CIA had heretofore never placed particular emphasis on

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that type of operational reporting, and we learned as the days went by how extremely important, indeed vital, that type of reporting is.

Throughout the month of June, the branch task force gradually was supplied information from the field which made it possible to begin thinking about the use of the forces within the Tehran garrison. The field reported that Tehran was garrisoned by five brigades, three infantry mountain brigades, and two armored brigades. In addition, four other military forces existed: the Gendarmerie, the police, the armed customs guard, and the forces under the military governor. It was also learned that the young Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Taghi Riahi, and his staff had been drawn primarily from members of the pro-Mossadeq Iran Party. It had to be assumed that the chief of staff and officers within all sections of his staff were under control of Mossadeq. It also had to be assumed that at least three out of five of the brigade commanders in Tehran were completely under General Riahi's control. These assumptions proved to be correct. SIS reported that Colonel [REDACTED] could be relied upon; this later turned out to be incorrect but for staff planning purposes in June it had to be assumed

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correct. It was disappointing to learn that Major General Zahedi, Prime Minister designate under TPAJAX, possessed almost no military assets. General Zahedi, therefore, could not be relied upon to execute his own staff plan.

In the early part of July, the branch task force was able to draw up a plan designed to neutralize the Tehran garrison and to isolate all other brigades in Iran. It appeared at that time that only a very small force could be relied upon by CIA, primarily the Third Mountain Brigade in Tehran. Therefore, our first staff plan was based upon the use of the Third Mountain Brigade for the capture and arrest of the officers assigned to the Chief of Staff, as well as the arrest and neutralization of all other forces in the city of Tehran.

Because of the fact that CIA did not possess any military assets capable at that time of helping TPAJAX, it was suggested that Station agent Colonel [REDACTED] be given special training. [REDACTED] was trained in a safe-house in Washington with the assistance of instructors from the training division. [REDACTED] had no idea what lay before him. He had never previously participated in any military action, although he had been superbly trained [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
before that had been the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Because of the extreme sensitivity of TPAJAX, [REDACTED] was given the lie detector test. In early July, [REDACTED] was directed to go to Tehran and to renew all of his old contacts within the Iranian Army.

In June, Carroll was assigned TDY to Cyprus to work with Donald Wilber, NEA Planning Officer, and SIS. Carroll concentrated on military planning aspects with SIS, and ascertained the extent to which SIS could control Iran military assets. Headquarters was extremely concerned because the plan assumed that the Shah would sign a firman dismissing Mossadeq without being certain that his Army officers and men were well organized enough to force Mossadeq from office in the event Mossadeq did not obey the firman, since CIA and SIS did not possess military assets capable of being organized into an effective fighting force and it was feared that the development of new military assets and their organization into a fighting force could not be accomplished in time.

SIS in Cyprus stated that it did have several important

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friends among the military, but the only officer among their friends then in a position to be of assistance to us was Colonel [REDACTED]. SIS agreed that our preliminary military plan must be based upon the assumption that Colonel [REDACTED] would cooperate. Military Planner Carroll doubted whether one brigade out of five would be sufficient to overthrow Mossadeq and stated frankly that our military plan must be viewed as extremely tentative; he also stated that he hoped upon arrival in Tehran to find other assets in addition to Colonel [REDACTED]. From the military point of view the discussions in Cyprus were extremely disappointing because they made it clear that we wanted to accomplish much but had very little with which to accomplish it. It also made it clear that Carroll and [REDACTED] should arrive in Tehran as soon as possible where the military plan would of necessity have to be completed.

On 15 July Carroll left for London where SIS studied the military plan for two days and approved it with little comment. They agreed that, if TPAJAX were to succeed, CIA must start from scratch and work quickly to find powerful friends among Iranian Army troop commanders. In London, Carroll with Major Keen and two other British Army officers on duty with SIS, went over two military plans which had been drawn by the branch task force.

Both of our military plans used the same arrest lists

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for military and civilian persons in Tehran. These lists were compiled as a result of a long study of pro-Mossadeq Iranians, and later proved to be at least 90 percent correct. The British approved the arrest lists after their CE expert and their biographical section had studied them. A third arrest list, the Tudeh Arrest List, was studied very carefully by SIS Tudeh Party experts and was approved without addition. It would seem that our appraisal of Iranians must have been based upon approximately the same information.

While these arrests lists were farmed out to SIS experts, Carroll sat down to study the two military plans with Major Keen and with the British Major. The first plan was based upon the assumption that [REDACTED] was a controlled British agent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After a detailed examination of the Target List for Neutralization In the City of Tehran (machine gun factory, Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Office of the Chief of Staff, etc.), SIS stated that the targets we had listed for neutralization were the correct ones and that we had assigned duties for components of the Third Mountain Brigade about as well as any other way they might suggest.

We next turned to an examination of our second military plan based upon the assumption that Carroll might be able to develop assets in Tehran capable of controlling three brigades. We all agreed that it would be extremely

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hazardous to base all of our hopes upon one brigade out of the five in Tehran and that, if possible, we should attempt to develop additional forces. SIS approved this plan and they then passed both plans up to a brigadier who returned them the next day without comment.

During these discussions a cable arrived in London via Cyprus from Tehran in which Tehran Station reported General Zahedi's "military assets." This message confirmed all of our fears. For some time the Station had been attempting to persuade General Zahedi to list his military assets and to indicate how he hoped to use them. At last General Zahedi reported. He claimed none of the five brigades in Tehran. His military plan assumed that he might be able to use the Imperial Guard, some troops from the Department of Army Transport, components from the Department of Police, and components of the Armed Customs Guard. He also hoped that Colonel [REDACTED] might be able to bring troops to Tehran from [REDACTED]. SIS asked Carroll to write for them an appreciation of Zahedi's plan. In that appraisal it was stated that he did not believe the Shah would sign a firman dismissing Mossadeq until Zahedi could indicate to him how Chief of Staff Riahi's control over the Tehran garrison could be broken; further, he felt that if TPAJAX were to succeed militarily

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assets must be developed within the five brigades in Tehran.

SIS agreed in London that military tasks should take the following priority:

1. Seizure and occupation of designated points.
2. Execution of arrest and detention lists.
3. Neutralization of pro-Mossadeq military forces in Tehran.
4. Neutralization of the city of Tehran.
5. Reinforcement of pro-Zahedi forces in Tehran by forces outside of the city.

These priorities were laid down because it was desired that communications be knocked out as soon as possible in order to prevent pro-Mossadeq forces and personnel from communicating with each other.

Carroll left London on the first available aircraft following these conferences, arrived in Tehran on 21 July, and got in touch with [REDACTED].

Sifting through [REDACTED] operational contact reports covering all of his important conversations in Tehran [REDACTED], two officers were noted as being of special promise. These were contact reports of conversations with Major General [REDACTED] and with Colonel [REDACTED], both of whom

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were old and good friends of [REDACTED]. These two officers reflected the fear of the Tudeh Party that was becoming general after the Tudeh showing of 21 July. Goiran, Goodwin, and Carroll agreed that it was imperative that Carroll meet as soon as possible with an officer appointed by Zahedi to work on our military scheme. Zahedi never did designate a military secretariat, and it was necessary for us to develop our own.

Because of General Zahedi's manifestly weak position among the military then on active duty, and because it became apparent that it would be necessary for CIA to seize the initiative and to furnish him with a military plan and military forces, the development of Colonel [REDACTED] was stepped up. [REDACTED] was directed to determine what assets Colonel [REDACTED] might be able to lead us to. Colonel [REDACTED] first offered a "Plan A" which called for a military coup d'etat without explaining how it was to be accomplished. Then [REDACTED] was pressed to persuade Colonel [REDACTED] to be more realistic, and on 30 July he received from Colonel [REDACTED] a plan which was more specific but still pitifully inadequate. Colonel [REDACTED] said he could execute arrests and target lists, neutralize military installations and non-cooperating forces within two hours; this was nonsense. The most important thing Colonel [REDACTED] reported was that he was in touch with three young colonels who might possess

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Important strength within the Tehran garrison. Colonel [REDACTED] also told [REDACTED] that General [REDACTED] lacked courage but would stiffen his back should the Shah appoint him chief of staff. Colonel [REDACTED] did not mention General Zahedi and did not seem to be in touch with him. [REDACTED] told Colonel [REDACTED] that he could put Colonel [REDACTED] in touch with one or two Americans whom he had met in the United States.

At this time the Shah also indicated that he did not have control of important military assets.

Carroll met [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on 2 and 3 August and began staff planning. Colonel [REDACTED] was full of desire to do something, but had no idea of how to go about it. He said that he had friends who could control the Second and Third Mountain Brigades but did not trust either Colonel [REDACTED] or Colonel Montaz, Commanding Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade. Colonel [REDACTED] reported that General [REDACTED] had told him the day before that if the Shah acted he was ready to perform any service whatsoever and to die for the Shah if necessary. After these early meetings with Colonel [REDACTED], it became apparent that he, himself, was not in a position to command anything and was only hoping that he might persuade his

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friends to do so.

Carroll then met directly with Colonel [redacted] and his friend. The latter turned out to be Colonel [redacted]. Colonel [redacted] reported a long list of assets within the Tehran garrison, principally among deputy commanders of brigades and regiments) commanders. On 6, 7, and 8 August, Colonels [redacted], and Mr. Carroll carried on staff planning based upon the units commanded by friends whom [redacted] claimed. Colonel [redacted] stated that his primary friends were [redacted], of the Tehran police; [redacted], of the Tehran Gendarmerie District; and [redacted]. He felt certain that ultimate victory would be ours through these friends, and through his friends who were regimental and battalion commanders, among whom were these important unit commanders in the Tehran garrison: [redacted]

Through these officers Colonel [redacted] was in touch with every infantry battalion commander in Tehran and with most of the company commanders; however,

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these officers had not been formed into an organization and were not ready to overthrow Chief of Staff General Riahi's firm control of the Tehran garrison which he exercised through the Brigade Commanders in Tehran. For instance, if we were to succeed we must arrest Colonel Sharokh, Commanding Officer First Armored Brigade; Colonel Parsa, Commanding Officer First Mountain Brigade; Colonel Montaz, Commanding Officer Second Mountain Brigade; and probably Colonel Ashrafi, Military Governor and Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade. Colonel Novzari, Commanding Officer of the Second Armored Brigade would probably remain neutral but we felt it imperative that his deputy, Lt. Colonel Bahrami, be arrested.

It therefore became clear from the military point of view that success might depend upon whether or not General Riahi succeeded in arresting our friends before we arrested his, and that the test of strength would very largely rest upon the amount of security we were able to maintain while attempting to knit all of our friends into a functioning team.

It also was clear that we had to devise a scheme capable of carrying on our operations in the event our first platoon of young officers was arrested. Carroll therefore worked for two nights with Colonel [REDACTED]

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devising a system which would work in the event our first team was arrested. The danger signal we adopted to alert battalion and company commanders to take independent action was the arrest of Colonel [REDACTED] and of his closest friends. The weakness in our plan lay in the fact that the station would not be in a position to contact battalion and company commanders but would have to depend upon Colonel [REDACTED] to do the job. While discussing this subject, Colonel [REDACTED] stated that he would be able to contact lower unit commanders within 48 hours after receipt of the Shah's firman.

The hesitation of the Shah in signing the firman worked to our advantage for it gave us several more important days in which to discuss with Colonel [REDACTED] the development of our final staff plan which was based upon the use of the units which his friends commanded. This problem was complicated by the fact that Colonel [REDACTED] became violently ill and was later forced to retire to his bed. As the climax approached, tension increased and it is not inconceivable that tension caused by fear had something to do with Colonel [REDACTED] illness. Colonel [REDACTED] did remain on his feet long enough to speak to the Shah on 9 August in an interview which later proved vital to the success of the military phase of TPAJAX. Until Colonel [REDACTED] saw the Shah, he was not

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certain that our friends in the Tehran garrison would act without the Shah's approval. However, after talking with the Shah, Colonel [REDACTED] was able to tell Colonel [REDACTED] that the Shah did desire military support in the event he should decide to sign the firman.

Colonel [REDACTED] was asked by the Shah whether or not the Army would back a firman dismissing Mossadeq. Colonel [REDACTED] told the Shah that he had been meeting with Carroll and that a reasonable staff plan was being prepared, one that assured victory if it were carried out properly. The Shah then asked [REDACTED] for the names of the officers who would cooperate, and Colonel [REDACTED] reported the same names which we had earlier submitted to the Shah through Asadollah Rashidian. He asked [REDACTED] to meet General Zahedi.

In reporting the substance of his audience with the Shah, Colonel [REDACTED] asked the station if the United States would support General Zahedi. He was told that it would. Colonel [REDACTED] also accepted General Zahedi. Both officers stated that they had not been in touch with General Zahedi for several months but believed him to be a very good leader.

During the nights of 11, 12 and 13 August, staff planning continued based upon the use of forty line commanders within the Tehran garrison. Colonel [REDACTED] met General

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Zahedi who agreed that General [REDACTED] might be chief of staff. General [REDACTED] expressed the desire to meet Carroll and to discuss plans with him, Farzanegan, Colonel [REDACTED], and Colonel [REDACTED]. This meeting was postponed until we felt our staff plan was complete enough for General [REDACTED] to act upon it.

On 11 August Zahedi asked [REDACTED] to have [REDACTED] come to see him. General Zahedi and [REDACTED] talked for three hours. [REDACTED] reported that General Zahedi was extremely appreciative of American assistance and asked [REDACTED] to act as a liaison officer between himself and the Americans for military purposes; he also asked him to become his officer in charge of the Military Bureau which had been meeting with Carroll during the last week.

On 12 August Farzanegan took General [REDACTED] to see Zahedi, and General [REDACTED] pledged General Zahedi all assistance. [REDACTED] also took Colonel [REDACTED] to see Zahedi and the latter reported to General Zahedi progress of military staff planning. In retrospect it would appear that under more favorable conditions we should have spent more time going over the staff plan with Zahedi and General [REDACTED], for it was at this moment that the military phase of TPAJAX passed into Zahedi's hands, although Zahedi did not know any of the young officers

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involved and General [REDACTED] knew only a few of them.

During the afternoon of 13 August, Carroll met with General [REDACTED] and the Military Secretariat composed of [REDACTED] Colonel [REDACTED] and Colonel [REDACTED].

The firmans were expected momentarily and much of the conversation revolved around the question of how long it would take Colonel [REDACTED] to contact our friendly forty line commanders. After a long discussion everyone agreed action should commence within 48 hours of the receipt of the firman. It was also agreed that Colonel [REDACTED] would deliver the firman to Mossadeq after he had sent the station a radio set attuned to Colonel [REDACTED] command net.

Colonel [REDACTED] flew to Ramsar with the unsigned firmans on 13 August.

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APPENDIX E

Military Critique

Lessons Learned from TPAJAX

re Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'Etat

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MILITARY CRITIQUE/TPAJAX

Lessons Learned from TPAJAX

Re: Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'etat

I. The Problem of Personnel Assessment

- A. If CIA desires to overthrow a hostile government by employing armed forces against that government, then CIA must identify friendly forces, make contact with them, and successfully employ them.
- B. The decision to attempt a military coup d'etat should only be made after it has been determined that potentially useful forces do exist. Distinction must be made in making this estimate of the situation between "grouseers" and "activists." When attempting to estimate potential assets, experience has shown that it is vital to have as detailed biographical information as possible on all military personnel whose presence might bear upon the problem, including possible enemies as well as friends.
- C. Biographical information cannot be collected in a short period of time. It must be reported on a basis of continuity and must include everything known about individual officers, no matter how trivial. Military

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attaches are the normal channels for these reports, but Military Advisory Assistance Groups, where present, are the best source of this type of information because they work and take recreation side by side with indigenous officers. It has been our experience that too little emphasis is being placed upon this requirement; too often the files of officers contain only short references to an officer's assignments, promotions, decorations, omitting all personalia which could indicate who an officer really is, what makes him tick, who his friends are, etc.

- D. Biographical files on CIA agents in the armed forces are more complete but often these agents are found in G-2 sections and other staffs, and not among troop commanders.
- E. Assuming that sufficient biographical information exists concerning military personnel and their motivations, our next task is to assess the character of each military person under review. The assessment of officers should be done with a clear appreciation of the traditions of the indigenous service in mind. For instance, the Army in Iran has a modern tradition of defeat. The Iranian officer is usually indecisive and covers his inferiority with bombast and chest beating. Therefore the location

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of leaders who are willing to lead and to die is a hazardous occupation. Perhaps the Shah is a good example of the "typical" Iranian officer; his weaknesses are reflected throughout his Officer Corps.

On the other hand, a true leader in the Army is worth his weight in gold for he truly will count for far more in Iran than in other countries where valor is traditional.

F. After personal assessment of officers has been completed, CIA will find good and bad officers within all factions or groups. Here political and patriotic motivations must be assessed as well as possible. The political milieu will underlay assessment of officers, and non-military operations (KUGOWN) might have to be prevailed upon to create conditions capable of intensifying or weakening motivations in such a way as to create potential assets which at the time of assessments do not yet exist.

G. Friendship toward "the free world," "the United States," "the United Nations," "white colonialism," and many other political motivations will be found in all countries. In Iran CIA found that officers were generally "pro-Shah," "pro-Mossadeq," or "fence-sitters." The intensity of individual political motivations was different in each

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case, and was often less important than personal motivations such as ambition, jealousy, young officers' resentments of old officers and vice versa. There is no tradition of military revolutions, but Reza Shah did seize control of the government by using military position as the springboard. Hence, the political motivation of officers and personal motivations within the political milieu have been and are factors to be considered in assessment of military personnel.

- H. Of equal importance in Iran was the assessment of the Commander-in-Chief, the Shah, who also is the head of State. From the military point of view, assessment had to be made of the Shah as Commander-in-Chief, including his depth of influence, command ability, and courage under fire. His use as a focal point or fusing point around which military persons and groups might rally also had to be assessed.

Without stating reasons, our assessment of his usefulness was positive in these fields:

1. Head of State to dismiss hostile government.
2. Commander-in-Chief as rallying symbol.

Our assessment was negative in these fields:

1. Commander-in-Chief as planner and participant in military action.

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- I. Turning from our assessment of the Shah, we concluded that the Shah as a symbol could be used to incite action on the part of important military personnel.
- J. Our assessments of individual military persons led us to the conclusion that Major General Zahedi was the best suited officer available to lead forces for the Shah against the hostile government for these reasons:

1. He was the only man in Iran openly bidding for the prime ministership.
2. He thus displayed unique courage in that action.
3. He had displayed courage in the past, for as a soldier of 25 years he had been made a Brigadier General in recognition of combat leadership against the Bolsheviks.
4. His life had been saved by an American doctor after four of Zahedi's ribs had been removed.
5. He was known to be pro-American and had permitted his son, Ardeshir, to study in the United States for six years. He was a senior Major General and had won the respect of many senior and junior officers.

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6. His negative qualifications were as follows:
- a. He had been out of the Army for several years and did not know young junior officers.
 - b. He was identified in some quarters as venal. His capacity for leading a coup d'etat was unknown; he had never distinguished himself as a staff officer, but primarily as a commander
 - c. Most of his friends were drawn from among the civilian population--few were Army officers.

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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1992, Table 1201.

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names of any of the Brigade Commanders in Tehran, and to our surprise, neither did the G-2 Section, Pentagon! Headquarters did not possess any idea of the order of battle in Iran nor did G-2, Pentagon. Before specific assessment of line commanders could be made, therefore, Tehran Station had to report to Headquarters military information which should have been collected by military attaches on a day-to-day basis.

- M. While assessment of individual officers was being made in Headquarters, the actual decision had been taken by the Department of State to do everything possible to turn out Mossadeq. This decision to proceed found us with no clear picture of the military situation in Iran, without even a list of officers and their assignments, and with no operational assets among those officers in command positions. It must be understood, therefore, that swifter movement was required in all phases of our military action to such an extent that assessments were made and decisions taken on a much less secure basis than would otherwise have been the case.
- N. Our assessment of Mossadeq's Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Taghi Riahi, was done with care. We studied him in the light of his total personal environment, including a study of the persons with whom he lived,

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the persons he had removed from office, the persons he appointed to office, persons he had gathered in his staff, the political persons with whom he associated. From the political point of view, there was no doubt that Mossadeq had chosen his chief of staff very well. (We felt certain that Riahi would follow Mossadeq in a showdown, and not the Shah.) But from the military point of view, Brigadier General Riahi had several weaknesses. We could not be sure, but we had good ground to hope that Riahi's lack of command and combat experience would prove important if a test of military strength could be brought about. We did not question his personal courage and integrity. We found that he was residing with three of the outstanding members of the pro-Mossadeq Iranian Party and that he actually had led a pro-Mossadeq faction within the Army. He and most of his staff had been French-trained and were very thorough in staff work and very green in the field.

- O. As the field began to report personalia concerning brigadier commanders, brigade deputy commanders, regimental and battalion commanders in Tehran and in other parts of Iran, we were able to assess the situation with much greater clarity. It became evident that it would be necessary to arrest or remove most of the brigade

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commanders and to develop operational assets, for the most part, beneath that echelon of command. This assessment later proved to be correct and saved us much time and kept us from harm--from the security point of view. Because of the all-pervading necessity of drum-tight security, we could see from the beginning the necessity for approaching and developing only those persons with whom we stood a very good chance of success.

- P. From all the above it can readily be seen that the possession of all-inclusive biographical information is vital to the success of any operation which includes large-scale use of military personnel. Failure can easily depend upon a mistake in the assessment of one officer and victory hinge upon it.

II. A. Military Intelligence as a Basis for Action Intended to Overthrow Hostile Governments:

1. A war map should be kept by paramilitary officers in each station where revolutionary action may be required. Maps should be assembled of every scale of possible use. The complete order of battle should be posted on a current basis. The supply situation as regards ammunition, gasoline and petrol, clothing and

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equipment, etc., must be watched very carefully. There may be no use sending a brigade into action against a hostile government when that brigade possesses only six rounds of ammunition per man.

2. Defensive measures taken by hostile governments should be watched very carefully. In Iran, Mossadeq's government assembled most of the motor transport into one motor pool; his government permitted only enough petrol for tanks to permit them to operate for one hour; the issuance of ammunition was reduced to an absolute minimum; and ammunition supply dumps were heavily reinforced (guarded). The signal code for the Iranian Army was changed only three weeks prior to the Mossadeq overthrow.

3. therefore, it is recommended that the following measures be taken:

At two critical moments, Chief of

Staff General Riahi assembled all officers in the Tehran garrison and made emotional appeals to their patriotism, equated by him with support for Mossadeq. Lists of officers' license plates on vehicles were called for by General Riahi, and in some cases officers were followed. Also, spot telephone checks were made to officers' homes

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in an attempt to learn which officers were spending their evenings away from their homes.

- B. It is also necessary to study all military installations which must be seized or protected. For that purpose it is necessary to have detailed drawings of important headquarters, of important communication centers, etc. In the beginning of TPAJAX we possessed none of this information, except for a few excellent sabotage studies made of civilian installations.
- C. In an action of this sort it must also be appreciated well in advance that key civilian personnel and civilian installations must be seized. It should be possible to call upon many sources of information for assessment of political figures, but the collection of information concerning physical characteristics of telephone offices, radio stations, airports, etc., is a matter that can greatly be assisted when collected under the guidance of a paramilitary officer who understands what he is looking for; that is not to say that an excellent intelligence officer could not do the same but his intelligence directives should be carefully drawn.
- D. Weather conditions may be absolutely vital to success and should be noted at least well in advance. Should fog exist, for instance, time and distance factors in

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Staff planning may be thrown off entirely. Rain and storms might do the same. The question of whether or not to begin action by daylight or at night is a vital decision, and it must be made on the ground. In places where curfews exist, conditions may be radically altered by that fact. In other locations the habits of the people may be of extremely important military significance; for instance, the siesta habit, including the closing of most of the shops in business areas, may be important. Also, the day in the week observed as the religious day should be studied for possible usefulness as well as important holidays. Days which neutralize or tend to neutralize opposition groups should be studied with care; for instance, training of military units in some locations is rotated and it might be found that a hostile unit will be sent out of the area of action on a day upon which it may be possible to act.

- E. Military information concerning G-1 sections may prove extremely useful. In some cases it is possible to arrange for the replacement or reassignment of officers who are in the wrong position from our point of view. The placing of the right man in the right spot at the right time is of course the most important factor in all military operations and should under no circumstances

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be overlooked in operations of this kind.

F. Actions which might be taken against you should be studied very carefully and you should receive well in advance notice of measures of this kind before they are actually effected. It will also be understood that G-2 sections may be used in various ways. The feeding by you of diversionary information concerning the existence of military cabals to G-2 sections may possibly be used in places where panic may result in the hostile camp. In Iran we were greatly assisted by the fact that many groups of officers were suspected of planning a coup. As tension increased, reports of this sort also increased. Although they served to alert the hostile government, they also served to smokescreen our activities and the activities of our friends. This whole matter is naturally a matter of study under local conditions, but our experience may be of some assistance in places where similar circumstances exist.

G. It may also be entirely possible that other military groups are being formed to combat the hostile government, and in that case we should know who they are and what they intend to do. It may be necessary to split some of these groups, or it may be necessary to fuse

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them with our forces. In both cases our action must be delicately taken on the basis of very good information. Provocation must be carefully watched for, and remedial steps planned for and taken in the event any of our friends nibbles at the bait.

- H. Information concerning our own friends is perhaps the most important field for collection. The appraisal of our own security situation on a continuous basis is a paramount consideration for current decision-making.

In Iran we developed and recruited young colonels after very quick assessment, fully understanding the risk we were taking; at the same time, we attempted to probe and to delve in an effort to find out as much about our new recruits as possible.

- I. If it is at all possible to develop secretly assets which can check upon the actions of our friends, it will be found extremely useful to have them, for it will be found that the military situation can become extremely fluid and it is absolutely vital to know who has been wounded, arrested, doubled, etc. Early warning of a security break should be provided for and a warning then established capable of reaching and warning other assets. This is particularly true during action phases.

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- J. Security controls may change from day to day and we should have information concerning that entire field. For instance, in the middle of an extremely fluid military situation it was necessary for one of our officers and for one of our principal agents to make hasty trips after curfew hours to cities eight and ten hours away from the capital. We were able to provide them with forged documents which proved absolutely necessary to the success of their missions.
- K. Information concerning the available radio and telegraphic nets is extremely important. In Iran there is an Air Force radio net, gendarmerie radio net, Army radio net, railroad net, and an oil company telegraphic net. The number and extent of telegraphic nets is often surprising in any country and they must be studied very carefully for obvious reasons. At one stage in operation TPAJAX we used the overt governmental telegraphic system, using simple phrases for operational meaning (over-writing). Telephone systems are easy means for both hostile and friendly forces to communicate with each other, and information should be gathered on the extent to which central tapping services exist and, if possible, targets under tap should be identified. In Iran it was known that the Tudoh Party had penetrated the governmental communication

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system and, despite that fact, we relied upon that system because at one point all other means of communication broke down. The insecurity of that practice was realized but had to be accepted under the circumstances. In the signal center in the office of the chief of staff, or the signal center used by the Army Chief of Staff, is the single most important communication base available to a hostile opposition. If this center cannot be penetrated it should be neutralized and alternate means of communications established for friendly forces.

- L. Information gathering can sometimes be of use during occasions in which it is necessary to fabricate "excuses for action." Good penetrations of the hostile government might possibly turn up actions taken by the hostile government which have not been revealed to the public. In attempting to recruit personnel to your cause, it will always be necessary to provoke them to action when their motivation is insufficient to cause them to act under their own steam.

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III. Military Planning as a Basis of Coup d'etat

- A. The science of military planning is too deep and well known to be covered in this paper. Needless to say, those officers who are responsible for military planning should have had qualified experience in the armed forces in preparation for this assignment.
- B. In addition to a background in military planning, officers should also be experienced in clandestine operations. The basis of a coup d'etat is security which permits us to exercise operational surprise. The basis of security is good operational tradecraft which can only come from experience.
- C. It may be assumed that a military bureau composed of indigenous officers will be available for specific local planning, either from within the target country or from without. This military bureau can operate only when it possesses current and complete military intelligence.
- D. The military bureau may be designated by the leader-to-be of the new friendly government or may be composed independently of the leader-designee. In either case, clandestine tradecraft is a vital necessity.
- E. Whether or not a CIA officer shall be exposed to this

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military bureau will depend upon the local situation.

In Iran we found it necessary to commit the CIA planner, who later found it necessary to participate in the operation itself on an equal basis with indigenous officers. It is obvious that this practice is an additional security risk which should be avoided if possible.

- F. Political arrest lists should be furnished the CIA military planner, and it is his job to designate forces to execute such lists. Military and civilian targets for neutralizing and seizure by friendly forces should be drawn up by the CIA military officer and the military bureau.
- G. If possible, a CIA radio net should be created specifically for the coup d'etat tying in our CIA field officer with the military bureau which in turn should be tied in to the headquarters and command units for friendly forces. Where this practice is not feasible, other means of communications should primarily be relied upon. But in all situations a primary and alternate means of communication among these elements should be created.
- H. Military planning should be based upon the principle that some elements within our friendly forces will be exposed, and that our operation must not collapse on that account. Therefore, danger signals should be

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included which automatically call for movement from one phase to the other depending upon who or what units have been exposed to the hostile government. In Iran there was good reason to believe that danger signals so noted prior to the change of government were instrumental in keeping alive an operation which, to an outsider, appeared to have failed.

- I. The possibility of civil war must be accepted by our military planners and measures taken within the plan for that eventuality. Such an eventuality might possibly include the necessity for establishing a safebase for the new friendly government. Possibilities and eventualities stemming from civil war can only be seen upon the analysis of each local situation, but they are not difficult to foresee and should certainly be planned for.
- J. The creation of safehouse bases for operational contacts must be planned for and executed well in advance of the commitment of our friendly forces. Several safehouses or safebases should be found in order to maintain contact with friendly elements in the event one or more of our safehouses are blown. In cases where CIA personnel are all stationed within an embassy the operational situation demands that safehouses and safebases be

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established. These safehouses should ideally include radio, independent telephone, or other means of communications, depending upon the local situation. In situations in which it is necessary to cache money, ammunition, arms, clothing, food, and documents, safehouses should be found with secure keepers capable of securing those items.

- K. Support items such as automobiles, taxicabs, and other vehicles should be procured and kept sterile well in advance of the operational situation.
- L. Compartmentation of persons and units who compose our friendly forces should be made wherever possible. In the event a part of our operation be exposed, it is vital that interrogation not disclose our entire assets.
- M. Members of the military bureau should under no circumstances actively participate in the operation because under interrogation they would be in a position to disclose too much.
- N. The military board should include both staff officers and line officers, and as many functional specialists as may be necessary under local conditions. A communications staff officer will be found very useful.
- O. Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be in the back of the minds of all CIA

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officers involved in this type of operation. Few, if any, operations are as explosive as this type. This fact makes it imperative that the best trained and experienced officers who can be found be assigned.

P. Military planning should include the possibilities of complete failure and, therefore, should include an evacuation scheme for CIA and indigenous personnel who might be exposed. Aircraft of American military attaches, evasion and escape nets, and other operational assets might have to be employed. If none of these assets exists then hiding places should be created in advance of the operation which are kept sterile throughout.

Q. Commitments to friendly persons should be kept well within our ability to make good. In Iran we did not rely upon bribery because we felt that those officers who would accept bribes would probably betray the operation in the event of extreme difficulty, i.e., torture. In Iran we did not spend one cent in the purchase of officers.

R. Forethought should also be given to the problem of care and keep of wives and families of friendly officers.

S. The possibility of using weapons of foreign make should be kept well in mind in cases where American arms are not indigenous to the local area.

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- T. As the first target for seizure in Iran, we designated communication centers. We felt it vitally necessary to prevent the hostile government and hostile forces from communicating with each other. We also felt that communication centers, including the telephone company, should be seized prior to the execution of the arrest list because we did not feel our friendly forces to be capable of executing all arrests at the same instant. Other local situations may, of course, change that picture.
- U. The possibility of catching hostile forces within camps or compounds should not be overlooked. In Iran all brigades were quartered in compounds which, in most cases, possessed only two exits.
- V. The possibility of using the command radio net of the local army should not be overlooked. However, warning and danger signals are usually a part of the Standard Operating Procedure of all armies, and extreme care should be taken that army radio operators chosen for this operation are secure.
- W. The possibility of action against mobs must be considered, including action against Communist paramilitary forces from factories, etc. Where this contingency exists it may be necessary to dispose friendly forces in such a

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way as to neutralize entire cities through the use of road blocks, strong points, traffic control, curfews, new documentation, etc.

X. Needless to say, a complete roster of officer assignments in the new army should be drawn well in advance in order that there be no confusion.

Y. Wherever possible it is much better to use the local army supply system than it is to create a new clandestine one. It also follows that it is much better to conduct the operation from within the country than it is to attempt a cross-border operation. It is also much easier to execute the operation when CIA officers are present than it is when CIA officers are outside the country. Deep cover personnel should be used in order to prevent severe blowback whenever it is possible to do so.

